The Room Where It Happened

“While foreign-policy labels are unhelpful except to the intellectually lazy, if pressed, I liked to say my policy was ‘pro-American.’ I followed Adam Smith on economics, Edmund Burke on society, The Federalist Papers on government, and a merger of Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles on national security.” 

Given that Bolton spends very little time explaining the broader philosophy guiding his decisions, this rare explication of his worldview is worth unpacking. For example, “pro-American” may seem like an obvious label for anyone working in US national security. Yet Bolton’s “Americanism” defines itself by its elevation of the national interest and US sovereignty above all other concerns, including human rights abuses and the promotion of democracy abroad. A particularly stark example of this attitude emerges after the death of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi by agents of the Saudi government. Bolton’s unwillingness to censure Saudi Arabia and its Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman grows out of a simple and cold calculus: If the US doesn’t sell weapons to the Saudis, the Russians will.

“Charles Krauthammer, a sharp critic of his, told me he had been wrong earlier to characterize Trump’s behavior as that of an eleven-year-old boy. ‘I was off by ten years,’ Krauthammer remarked. ‘He’s like a one-year-old. Everything is seen through the prism of whether it benefits Donald Trump.’” 

Bolton has many criticisms of Donald Trump, but most of them are variations on this idea. It is virtually impossible for Trump to make foreign policy decisions that aren’t framed first and foremost through the lens of what benefits him electorally. This is largely reflected in the president’s unfettered need to make big deals—or at least deals that can be spun as big in the press—with foreign adversaries. It manifests in its purest form during the Ukraine scandal, during which Trump threatens to alienate a strategic US ally if it doesn’t launch dubious investigations into the president’s political rivals. What’s worse, adversaries know this about Trump and frequently play to his vanity, sometimes winning important concessions in the process.

“As in many other cases, international agreements provided the semblance of addressing major issues, giving national politicians something to take credit for, but made no discernible real-world difference (in this case giving leeway to countries like China and India, which remained essentially unfettered).” 

This is a clear summation of Bolton’s broader antipathy toward international agreements. In this case, his focus is on the Paris Accords, which he applauds Trump for leaving. Without weighing in on the seriousness of the threat of climate change, Bolton asserts that flawed international agreements, even those with worthy goals, do more harm than good by lulling participants into believing a solution has been reached. What he doesn’t mention is that Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Accords is viewed by many in the context of the president’s strong climate change denialism, giving his abandonment of the agreement a symbolic resonance that only downplays the threat further.

“The President cannot be Secretary of State; it is inherently impossible in the nature of both positions. What he can do, and often has done with unhappy results, is to prevent anyone else from being Secretary of State.” 

This quote comes from Dean Acheson, secretary of state under President Harry S. Truman and one of Bolton’s idols. It will come to hold enormous resonance with respect to Trump, who throughout the book stresses that only he can make the big diplomatic deals, not Pompeo and not Bolton. As a result, abnormal diplomatic channels emerge, like the exchange of “love letters” between Kim and Trump.

“It was simple truth that not presenting options until the last minute, making sure that those options were rigged in the ‘right’ direction, and then table-pounding, delaying, and obfuscating as long as possible were the tactics by which a savvy bureaucrat like Mattis could get his way.”

Mattis is one of the few “adults in the room” still present when Bolton arrives in Trump’s White House. Here, the author details the methods by which these early officials work around Trump’s objectives to assert their own agenda. While the two differ on a number of key issues—particularly the threat posed by Iran—it is somewhat ironic that, by the end of his tenure, Bolton is forced to become a savvy bureaucrat like Mattis to steer the Trump administration away from disaster.

“Trump answered that he didn’t want to negotiate with the EU. Too bad he didn’t feel that way about North Korea, I thought to myself.” 

