The Theory of Moral Sentiments

An object might have utility, a usefulness that promotes some measure of convenience, and for this reason we might regard said object as beautiful, but it is often the “fitness” of the object that excites our admiration and renders it “more valued, than the end for which it was intended” (168). A watch that keeps excellent time, for instance, is admired more for its “perfection” than for the punctuality it promotes (169).

As we admire objects more for their fitness than for their utility, so too do we approve of a man’s actions when they appear fit and proper, not when they appear merely useful. Indeed, “the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility” (176). When we exercise self-command, for instance, we are pleased not only because our act of restraint might prove useful to us in the future but also because “the sentiments which influence our conduct seem exactly to coincide with those of the spectator” (177).