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Trump wants desperately to pull out of “endless wars” in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The trouble is, the author writes, the president has no plan to address the aftermath of withdrawal, as key allies are left abandoned and terrorism is allowed to spread unchecked.
Before launching into Trump’s failed attempts to leave Syria and Afghanistan, Bolton describes a very telling phone conversation between Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regarding the release of Andrew Brunson, an evangelical preacher living in Turkey whom Erdogan arrested as a political dissident. At Erdogan’s urging, Trump instructs Pompeo and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin to interfere with a US investigation into Halkbank, a state-run Turkish bank with close ties to Erdogan and his family. In return, Erdogan may release Brunson. To Bolton, this reflects Trump’s willingness to obstruct justice for political purposes—after all, the release of an evangelical preacher from a majority Muslim nation would appeal greatly to his base. Because the case is being handled by the Southern District of New York, which enjoys a measure of autonomy from the federal government, the gambit falters. Yet this dynamic of viewing foreign policy through a strictly electoral lens emerges again before the book’s end.
Despite these tensions, Erdogan’s “bromance” with Trump remains intact. This has significant ramifications for US foreign policy in Syria. Turkey’s military involvement in Syria increases during Trump’s administration, particularly in the country’s northeast region which is currently under the control of the Syrian Opposition. Pockets of ISIS terrorists remain in the region, but most of the group’s territorial holdings have been wiped out by a coalition of Kurdish fighters, assisted by US troops. Erdogan claims his encroachment of the region is designed to help fight ISIS, yet Bolton believes his true motives are to wipe out the Kurds. Bolton writes, “It was complicated, but what was not complicated was the strong US sense of loyalty to Kurds who had fought with us against ISIS” (192).
In December 2018 Trump tells Bolton, “We should get the hell out of [Syria]” (193), adding that he should devise a withdrawal plan so Turkey can finish off ISIS. For Bolton, this is a personal crisis. Aside from the extent to which this constitutes a betrayal of the Kurds, it also gives the Kurds a powerful incentive to forge an alliance with al-Assad to avoid certain death at the hands of Turkey. Given that al-Assad is, in Bolton’s view, Iran’s proxy, this outcome is unacceptable.
When Trump’s plans become public, the president receives significant pushback from usually reliable allies like Israel and congressional Republicans. This gives Bolton a window to delay withdrawal. For Mattis, however, it’s all too much; he resigns in protest on December 20 and is replaced in an acting capacity by Deputy Defense Secretary Pat Shanahan. Meanwhile, Mattis’s public resignation letter, which specifically cites Trump’s Syria policy as his reason for leaving, makes it even more politically risky for Trump to withdraw.
In Bolton’s view, a US military presence in Syria is preserved thanks to a meeting at al-Asad Air Base in Iraq, where a group of Iraqi and American military leaders convince Trump they can finish off ISIS and prevent it from reemerging if allowed to remain deployed in Syria for a little longer. Aside from extending the timetable for leaving Syria, Bolton believes that the meeting finally impressed upon Trump the importance of maintaining a troop presence in the region. The feeling is short-lived, however. Until the end of Bolton’s tenure in September 2019, around 1,500 US troops remain in Syria. Yet less than a month after Bolton’s departure, Trump once again orders a full US withdrawal from Syria, which Bolton characterizes as “a complete debacle for US policy and for our credibility worldwide” (212).
A much more intractable challenge for Trump is the withdrawal troops from Afghanistan, a key campaign promise. Bolton attributes much of Trump’s opposition to a continued troop presence there to resentment over how Mattis handled the war effort under his watch. In Bolton’s telling, briefings on Afghanistan tend to devolve into extended Trump rants—on Afghanistan, yes, but also on a range of other grievances related to Mattis, NATO, Syria, North Korea, and how uncomfortable Trump was during a visit to the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. The end result is always the same: Trump doesn’t want to hear the opinion shared by Bolton, Pompeo, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph Dunford that if the US withdraws from Afghanistan, the Taliban will reemerge as a haven for terrorists intent on attacking America.
Bolton takes a step back to examine the chaos and dysfunction of the Trump administration through a wider lens. While serving under George H. W. Bush, Bolton and then-National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft led a 75-minute national security briefing to the president every morning at 8 o’clock. By contrast, Trump receives two national security briefings a week, during which he spends more time talking than listening. Especially painful to Bolton is the vindictive nature of many of Trump’s conversational asides, particularly those targeted at John McCain, both while the senator was alive and after his death.