Throughout the book Bolton tries and fails to convince Trump that protecting Western allies is fundamentally to the benefit of America. Even Bolton, with his default antipathy toward international agreements, understands the importance of preserving NATO, even if it means making concessions to European countries. Much of Trump’s preference toward dealing with adversaries as opposed to allies stems from his inability to distinguish between America’s interests and his interests. For example, maintaining functional relations with countries like France and Germany does not generate headlines; a blockbuster deal with Kim Jong Un would. Yet even if one accepts the premise that Trump’s foreign policy is based entirely around what benefits him politically, the execution of his strategy involves high risks with few rewards, at least during the period covered by the book.

“The letter was pure puffery, written probably by some clerk in North Korea’s agitprop bureau, but Trump loved it. This was the beginning of the Trump-Kim bromance.” 

Bolton is shocked by the ease with which Kim wins over Trump through flattery. In Bolton’s telling, the letter isn’t even terribly striking beyond the wanton adulation it expresses toward Trump. Though somewhat crude, the term “bromance” is a surprisingly fitting descriptor for many of Trump’s relationships with world leaders, almost all of them autocrats like Recep Erdogan.

“Kim Jong Un knew just what he was doing when he asked what Trump thought of him; it was a question designed to elicit a positive response, or risk ending the meeting right there. By asking a seemingly naïve or edgy question, Kim actually threw the burden and risk of answering on the other person. It showed he had Trump hooked.” 

Prior to this point, Kim’s diplomacy is seen by Bolton as little more than crude yet successful attempts to flatter Trump. Here Bolton acknowledges Kim’s tactical skill in negotiations. Kim asks many such questions at the Singapore summit, including some directed at Bolton that are designed to throw him off. At least in his own telling, Bolton acquits himself in these moments, albeit a bit stiffly.

“Until the end of the call, Trump didn’t seem to realize Pompeo hadn’t actually seen Kim Jong Un, asking if Pompeo had handed over the Trump-autographed copy of Elton John’s ‘Rocket Man’ CD, which Pompeo had not. Getting this CD to Kim remained a high priority for several months.” 

Aside from reflecting the “priorities” of the Trump administration, the Trump-autographed Elton John CD is a fitting symbol for the president’s foreign policy approach. For one, it reflects his narcissism—readers may wonder what kind of person signs another person’s CD, for example. The name “Rocket Man” is also a callback to one of Trump’s tweets, which throughout the book are depicted as the president’s primary channel for foreign policy. It also reflects the extent to which Trump’s diplomatic relationships are built on bromantic camaraderie and in-jokes—a fine strategy in real estate, perhaps, but less advisable when dealing with tyrants who possess nuclear weapons.

“Putin struck me as totally in control, calm, self-confident, whatever Russia’s domestic economic and political challenges might have been. He was totally knowledgeable on Moscow’s national-security priorities. I was not looking forward to leaving him alone in a room with Trump.” 

In Bolton’s view, far less cunning autocrats have gotten the better of Trump in the past, including Erdogan. Thus, he is understandably uneasy about the possible concessions Putin might extract in his one-on-one with Trump. It is worth pointing out that the one-on-one elicits neither concessions nor attitudinal shifts in US foreign policy, suggesting that perhaps Bolton underestimates Trump. Another possibility is that Putin is playing the long game with Trump, sowing seeds that may not bear fruit for months. For example, it is difficult not to sense Putin’s influence from afar in Trump’s dealings with Ukraine.

“NATO had been a successful deterrence structure, for decades blocking the Red Army from knifing through Germany’s Fulda Gap and deep into the heart of Western Europe. Of course, the United States was always the overwhelmingly greatest force contributor. It was our alliance, and it was primarily for our benefit, not because we were renting ourselves out to defend Europe, but because defending ‘the West’ was in America’s strategic interest.” 

Bolton’s support for NATO should not be seen as inconsistent with his broader antipathy toward international agreements. Given his belief that NATO serves the US’s strategic interests, his support for it is perfectly in line with his Americanist philosophy. This quote also offers a rebuke to one of Trump’s most common refrains: that the US contributes too much money to NATO and would be better off withdrawing from the organization. Bolton and Trump’s split on NATO shows that despite the two men’s shared espousal of an “America First” mentality, Bolton’s version reflects a much longer view of how the US’s interests are best served.

