The Rise of the Roman Empire

Polybius explores Roman commander Publius Cornelius Scipio’s strategic genius, revealed in his siege of New Carthage. The historian addresses earlier accounts of Scipio that color him as favored by fortune. He argues that Scipio’s success was due to his planning, organization, and logic. Scipio took advantage of an opportunistic moment: Carthaginian forces were scattered around Spain, leaving an opening for Scipio to advance his army into New Carthage. This would give him a central position and a store of weapons and wealth.

Scipio met with locals to learn about the city and to expose its secrets. The discovery of a shallow lagoon gave him an idea for a land and naval assault on New Carthage. His first attempt was unsuccessful, but this gave his enemies the sense that they were unbeatable. On his second attack, Scipio took advantage of low tide, scaling the city from a side that was unwatched by guards.

Polybius praises Scipio’s approach in the aftermath of his victory. He gave each soldier a fair share, released citizens, promised freedom to enslaved laborers, and recruited workers to join him. He then sent a letter out, declaring his victory and building his reputation. At news of his success, those who were reluctant to ally with Rome felt motivated to declare their allegiance.

Everyone awaited the arrival of Hasdrubal to arrive in Italy and join his brother Hannibal with the aim of reinforcing Carthaginian forces. The Romans were eager to stop the brothers’ reunion. Hasdrubal realized he had no time to develop a strong strategy against the advancing Roman army, so he positioned his military behind a line of elephants.

Roman commanders struggled to gain access to Hasdrubal. Terrain limited access from the sides, and the elephants were strong enough to trample both armies. The relentlessness of Roman troops at all available sides forced Hasdrubal into an impossible situation. He died in battle. Polybius pauses to pay tribute to Hasdrubal, whom he considers a courageous and dignified leader. He explains that the way Hasdrubal faced death is further evidence of the leader’s strength and character.

Rather than thinking only of what he would do if he won, Hasdrubal thought carefully about what he would do if he found himself in a position of loss: “These remarks may serve as a warning to all those who direct public affairs that they should neither betray the hopes of those who trust in them by recklessly exposing themselves to danger, nor by clinging to life when duty has shown them another path” (426). Hasdrubal solidified himself in the memory of his soldiers by fighting until the end. Polybius praises Hannibal’s leadership as well, but argues that the leader would have achieved more had he focused on conquering other parts of the world before taking on Rome.

The Roman army killed approximately 10,000 Carthaginians and Gauls in the battle against Hasdrubal. The word of their victory spread throughout Rome.

While Polybius alludes to criticism of the Sicilian historian Timaeus in previous sections, he devotes himself to his topic in Book 12. He opens his argument with a critique of Timaeus’s geographical writing, noting that the scholar relied heavily on outdated and biased myths about Africa as a barren landscape with few animals. Polybius emphasizes that Timaeus was a lazy and hypocritical historian who used secondhand rather than primary sources while judging others for doing the same. Timaeus’s writing about the colony of Locri in Italy made a false claim about nobility descending through a maternal line, and Polybius condemns this as a gross inaccuracy.

Polybius delineates between falsehoods that are intentional and unintentional, and he asserts that Timaeus was guilty of both. Polybius believes that it is the historian’s duty to adhere to the truth, even when the facts do not align with the historian’s personal perspective: “If writers make all their judgements according to the measure of their own anger and jealousy, we inevitably come to suspect their statements and to be on guard” (435). Polybius concludes that Timaeus deliberately misrepresented history to advance his own agenda, and that he relied on gossip rather than evidence.