Trump’s spite is very hard on John Kelly. As a father whose son died in Afghanistan in 2010, Kelly must bite his lip whenever Trump disparages the war effort there. Kelly takes this as an implication that his son died for no reason. He tells Bolton, “Trump doesn’t care what happens to these guys. He says it would be ‘cool’ to invade Venezuela” (225).
Finally fed up with working for Trump, Kelly resigns in December 2018. On his way out, he tells Trump not to replace him with a “yes man” or else he will be impeached. Trump replaces him with Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney. While Bolton doesn’t explicitly call Mulvaney a “yes man,” he writes, “There was a lot of evidence that Kelly’s hypothesis was entirely correct” (245).
In January 2019 Venezuela experiences a presidential crisis. In the wake of incumbent Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration, the country’s legislature calls the election results illegitimate and declares its leader, Juan Guaidó, as acting president under rules stipulated in the Venezuelan Constitution. For Bolton, this presents an opportunity to unseat the heir to Hugo Chavez and initiate a regime change in an oppressive socialist state.
As pro-Guaidó protesters flood the streets of Caracas, Trump is eager to send in the US military to accelerate Maduro’s downfall. Bolton, however, prefers to exert nonviolent pressure, citing inevitable opposition from both parties in Congress. He wants to implement oil sanctions against Venezuela and to declare the country a state sponsor of terrorism. Most importantly, Bolton believes the US must formally recognize Guaidó as the president of Venezuela, which Trump does.
As the conflict stretches on, Trump grows nervous about his support for Guaidó. Bolton points out the president’s fixation on the fact that Guaidó’s attractive wife, in her meeting with Trump, did not wear her wedding ring. In Trump’s mind, this implies weakness in Guaidó. Moreover, the president is increasingly distracted by domestic issues, particularly the government shutdown over his proposed Mexican border wall. Bolton must also contend with Pompeo and the rest of the State Department, who fear for the safety of their embassy staff in Venezuela should the US continue to exert pressure. Finally, Mnuchin proves to be an obstacle when it comes to applying sanctions. Bolton believes that Mnuchin worries too much about the impact of sanctions on large US companies when he should be worried about America’s big-picture geopolitical interests.
When a ploy to have Venezuela’s top federal court declare Maduro’s phony legislature illegitimate fails, the game is effectively lost in Venezuela. In taking stock of the failed regime change effort, Bolton blames bureaucratic slowness in the US, Trump’s lack of sustained attention to the effort, and mistakes made by Guaidó and the opposition.
In these chapters the divisions between Bolton and Trump’s foreign policy worldviews deepen even further. It is almost absurd to recall the book’s opening chapter when Trump tells Bolton, “You know, you and I agree on almost everything except Iraq” (18). On Syria, Trump wants Turkey to finish off ISIS, while Bolton believes the political situation on the ground is too delicate for the US to withdraw. To Trump, Afghanistan is merely another “endless war” which he vowed to abandon on the campaign trail, while Bolton is sure that a US withdrawal would lead to a terrorist attack on the United States. Even on the matter of Venezuela, Trump calls for a US military assault, while Bolton recommends nonmilitary intervention, one of the only times the president is more hawkish than the author. This suggests a lack of coherence to Trump’s foreign policy views, at least when it comes to countries with weak central leadership.
Despite this apparent incoherence, there are some consistent strains to Trump’s philosophy on foreign relations. The first is Trump’s inclination to view foreign nations through the lens of domestic electoral politics. Unlike Russia, China, and North Korea, each of which has a strong leader whose actions could potentially affect the outcome of the US presidential election, countries like Afghanistan and Syria are viewed as “losers” in Trump’s mind. Thus, they are somebody else’s problem. Venezuela is something of an outlier—it is difficult to ascertain why Trump, who campaigned on ending endless wars, wants to step into another potential military quagmire in Venezuela. Given Trump’s broader approach toward foreign policy, it is possible he believes that a tough military response there would shore up support among his anti-socialist base. However, Bolton is quick to point out that even staunchly anti-Maduro Venezuelan and Cuban Americans are shocked to hear that a military option is on the table.