“Under President Clinton, America suffered its own military declines, as he and others saw the collapse of Communism as ‘the end of history,’ slashing defense budgets to spend on politically beneficial domestic welfare programs. This ‘peace dividend’ illusion never ended in much of Europe, but in ended in America with the September 11 mass murders in New York and Washington by Islamicist terrorists.” 

Bolton provides a compelling argument for why America’s foreign and domestic policies differ from that of so many European countries. To him, Europe is still stuck in a mode resembling the Clinton era of good feelings, during which the US avoided any major conflicts, at least on the world stage. Yet it also betrays a tendency possessed by Bolton and many other conservatives to thrive best when aligned against a monolithic foreign adversary, whether it’s communism or terrorism. This is where Trump most diverges from the Boltonist conservative mold, as he tends to pit himself against adversaries closer to home, whether within the United States or within international alliances like NATO.

“Trump was correct on the burden-sharing point, as Obama had been, a convergence of views that might have shaken Trump’s confidence in his own had he paid attention to it.” 

This quote reflects Bolton’s belief—shared by many others—that a significant number of Trump’s policy stances are reflexive attempts to distance himself from his predecessor. This dynamic emerges with other politicians toward whom Trump feels intense personal animosity. Bolton observes that Trump’s anger over the War in Afghanistan is suffused with resentment over former Defense Secretary Mattis. Trump’s habit of conflating the personal and the political continues to be the book’s dominant thread.

“The key point was there were no agreements on anything, no concessions, no real change in substantive foreign policy. I was delighted. And relieved. No successes, but that didn’t trouble me at all, since I had long seen this entire summit as one massive exercise in damage control.” 

In taking stock of the Putin summit in Helsinki—up until the press conference, at least—Bolton is relieved that Trump seemingly avoided falling victim to an adversary’s manipulations. Yet immediately after the summit, Trump commits an unforced political error by professing his faith in Putin over the US intelligence community when it comes to Russian election-meddling. This suggests that Trump did fall victim to Putin’s manipulations, it just wasn’t by way of discrete policy concessions, as was the case in Singapore with Kim. Finally, the quote reveals the extent to which Bolton increasingly views his job as damage control, a dispiriting conclusion given his ambitions to shape US foreign policy.

“Trump seemed to think that criticizing the policies and actions of foreign governments made it harder for him to have good personal relations with their leaders. This was a reflection of his difficulty in separating personal from official relations. I’m not aware of any case where Russia or China refrained from criticizing the United States for fear of irritating our sensitive leaders.” 

In Bolton’s view, Trump’s need for personal approval from leaders of authoritarian nations makes him unique among US presidents. The president justifies this by claiming that big, transformative deals are only possible when the two leaders involved have close personal relations. This may be true in business, but on the world stage, Trump’s attempts to ingratiate himself with adversarial heads of state lead to troubling concessions.

“He then turned to his visits to Walter Reed, where the wounded soldiers had not had the impact on Trump that have on most people, impressing them with their bravery and commitment to their mission. Trump had simply been horrified by the seriousness of their wounds.”

Although Trump’s reputation of disparaging the US military is disputed, it’s become a frequent topic of national conversation during his presidency. Aside from anonymous reports, Trump’s public statements surrounding individual veterans have come under enormous scrutiny. For example, during his campaign for office, Trump said of John McCain, “I like people who weren’t captured.” Also on the campaign trail, Trump showed insensitivity in discussing the parents of a US Army captain who died in Iraq.

“He then, stunningly, turned the conversation to the coming US presidential election, alluding to China’s economic capability to affect the ongoing campaigns, pleading with Xi to ensure he’d win. He stressed the importance of farmers, and increased Chinese purchases of soybeans and wheat in the electoral outcome. I would print Trump’s exact words, but the government’s prepublication review process has decided otherwise.” (

Appearing in newspapers across the country, this is one of the most newsworthy moments captured in Bolton’s book. Trump’s willingness to invite foreign election interference, despite the intelligence community’s work to halt this meddling, reflects the president’s persistent attitude that his personal interests outweigh the nation’s interests. Trump’s broader strategy toward China also reflects his tendency to project strength against a nation in public, only to plead with that nation’s leaders for personal favors in private.

