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The authors insist that the more unequal a society is, the higher its risk of becoming dysfunctional. Countries tend to do either well or poorly on all different outcomes, from health to education. The most consistently high-ranking countries are Japan and Scandinavian nations, while the most consistently poor performers are the US, the UK, and Portugal. The authors present a graph that combines all of the results they reference in their work as a visual summary of their overall findings.
Wilkinson and Pickett argue that reducing inequality will not only help society’s poorest but people across all social classes because inequality creates social problems that are not limited to the poor. The authors cite a study that compares middle-aged white people in the US and England and found that the Americans consistently had poorer health than their English counterparts. They reference other studies on mortality in different countries to demonstrate that equal countries have lower mortality rates across social classes than more unequal ones. Researchers had similar findings when comparing individual US states: the more equal states had lower death rates across all social classes. Comparing educational scores revealed similar results; even the best-educated kids in the US and UK did not do as well as the highest-educated kids in Finland. The authors claim that even the richest people would likely benefit from greater equality in society, but that because this group is a “tiny fraction” of the population, it is difficult to study (181). The authors conclude that several studies have demonstrated that greater equality benefits everyone in society proportionately: the poor the most, the middle-class a moderate amount, and the rich a smaller amount still.
The authors entertain alternative explanations to why some countries perform well and others don’t. Some people have noticed that English-speaking countries tend to perform worse than other developed nations. The authors claim that even if you took them out, there would still be a close relationship between negative social and health outcomes and inequality. The authors confront the critique that countries’ differences can be attributed to culture, rather than inequality. They point out that countries like Portugal and Spain have similar histories and geographies and many parallels in their cultures, yet Portugal, the more unequal country, is much worse off than Spain. Meanwhile, Japan and Sweden, two consistently high performers, have numerous substantial cultural differences but perform similarly.
The authors did not find a connection between public social expenditure and countries’ well-being. They claim that this is likely because governments either spend more on health and education programs or on policing and imprisonment. They explain, “Part of the reason for this is that governments may spend either to prevent social problems or, where income differences have widened, to deal with the consequences” (184). For instance, New Hampshire has the lowest social expenditure of any US state but consistently performs the best out of all of the states, which the researchers attribute to its relative equality of incomes.
The authors consider the role of race in social hierarchies and agree that ethnic minorities are often overrepresented among the lowest earners. They explain that “The prejudice which often attaches to ethnic divisions may increase inequality and its effects” (185). Wilkinson and Pickett claim that the poor performance of countries such as the US, which has a long history of racist ethnic division, cannot in itself explain its poor performance, which is related to its continued inequality. They point to Portugal as an example of a country that does not have the same ethnic divisions but also scores poorly and is unequal.
Another critique posits that family breakdown and the rising rates of single-parent families are the cause of poor well-being. The authors refute this theory, claiming that there isn’t a strong correlation between the number of single-parent families and child well-being at the international level. They point to evidence that shows that government support can shield children from the negative effects of being raised by a single parent. They also reject the idea that countries’ differing histories account for their performance, noting that what seems to matter the most is their current level of financial equality, not how they got there.
The authors acknowledge that it is difficult to prove causality but insist that their graphs show a consistent relationship between inequality and poor health which is “too strong to be attributable to chance” (189). They address the direction of causality, noting that some people wonder if engaging in social problems or experiencing worse health could be drivers of inequality. The authors refute this idea, pointing to measures of well-being such as childhood wellness and homicide, which would not decrease income equality amongst adults. While people with failing health might experience a decrease in incomes, this would not explain why people of all income levels fare worse in more unequal societies.
The authors conclude their chapter by reminding the reader that successful theories should be able to accurately predict how a phenomenon will occur. They believe that the degree of inequality in a society will predict its social and health outcomes.
The authors are not interested in making claims about utopias or perfecting human life but instead focus on simply making realistic improvements to society. Since some countries, such as the Scandinavian countries and Japan, already live in egalitarian societies with a high quality of life, they acknowledge that this is achievable.
While self-interest can seem like the primary driver of human behavior, the authors believe that fostering equality “allows a more sociable human nature to emerge” (199).