The second strain in Trump’s foreign policy doctrine, at least in Bolton’s view, is a lack of appreciation for the sacrifices of US troops. As of the 2020 election season, this continues to be an enormous point of contention in domestic politics. Bolton points out that some of Trump’s most vindictive asides are targeted at military veterans, including John McCain, John Kerry, and Mattis. Particularly disturbing is Bolton’s recollection of Trump’s less-than-solemn attitude toward wounded veterans at Walter Reed. Corroborating Bolton’s view of the president in this regard are countless news reports that have surfaced throughout Trump’s candidacy and presidency alleging insensitive or outright malicious comments about fallen US soldiers. Many of these reports are anonymous accounts, yet one need not rely on anonymous sources to sense Trump’s problematic attitude toward US troops. Trump has repeatedly disparaged McCain’s military record in public, most infamously when he told reporters at a campaign event, “[McCain’s] not a war hero. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured.” (Schreckinger, Ben. “Trump attacks McCain: ‘I like people who weren’t captured.’” Politico, 18 July 2015.) Also on the campaign trail, Trump disparaged the Muslim parents of a fallen US soldier in an interview with ABC News. (Turnham, Steve. “Donald Trump to Father of Fallen Soldier: ‘I’ve made a lot of sacrifices.’” ABC News, 30 July 2016.)
Bolton also identifies Trump’s strong propensity to think of foreign policy issues through the lens of his personal grievances. This is particularly true of Trump’s attitude toward the War in Afghanistan. Each time the costly stalemate is discussed in a Principals meeting, Trump launches into a tirade about Mattis’s failed strategy on the ground. Even after the withdrawal of the nuclear deal, discussions on Iran inevitably lead to rants about John Kerry’s poor deal-making. And of course, the shadow of President Barack Obama looms over much of Trump’s decision-making. Bolton suggests that, had Trump known that Obama shared his view that NATO member countries don’t contribute a fair share to defense spending, the president might have reversed his opinion on the matter.
To Bolton, Trump’s opinions and methods on foreign policy pose a national security threat. Yet many observers view Trump’s divergent views as a positive thing for the country. In an article at Vox, journalist Alex Ward writes, “After reading former National Security Adviser John Bolton’s tell-all book, it becomes exceedingly clear that President Donald Trump’s foreign policy is terrible—but Bolton’s is much, much worse.” (Ward, Alex. “The real villain of John Bolton’s Trump book is John Bolton.” Vox, 24 June 2020.) Ward quotes US foreign policy expert Joshua Shifrinson, who believes that had Trump followed Bolton’s advice, the US would be engaged in “something equivalent to two more Iraq Wars.” This may be an overstatement. While Bolton makes clear that he believes regime changes, likely initiated by US military campaigns, are the only solution to protecting America from Iran and North Korea, he never directly counsels Trump to do this. Nevertheless, had Trump been more receptive to his national security team’s advice—as Bolton’s former boss George W. Bush had been—it is possible that Bolton would have been emboldened to recommend such moves.
The divide between Bolton and Trump may indicate a broader split within the Republican Party at large. Trump’s campaign message to “end endless wars” clearly resonated with voters, even if it was a departure from Republican messaging during the post-9/11 era and the Cold War. Yet some observers say it would be a mistake to believe that future Republican presidents won’t return to a foreign policy doctrine similar to Bolton’s. In his article at Vox, Ward points to prospective 2024 Republican presidential candidate Tom Cotton, whose hawkish views are more in line with that of Bolton and his Bush-era ilk. He quotes US foreign policy expert Justin Logan, who says, “A lot of the ideas that [Bolton] holds have more currency in Washington than you would hope.” Moreover, a 2019 Gallup poll shows that support for the War in Afghanistan continues to cleave heavily along party lines, with a majority of Republicans saying the war protected the US from terrorism and a majority of Democrats saying it made the US less safe. (Reinhart, RJ. “US Views Mixed on War in Afghanistan.” Gallup, 11 Sep. 2019.)
Finally, Bolton begins to show the transactional nature of Trump’s approach toward foreign policy, which in his view often constitutes obstruction of justice. This is reflected here by Trump’s dealings with President Erdogan and his offer to impede the Southern District of New York’s investigation into Halkbank. This is only the first of many similar instances that greatly trouble Bolton, as Trump engages in a dynamic that culminates in the 2019 Ukraine scandal and his subsequent impeachment.



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