“Xi explained to Trump why he was basically building concentration camps in Xinjiang. According to our interpreter, Trump said that Xi should go ahead with building the camps, which he thought was exactly the right thing to do. Pottinger told me Trump said something very similar during the 2017 trip to China, which meant we could cross repression of the Uighurs off our list of possible reasons to sanction China, at least as long as trade negotiations continued.” 

This was another newsworthy moment of Bolton’s book. If true, it reflects a startling abandonment of the US’s moral position regarding human rights. To Bolton, who tends to view the misdeeds of foreign adversaries through a pro-American realpolitik lens, this exchange removes another bargaining chip the US could have used to pressure China and slow its ascent.

“The idea that a minor bureaucratic restructuring could have made any difference in the time of Trump reflected how immune bureaucratic pettifoggery is to reality. At most, the internal NSC structure was no more than the quiver of a butterfly’s wings in the tsunami of Trump’s chaos.” 

Bolton vigorously defends his restructuring of the pandemic preparedness personnel at the NSC, a decision that drew enormous scrutiny as the United States struggled to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. On one hand, Bolton is probably correct that a host of issues—from Trump’s rhetoric to the politicization of various health agencies—contributed more to America’s failure to sufficiently address the COVID-19 pandemic, relative to most other developed countries. Yet numerous outside observers point out that Bolton’s decision is part of a broader pattern of chaotic and ill-advised personnel decisions that left the US more vulnerable to several crises.

“North Korea had what it wanted from the United States and Trump had what he wanted personally. This showed the asymmetry of Trump’s view of foreign affairs. He couldn’t tell the difference between his personal interests and the country’s interests.” 

To Bolton, this is the defining characteristic of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine. It emerges in the president’s dealings with Erdogan, Xi, Zelensky, and virtually every other world leader he encounters. It even invades his decision-making with regard to Afghanistan, as Trump’s chief concern appears to be how a deal with the Taliban would play politically in Congress and with the electorate.

“In my government experience, this was the most irrational thing I ever witnessed any President do. It called to mind Kelly’s question to me: what would happen if we ever got into a real crisis with Trump as President? Well, we now had one, and Trump had behaved bizarrely, just as Kelly had feared.” 

This pertains to Trump’s decision to cancel a retaliatory military strike against Iran roughly two hours before its scheduled time. Observers who oppose military escalation with Iran may question Bolton’s characterization of the decision as “the most irrational thing I ever witnessed any President do.” Yet the irrationality Bolton refers to is reflected in Trump’s whiplash decision-making and reticence to follow through on bold action, justified or not. Moreover, it foreshadows Trump’s mishandling of a far more dramatic “real crisis”: the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing economic recession.

“Trump repeated one of his hobbyhorses, namely that it was cheaper to rebuild the World Trade Center than to fight in Afghanistan, inconveniently ignoring the loss of life in the 9/11 attacks, not just the cost of rebuilding.” 

Bolton views a wanton disregard for human life as one of the most disturbing components of Trump’s foreign policy approach. This is also shown through the president’s flippant desire to invade Venezuela and the lack of respect he shows military veterans at Walter Reed. Ironically, one of the only times Trump expresses concern over military casualties is when he cancels the Iran strike upon hearing about the potential for civilian deaths.

“Throughout my West Wing tenure, Trump wanted to do what he wanted to do, based on what he knew and what he saw as his own personal interests. And in Ukraine, he seemed finally able to have it all.” 

In Bolton’s telling the Ukraine affair is the culmination of Trump’s narcissistic approach toward foreign policy. Unlike his dealings with Kim, Xi, and Erdogan, Zelensky is the young new leader of a country that is stuck in a precarious position and desperately needs the US’s help. This allows Trump to better force his will on the leader in the hope of gaining an electoral edge over Joe Biden. Finally, Bolton frames the entire incident as a sustained and calculated effort, unlike the more impulsive moves Trump made in the past.