Humans can interact in a hierarchical way, or by establishing friendships. The authors characterize these as opposites, with hierarchy fueled by “power and coercion” while friendships are based on “reciprocity, mutuality, sharing” (199).
People can be each other’s best resource and companions, or most dangerous rivals. Competition within species is more hostile than between species, and humans are wired to view each other as competition. However, these instincts can be managed by living in societies, such as that of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, which are more egalitarian and emphasize sharing. The authors claim that, despite the inequality in our societies, on an individual level people seem to have a healthy sense of fairness. For instance, a study demonstrated that people playing a sharing game would usually split money fairly with strangers.
Humans are most closely related to chimpanzees and bonobos. While chimpanzees form hierarchies headed by large, popular males, bonobos are more egalitarian and fight less than chimps, instead resolving their tension through affection and sex. These lineages have given humans both instincts, but the authors claim that our social DNA is closer to bonobos, wiring us for more positive relationships. Wilkinson and Pickett characterize humans as obsessively social and highly affected by the quality of our relationships. Our social skills also help us as we seek higher status, usually as a means to make ourselves attractive to potential mates. Males are particularly concerned about attaining status, as evolutionarily low status could mean being shut out of reproductive opportunities altogether. The authors argue that early human societies kept the peace by maintaining egalitarian social structures and sharing. People who tried to cheat or dominate others would be ridiculed, ostracized, or attacked. Living in this way incentivized people to cooperate with others and behave for the benefit of the group.
The authors conclude that humans have different “social strategies” for different situations: in hierarchies, people learn to be self-reliant and behave competitively with other people, while in interdependent living situations, people form stronger relationships with others and focus on contributing rather than gaining status (209). People are primed for either experience depending on their childhood. Parents who experience stress, conflict, and competition tend to pass on this expectation to their children, who are more likely to be aggressive and have less empathy for others. According to the authors, this explains why children in unequal societies are more likely to experience social problems, teen pregnancy, childhood obesity, and more.
People are wired to benefit from social relationships. Our brains have “mirror neurons” which fire when we observe other people’s actions, making us feel as if we are part of what they’re doing. This biology wires us to imitation and sympathy. Another biological function is the release of oxytocin, a hormone that impacts bonding and trust building. Trusting others allows humans to experience this feel-good hormone, and bond effectively. Moreover, studies show that exclusion or “social pain” is as impactful as physical pain. The authors claim that status differences can trigger social pain, as inequality and rejection are forms of social exclusion. The authors argue that this evolutionary lens provides an explanation of why unequal societies seem to be so damaging and argue that more egalitarian societies are more “humane” and “practical” (216).
In this passage, the authors investigate how reducing inequality could help countries cope with climate change. Wilkinson and Pickett claim that economic growth is not linked to improvements in quality of life and that environmental limitations will constrict how much growth societies can achieve anyways. They argue that consuming less carbon does not decrease a country’s wellbeing. Indeed, many countries have higher lifespans and consume considerably less carbon than countries with lower lifespans. Some societies, such as Sweden, Costa Rica, and Switzerland, have long lifespans “at the minimum environmental cost” (220).
Countries will have to cut carbon emissions, and this should be done fairly, so that wealthier people who emit more carbon in their lifestyles should pay more than lower earners who also have lower emissions levels. The authors support the idea of “carbon rations” in which everyone is given an allowable amount of carbon, but poorer people who do not use their full ration can sell it to richer people who want to emit more.
The authors propose shifting to a “steady state economy” in which people are incentivized to “build and maintain longer-lasting goods of every kind” (223-24). This would reduce carbon emissions and limit the waste of Earth’s materials. The authors believe this will spur innovation rather than stagnate countries’ economies. Evidence shows that more egalitarian countries produce more inventions; there is a much higher rate of patents issued in Sweden and Finland than in unequal countries the US and Portugal.
By decreasing inequality, the authors believe that societies will also mitigate the “cultural pressure to consume” (225). As inequality rises, people feel anxious that their appearance and goods will seem out of date compared to others and consume more to keep up. The authors point to evidence that increased inequality also increases spending: over the last several decades the US and UK have become more unequal. At the same time, people’s average savings has gone down and debt has gone up. The authors emphasize people’s status anxiety by pointing to a study that revealed that about half of participants would rather earn less but live in a society where they were better off compared to others. Indeed, it seems that many people make purchases just to distinguish themselves socially: the “Veblen effect” is a term economists use to discuss purchases that have social value, but little practical usefulness (230). The authors conclude that “once we have enough of the necessities of life, it is the relativities which matter” (229).
