Thomas Aquinas distinguished for the first time between intellect and will, giving primacy to the intellect. For Aquinas, intellect is concerned with universal truths, while Will seeks the good. The two faculties cannot be collapsed into one, yet intellect has priority because it orients the Will toward what is rationally necessary. Arendt finds this significant because it resonates with her own concern that evil arises when individuals break away from the whole of reality and give primacy to themselves. In this sense, The Moral Importance of Thinking is at stake. Thinking, like intellect, guards against the temptation to mistake partial perspectives for total truth. It disciplines the Will by recalling the larger whole.

Scotus, however, reversed Aquinas’s hierarchy by giving primacy to the Will. For Scotus, the Will is the faculty that makes freedom possible, while intellect serves it. Freedom depends on contingency—the fact that humans do not always know in advance what they will choose or what outcomes will follow. Arendt agrees with Scotus that radical Cartesian doubt, which attempts to rely only on reason and deny trust in others, is unsustainable. Human beings depend on a shared trust in testimony, tradition, and community. This insight underscores The Plurality of Experience and Responsibility: Freedom is not exercised in isolation but within a web of relationships where one’s choices impact others.

In contrasting Aquinas and Scotus, Arendt reveals the tension between reflection and action. For Aquinas, the danger lies in a Will untethered from truth; for Scotus, the danger lies in an intellect that stifles freedom. The fragile balance becomes meaningful in the shared world of appearance. The Primacy of Appearance is therefore central here: Neither intellect nor the Will has significance unless their operations emerge in the world where others can see, judge, and respond. Thinking without willing remains abstract; willing without thinking risks arbitrariness.