Throughout his public life, Theodore Roosevelt argued that a powerful navy worked as a steady brake on conflict rather than an engine for it. He eschewed the more avoidant approach of other presidents who prioritized peace by neglecting the country’s military, specifically its navy. In To Rescue the American Spirit, Bret Baier shows Roosevelt tying naval strength to deterrence, since visible preparation reduces the chance that a hostile power will gamble on aggression. Roosevelt developed this view early in his career and kept it at the center of his presidency, from his writing on military readiness to his decision to send the Great White Fleet around the world. He treated sea power as a means of projecting stability so potential rivals had little incentive to provoke a fight. His goal rested on creating conditions so favorable to American interests that armed conflict would fade as a likely outcome.

Roosevelt built this outlook on his study of American history, especially the War of 1812, which he used to argue that a country that leaves itself unprepared invites disaster. The book quotes his claim that “a proper armament is the surest guarantee of peace—and is the only guarantee that war, if it does come, will not mean irreparable and overwhelming disaster” (111). Roosevelt compared battleship construction to buying insurance, since he saw naval investment as a careful, defensive hedge against catastrophe. His argument challenged the pacifist claim that military buildup heightens the odds of war, and it outright conflicted with President McKinley’s stance that investment in one’s military was both unnecessary in times of peace and sowed unease among the American people. He instead framed a strong navy as a stabilizing force that protected a nation from coercion.

As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt put this approach into practice. Rising tension with Spain over Cuba pushed him to strengthen American readiness, and he sent a cable to Commodore George Dewey that reflected his mindset. The cable told Dewey to keep his crews stocked with coal and, if war came, to launch “offensive operations in Philippine Islands” (122). Roosevelt wanted Dewey ready for a quick strike that would seize the advantage on a secondary front. This step captured Roosevelt’s habit of planning early so the navy could set the terms of any conflict that broke out. His preparation ensured that if war erupted, the United States would fight from a position of strength. Once the Spanish-American War was declared, Roosevelt’s efforts in the Philippines immediately paid off, garnering the admiration of even those who’d previously doubted his readiness for conflict.

Roosevelt relied on this same mixture of strength and message when he sent the Great White Fleet on its world tour after he became president. In 1907, he ordered 16 battleships to circle the globe for 14 months. Baier describes the journey as a piece of strategic communication rather than a threat. Roosevelt wanted to stage a “show of dominance” aimed at potential rivals, especially Japan, so they understood the reach of American sea power (276). The tour also stirred national pride and helped him win support in Congress for future naval appropriations. By highlighting America’s ability to operate in two oceans, Roosevelt signaled that the nation had the reach to defend its interests far from home. This demonstration captured his belief that the surest way to avoid a fight is to make clear that the country can win one.