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Hannah ArendtA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Arendt asks what caused humans to realize they could look to the future through the Will. She points to Aristotle, who saw reason as the mediator that keeps humans from committing evil acts. However, Aristotle’s construction was based on inclination: Reason inclines humans to make the right choice. This is not the same thing as Will, according to Arendt, who believes Will requires freedom.
In Aristotle’s construction, humans are pulled continuously between desire and reason. The choices they make are ones which move them toward happiness; therefore, they may choose either desire or reason. Neither is inherently wrong so long as they move the individual toward happiness. Arendt argues that this does not speak to action, something that requires premeditated thought.
Paul was the first to introduce the idea of free will that became a foundational problem for philosophers. In his “Letter to the Romans,” Paul recognizes a conflict within himself. He wants to obey the law of God, but he still commits actions against the law: “I do not understand my own actions…for I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate” (65). In this statement, Paul conceptualizes the idea of the original sin, that humans are innately sinful. Paul suggests that the only thing that can save people is not their own Will, which is powerless to win this conflict, but through the salvation of Christ.
In Chapter 9, Arendt turns to Epictetus, a Greek Stoic philosopher. Epictetus and Paul have many similarities in their philosophies, including their study of the Will and the mind. Unlike Paul, Epictetus suggests that humans have both the will to obey or disobey rather than an inevitable predilection for sin. Epictetus believed that all people want to be happy and that it is the work of philosophy to help find a way toward happiness. He viewed the Will as both good and evil. Epictetus saw a retreat into the Will as a way to achieve happiness—to separate the self entirely from worldly matters.
Arendt is critical of this radical withdrawal from the world. She views the primacy of thought as a problematic temptation for many philosophers. However, she admires Epictetus for equating the Will with a pure form of freedom—a concept that she carries into her own philosophical work.
Arendt says that Augustine was the first Christian philosopher: While he was a Christian, his conversion was a philosophical conversion. Both Epictetus and Augustine saw the world as torn. While Epictetus believed that humans should overcome this division and master the Will, Augustine proposed that the inevitable conflict requires grace and forgiveness. Augustine’s starting point was the Stoic quest for happiness. Arendt explains that a priority of happiness marked Augustine’s era: “We find this pragmatic concern for private happiness throughout the Middle Ages; it underlies the hope for eternal salvation and the fear of eternal damnation and clarifies many otherwise abstruse speculations” (85). A focus on happiness centers the self and individual experience over plurality.
Arendt considers Augustine an original thinker. The free choice of the Will occurs frequently in Augustine’s works. At first, Augustine did not believe that humans should have access to free will because it would remove them from sin. Later, after reading Paul’s “Letter to the Romans,” Augustine determines that there are two sides to the Will: The carnal and the spiritual. Grace and forgiveness are the bridges that will repair the division between the two.
Arendt devotes the second part of her work to the question of the Will, a faculty she sees as essential to understanding how humans orient themselves toward the future. While Volume 1 on Thinking traced the inner dialogue of the self, Volume 2 on Willing pushes into new territory by examining how we act upon thought—or perhaps more fundamentally, what makes us able to choose between possible futures. Arendt’s exploration is both historical and genealogical, following the evolution of the concept of the Will from Aristotle through Augustine.
Arendt begins her treatment of the Will with Aristotle, whom she credits with articulating a precursor to the concept. Aristotle’s framework placed human beings in a constant pull between desire and reason. To choose well meant to incline toward reason and, through it, toward happiness. Arendt is critical of the lack of plurality in this ideology because it centers the self. For her, Will is precisely the experience of freedom, the act of being able to begin something new, not predetermined by desire, reason, or natural inclination. These expressions of freedom happen within The Plurality of Experiences and Responsibility, and their rightness or wrongness is determined by their position within the collective.
The question of freedom becomes more pressing in her treatment of the Apostle Paul. Unlike Aristotle’s balancing act between desire and reason, Paul presents the Will as fractured, internally divided against itself. Arendt embraces this division, but she challenges Paul’s insistence that thinking and even willing to do something is the same as enacting it. Epictetus offers an important counter to Paul with the radical assertion of the Will’s omnipotence. For Epictetus, the Will is both utterly free and sufficient for human happiness.
Arendt admires the boldness of Epictetus’s insistence on the freedom of the Will, yet she is sharply critical of its consequences. To sever the Will from the world is to deny the very conditions of plurality and The Primacy of Appearance: “The philosopher is no longer the thinker examining whatever may come his way but the man who has trained himself never to ‘turn to outward things,’ no matter where he happens to be” (75). Happiness, if it is only achieved through withdrawal into the Will, comes at the cost of engagement with others. It is with Augustine that Arendt locates the true beginning of philosophical treatments of the Will. Unlike Paul, who placed salvation outside the reach of human volition, Augustine grappled seriously with the inner conflict of the divided Will. He did not deny its weakness, but he refused to retreat.



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