Thirteen Days

President Kennedy wrote to Chairman Khrushchev on Monday, October 22 expressing his desire to avoid a misunderstanding that could “plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor” (61-62).

In a communication received on October 23, Khrushchev declared that the Soviets would not comply with the blockade and would take action in response to American interventions. He charged that America was taking the world to the brink of nuclear war. On Thursday, the President reiterated to Khrushchev that, “despite private and public assurances that missiles would not be placed in Cuba–that very step had been taken by the Soviet Union” (62). On Friday, while waiting for Krushchev’s response, U.S. intelligence revealed intensified Russian efforts to complete the missile sites, leading Robert Kennedy to conclude that, “all our efforts and letters, however, seemed to be having little effect” (63).

President Kennedy identified the first ship that was to be intercepted and boarded, the Maruda, chosen specifically for its international background as a non-Soviet ship. President Kennedy was sending a strong message that the U.S. was serious about executing the blockade and, at the same time, as the Maruda was a Panamanian vessel, “it did not represent a direct affront to the Soviets, requiring a response from them” (64). After the U.S. Navy determined that there were no weapons aboard, the Maruda was cleared to proceed to Cuba.

Despite successfully completing an incident-free intervention, the prevailing mood among the committee remained bleak, as “each hour the situation grew steadily more serious” (64). The Russians were still working to make the missile sites operational and disputing the legitimacy of the blockade. In an effort to continue pressure on the Soviets, the President added nighttime surveillance flights and expanded the embargo list to include oil. The group felt that their response had been ineffective and there was a general consensus that “if the Russians continued to be adamant and continued to build up their missile strength, military force would be the only alternative” (64).

The State Department was directed to develop a plan for establishing a government in Cuba following an American invasion. American military experts predicted that such an operation would result in a high casualty rate. CIA Director John McCone compared the challenges of the Cuban terrain to those America encountered in Korea and warned that “an invasion was going to be a much more serious undertaking than most people had previously realized” (66).

President Kennedy remained attentive to all the details of attack preparation. A letter arrived from the Soviet Chairman that evening. Robert Kennedy disputes later interpretations of the communication as indicative of Krushchev’s mental distress. The message, evidently written by Khrushchev himself, was “very long and emotional. But it was not incoherent, and the emotion was directed at the death, destruction, and anarchy that nuclear war would bring to his people and all mankind” (66).

Khrushchev repeatedly stated the urgency of preventing a military conflict that once begun neither side would be able to control and “reciprocal extermination will begin” (68). Khrushchev assured the President that the missiles were solely to defend Cuba, which was necessary in light of American attempts to overthrow the communist government in Cuba. Admitting for the first time that the missiles were actually in Cuba, Khrushchev argued that this fact made the blockade unnecessary, as Soviet ships would deliver no additional weapons. Khrushchev offered to remove Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for ending the blockade and assurances that the U.S. would not attack Cuba. Ending, Khrushchev stated that he was willing to work with Kennedy to de-escalate tensions and prevent a war. 

Working past midnight, the committee scrutinized the letter exhaustively, and referred it to the state Department for further evaluation and guidance, prior to a response. Leaving the meeting with a “slight feeling of optimism,” Robert Kennedy thought that “the letter, with all its rhetoric, had the beginnings perhaps of some accommodation, some agreement” (69). In addition, the Soviet Embassy had communicated a similar offer to the U.S. government through John Scali, a reporter for ABC. President Kennedy, too, “was for the first time hopeful that our efforts might possibly be successful” (69).