The Rape of Nanking

In examining the role played by Japan’s central political and military leadership in allowing and perpetuating the Rape of Nanking, the author highlights the great lengths the country went to in shaping a false narrative around the massacre. In fact, she suggests that had Japan spent as much time and effort instilling discipline in its soldiers as it did on producing propaganda, the massacre may have died down far sooner, saving tens of thousands of lives. Moreover, the author argues that efforts by the Japanese government to cover up the brutality of Nanking emboldened soldiers. She writes, “The behavior of the Japanese soldiers grew worse when they realized that their actions would not be observed by the world media” (153). Once again, the author makes a compelling argument that individuals across the entire Japanese military and government apparatus were not only complicit in the Nanking massacre but directly responsible for it.

While the expulsion of journalists from Nanking was certainly a blow to efforts to publicize the massacre, the author suggests that the missionaries left in the city were arguably better suited to capturing the barbarity on display than reporters. After all, the scene resembled nothing even the most hardened journalists had seen in warzones and was more akin to the apocalyptic visions and underworld imaginings of the Bible. The author writes, “Finally, the missionaries had an additional advantage the Japanese did not foresee: they had spent their entire lives contemplating the true meaning of hell” (154).

It is telling that the average American living at the same time as the Nanking massacre knows more about the event than an American living during the mid-1990s, when the author writes her book. For example, footage from the Nanking massacre appears in director Frank Capra’s military-commissioned documentary series Why We Fight, which screened in theaters all over the United States. This reality speaks to the effectiveness of postwar efforts taken by Japan, China, and even the United States to erase the Rape of Nanking from the historical record.

Once a puppet government of Chinese collaborators was established, the massacre finally abated. At this point, the book becomes an examination of the occupation tactics of the Japanese. While the unchecked brutality finally ended, a more slow-burning horror unfolded in Nanking. Instead of employing a shock-and-awe strategy of extermination, the Japanese occupiers used fear and desperation to keep the Chinese from retaliating. For example, the Japanese soldiers’ insistence that the rotting corpses remain in the street was a horrifying way to remind the Chinese of what would happen if they resisted, as if they could possibly forget the massacre of the past few weeks. The occupation also reflects the devious manner in which the Japanese used post hoc arguments to justify the massacre. For instance, the fact that so many Nanking residents became addicted to heroin and therefore turned to crime to support their habits was cited by Japan as a reason for invading the city in the first place.

Yet despite the miseries of occupation, it may surprise some readers that Nanking did not fall into the state of famine that killed up to 3 million in China during World War II. Japan even eventually allowed food shipments to Nanking to resume. An examination of the historical record, however, suggests that World War II-era famines in China—particularly those to the west of Nanking in the Henan province—were likely as much the result of actions taken by the Chinese as they were a consequence of Japanese terror. While historian Rana Mitter is largely sympathetic to Chiang with regard to his role in causing famine, he blames corrupt local authorities who failed to enforce grain quotas and used whatever food was available for private use. Given the disease and cannibalism that wrecked the Henan province in 1942 and 1943, it is appalling to think that the Nanking massacre and occupation could have been even worse.

Finally, the author depicts the war crimes trials held in both Nanking and Tokyo. She points out that while only a small number of war criminals were tried in Nanking, the trials “gave the local Chinese citizens a chance to air their grievances and participate in mass catharsis” (170). While justice is preferable to mere catharsis, the power of such airings of grievances cannot be dismissed. In this way, the trials are akin to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, created in 1995 to allow victims to confront the perpetrators of Apartheid-era crimes, even if no sentences were ultimately handed out.

The real outrage of the war crimes trials, according to the author, was the immunity granted by the United States to Emperor Hirohito, Asaka, and the rest of the Imperial family as part of the surrender agreement. In terms of Japanese war crimes, what Hirohito knew and when he knew it is the source of significant contention among historians. For the author’s part, she makes a compelling case that it is outlandish to believe these atrocities were committed without the emperor’s consent, even if he did not know their exact details. Unlike the Nazis, the Japanese destroyed any and all paper trails linking Japan’s political leaders to World War II-era war atrocities, leaving behind a series of blind spots for historians. Yet as the author points out, the earliest parts of the massacre were publicized by the Japanese themselves as sources of significant pride. One must assume that Hirohito didn’t read his own country’s top newspapers to believe he was unaware of the Nanking massacre. Hirohito’s awareness aside, however, the author states that perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of his escaping justice for Japanese war crimes was that it impeded the extent to which Japan took national responsibility for these atrocities. Quoting Hirohito biographer Herbert Bix, the author writes:

‘Many would find it difficult to believe that they had been accomplices in aggression and murder on a near-genocidal scale when the emperor whom they had served so loyally never had to bear responsibility for his own speech and actions’ (176).