Pickett and Wilkinson connect these findings with their discussion on sustainability, arguing that becoming more sustainable will entail shifting from creating “economic growth” to creating a “sociable society” (230). While this may mean having fewer goods, people will enjoy an improved quality of life with better health and community.
The authors argue that international inequality between countries should also be reduced. More equal countries are more likely to give aid to poorer countries, cooperate more productively on international treaties, and be less belligerent.
Wilkinson and Pickett claim that to effectively reduce inequality societies will need to embrace a real “transformation” which includes a genuine social movement that aspires to equality. They warn against frightening people with talk of “revolution,” which would spark a backlash. Instead, they emphasize that these changes should make society less fearful and more sociable for everyone. The authors refute the notion that striving for more income equality would reduce ambition or make society mediocre. They point to egalitarian societies in which people achieve excellence in academics, arts, and sports. Moreover, more equal societies have better educational achievement than unequal ones, as they previously discussed.
The authors lament that government attempts to address social problems, from drug addiction to obesity, often fail to have any substantial effect. For instance, the British government introduced policies that tried to decrease the health outcome differences between wealthy and poor people. This effort failed. The authors blame the government’s tendency to rely on messaging in an attempt to change behavior, while people’s material circumstances remain the same.
Wilkinson and Pickett are hopeful that countries can change their circumstances quickly. Nations like Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia have historically responded to crises by decreasing inequality through transformative policies like land reform and wealth sharing. Citing economist Paul Krugman, the writers point to practices that are sure to increase inequality, such as weakening unions and changes in norms that allow CEOs and others at the top to have “runaway incomes” (242). Failing to maintain minimum wage legislation also contributes to the problem. The authors compare “monetarist economics” as practiced by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher to a “disease” that spread throughout most English-speaking countries and widened inequality, beginning in the 1980s (244).
There are many ways for countries to reduce inequality. For instance, Japan has relatively equal incomes to begin with, and so they do not need to practice extensive redistribution of wealth. Meanwhile, the Scandinavian countries use taxes to reduce poverty and provide social programs. The amount of money governments spend is not as important as what they spend it on: the US uses the same proportion of its GDP on social spending as Japan, yet the countries have vastly different outcomes. They warn leaders that by cutting taxes and maintaining low social expenditures they risk creating social problems that will have to be addressed by policing and prisons, thereby raising social expenditure anyways. They point to the US as an example of such a tradeoff, noting that many states spend as much money on prisons as on education. The authors frame education and family support programs as a long-term investment: children who grow up with these programs are more likely to turn into working tax-payers than criminals.
The authors acknowledge that inequality can be a divisive political issue. According to a focus group study, discussing evidence about inequality and its consequences can change attitudes toward it. While modern politics may not present sweeping idealistic visions about society, people do have an appetite for creating a fairer and less materialistic society. For instance, polls in the US showed that most Americans were concerned about inequality and thought that the country’s wealth should be more evenly shared. The authors lament that the corruption and inefficacy of the Soviet Union’s communism has given people the impression that there are no alternatives to capitalism, as it is now practiced in most Western countries. In fact, they argue, there are democratic models for more equal societies.
For instance, some of the most responsible companies and services are those that are “non-profit,” such as cooperatives, credit unions, and publicly owned companies. The writers advise that the “inequality-generating forces” in the private, profit-driven sector be “contained and democratized” through taxation or changing pay schemes to ensure fair pay and limit excessive executive pay. A longer-term approach would be to incentivize employee-ownership schemes and combine them with participatory management. These schemes give employees a share of the company, allowing them to profit more when the company does well.
The authors support the practice of companies being 100% employee-owned; this would make businesses responsive to their own workers rather than investors. Financed by mortgages or loans, businesses would retain all of their control over their company’s decisions. These changes would transform businesses from being property to a form of community. This reduces resentment and feelings of inferiority and increases people’s sense of control over their earnings and emotional and financial investment in their workplace. The authors point to examples of successful employee-run companies and employee buy-outs to prove that this method can be viable and financially successful. They argue that these businesses create several financial and social advantages for their communities. For instance, employee-owned businesses may behave more ethically than investor-owned ones.
