When Arendt closed the first volume, she considered where in time and space the thinking ego exists. She explains that this was to set up similar discussions about the position of the Will. Many philosophers are critical of the concept of the Will, calling it an illusion. The Will functions similarly to the thinking ego: It takes things that are absent from the senses and makes them present. 

Arendt explains that what makes the Will so tricky for professional thinkers is that it is not taking things that exist in the apparent world, but rather is focused on things that do not exist, or that do not yet exist. She argues that the concept of Will is inherently synonymous with freedom and that it is innate to the human condition. The Greeks did not define Will because they saw time as cyclical, but philosophers do not think about time in the same way now. The future is uncertain and indeterminable rather than a return.

Arendt defines the modern age as the post-Greek world, which she considers to be the second most influential turning-point in philosophical history. The modern age introduced the idea of progress and an emphasis on the future. 

Although the modern age gave primacy to reason, at the end of the age philosophers began to turn toward Will as the primary mental activity because of its relationship with progress. Nietzsche, then, returned to the Greek’s conception of time and introduced the concept of eternal recurrence.

Arendt explains that there has been a strong historical disbelief of the Will. She considers the contributions of post-medieval philosophers who suggest that even though people are conscious and take action, this does not mean that they are free in their action. Arendt suggests that the reason philosophers doubt the Will is the concept of freedom itself. Willing requires a greater freedom than thinking, because willing involves a free act.

The problem of philosophers’ resistance to the idea of human freedom and free will is that they are correlating these concepts with power to begin something that is entirely new. They believe that no matter what a person may choose to do, that decision is predicated or caused by something else. Arendt argues that reality deludes philosophers into thinking that freedom is implausible.

Arendt opens this chapter by comparing how philosophers approach thinking versus the Will to how they approach the mind versus the body. Her comparison is a reminder that there is an intrinsic relationship between the outer and inner realms. Even though thinking and willing are entirely different modes of mental activity, they are connected. The clash between thinking and willing occurs because they cannot both occur at the same time. Where willing is about action, the thinking ego is about doing nothing.

Hegel is known for giving primacy to the future over the past. Arendt suggests that this may seem counterintuitive at first because Hegel is known for his work on history. However, Hegel says that whatever is happening in the present or the past has no meaning until humans reflect upon it. Arendt agrees with Hegel about the value of the future, and she argues that the Will lives in the realm of the future.