Next, the authors discuss how some people view equality as a limitation on their freedom, but the authors argue that it is actually inequality which is a “denial” of freedom and democracy. According to Wilkinson and Pickett, if democratic ideals were extended into the economy, then workplaces and wages would be fairer. They consider how modern economies are changing and how governments could act in the interest of their citizens by negotiating free access to useful goods such as software, educational materials, medicines, and other inventions.
The authors reflect on how, over the centuries, societies have slowly become more egalitarian. They urge the reader to consider the benefits that everyone could experience if people and governments embraced egalitarian policies. Pickett and Wilkinson list the many ways that governments can influence incomes and remind them that developing a clear political vision is essential to persuading the public that a more equal society would benefit everyone. The authors conclude by hopefully stating that “we are on the verge of creating a qualitatively better and more truly sociable society for all” (271).
In these passages, the authors continue to rely on statistical evidence and academic studies to support their argument. One of their most significant claims is that inequality is negative for people of all social classes—not just the poor. While poverty is a factor in poor health and social outcomes, the authors provide evidence that inequality also harms middle and upper-class people, too. By comparing health outcomes for people of different social classes in America and England, the authors can show that even more affluent people in unequal countries have worse outcomes than their equally wealthy peers in more egalitarian locations. This data encourages the reader to think about how inequality, or other factors, may be triggering worse outcomes for middle and upper class people in unequal nations like the US.
In these chapters, the authors also develop the theme The Benefits of Egalitarian Communities. By investigating human evolution and the different instincts it has encoded in each individual, the authors suggest that while people are wired to behave selfishly in “dominance hierarchies,” humans thrive in more egalitarian settings where these self-serving instincts are muted by the desire to fit in and contribute productively to the group. By pointing to the long history humans have had living in relatively small and egalitarian groups, the authors paint this communal living as the natural human condition. They explain, “Despite the modern impression of the permanence and universality of inequality, in the time-scale of human history and pre-history, it is the current highly unequal societies which are exceptional. For over 90 percent of our existence as human beings, we lived, almost exclusively, in highly egalitarian societies” (207). These observations invite the reader to reconsider the notion that all human societies have huge differences in status, and to think about how human evolutionary make-up may wire people to thrive in more cooperative settings.
The authors also bolster their theme on Social Evaluation and Acceptance by including more evidence that people suffer real pain and stress when they live at the bottom of a social pyramid, where they are denied a sense of acceptance from people with more power than them. By equating social exclusion on an individual level with the painful rejection they believe society’s poorest feel, the authors ask the reader to believe that studies on individuals are an accurate microcosm of people’s experience of society. They write, “In contrast to the rewards of co-operation, experiments using brain scans have shown that the pain of social exclusion involves the same areas of the brain as are stimulated when someone experiences physical pain” (214). The authors link this evidence to their argument that hierarchical societies are intrinsically discriminatory towards those in the lower classes, who suffer from the pain of this rejection. They persuasively tie these insights together, writing, “In this light we can perhaps begin not only to see why more unequal societies are so socially dysfunctional but, through that, perhaps also to feel more confident that a more humane society may be a great deal more practical than the highly unequal ones in which so many of us now live” (216). By highlighting the negative experience of those at the bottom of these hierarchies—and offering a more “humane” alternative which promotes social acceptance—Wilkinson and Pickett try to convince the reader that steeply graded social structures are harmful and unnecessary.
The Spirit Level consistently works to persuade the reader of the authors’ agenda and belief systems, and the writing is thus carefully crafted to impact the reader from beginning to end. Wilkinson and Pickett use strong language to portray inequality as problematic. For instance, in this section, they compare inequality to a “pollutant” that negatively affects everyone (179). By additionally calling inequality a “hugely damaging force,” the authors add gusto to their argument and ask the reader to take their points seriously (195). Together with statistical evidence and personal anecdotes, Wilkinson and Pickett create a compelling argument for an egalitarian society, rounding out Part 3 of the book with a clear and persuasive purpose.



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