Upheaval: Turning Points for Nations in Crisis

“[A] situation in which you found yourself facing an important challenge that felt insurmountable by your usual methods of coping and problem-solving. You struggled to develop new coping methods. As I did, you questioned your identity, your values, and your view of the world.”

Describing what a personal crisis is, Diamond highlights the need for intentional change in the definition. Crises, both personal and national, require selective changes. No one or no nation can completely change. Understanding what should be retained and what should be changed is critical to The Successful Navigation of National Crises.

“Hence we expect some relationships between how individuals cope with individual problems, and how nations composed of many individuals cope with national problems.”

Diamond’s thesis is that coping mechanisms developed for individuals in crisis apply to nations as well, invoking Parallels Between Personal Therapy and Collective Adaptation. Here he acknowledges that there will not be a perfect fit, given the differences between individuals and nations. However, he expects this framework to have significant applicability.

“It took the Finns’ fierce resistance and willingness to die, and the slowness and the cost of the war against Finland, to convince the Soviet Union not to try to conquer all of Finland in March 1940.”

Facing the crisis of a Soviet invasion, the Finns were realistic in setting their goals. They knew that they could not defeat the much larger and well-armed Soviets. However, they used guerrilla tactics and their local knowledge of conditions to slow the invasion and inflict heavy casualties. That resistance proved decisive in achieving the Finns’ goal of retaining independence.

“The Soviet Union would never have behaved as it did if it had not trusted and felt secure with Finland and with Finland’s leaders.”

As a small country sharing a long border with the Soviet Union, Finland had to make sure that the larger country had no incentive to invade. As a result, its post-war leaders made concessions to appease the Soviets. For example, the press self-censored so as not to offend Soviet sensibilities. Although Westerners criticized the Finns for making such concessions, the country was correct to do so. Its leaders recognized Finland’s unique vulnerability. With these concessions, Finland was able to thrive with a democratic system and strong economy.

“For Japan, Perry’s arrival, and his open threat of overwhelming force, conformed to our definition of a ‘crisis’: a serious challenge that cannot be solved by existing methods of coping.”

Prior to Perry’s arrival in 1853, Japan was a society closed to foreigners. Perry demanded that ports be open to US ships. Realizing that Japan could not adequately defend itself against such a Western invader, the country set out to strengthen itself via the acquirement of some Western methods. Japan successfully coped with this external crisis by engaging in a process of selective change.

“The third basic principle of Meiji leaders was to identify, adopt, and modify, in each sphere of life, the foreign model that was best matched to Japanese conditions and values.”

The Nature of Successful Navigation During National Crises was embodied by Japan’s use of several Western models in each sphere. Several of its leaders traveled to the West and learned the various ways in which educational systems, economic systems, military systems, and others were structured in different societies. They modeled their systems on the best one in each sphere for their needs. For example, Japan modeled its navy on the British one, and its army on the German one, all while retaining its core cultural values.

“Even though he knew that his candidacy had been supported by only 36% of Chilean voters and had been opposed by the Chilean armed forces and the U.S. government, he rejected moderation, caution, and compromise, and instead pursued policies guaranteed to be anathema to those opposing forces.”

Referring to Allende, Diamond highlights his lack of an honest appraisal of his power and the importance of this factor, which in turn exacerbated the crisis in Chile, especially when these policies caused the economy to decline. Diamond’s analysis is, however, somewhat contradictory and incomplete, as he later credits Pinochet with resolving some aspects of the crisis even though Pinochet wholeheartedly rejected “moderation, caution, and compromise” himself, and killed or disappeared his opponents during his own regime. Diamond also tends to downplay or ignore the US’s direct interference in undermining Allende through supporting his opponents and embracing the coup. Such aspects of Diamond’s analysis reflect the fact that he is writing for a popular audience, not a specialist one, and so resorts to simplification and generalization to maintain accessibility and clearer argumentative lines.

“Thus, Chile after Pinochet reverted to being a functional democracy still anomalous for Latin America, but with a huge selective change: a willingness to tolerate, compromise, and share and alternate power.”

During Pinochet’s dictatorship and in the years leading up to it, Chileans had no desire for compromise and considered political opponents enemies. After Pinochet relinquished power, there was a recognition of the need to build a Chile for all. The left-leaning parties retained market reforms, for example. In making this change, Chileans ended their long-lasting crisis. Such examples provide evidence for the value of Learning from Comparative History, as Diamond later asserts that the US currently faces similar problems with political polarization.

“The archipelago’s inhabitants themselves did not share a national identity, nor a national language, nor a sense of unity in opposition to the Dutch.”

It was Europeans who came up with the term Indonesia around 1850. This nation thus had the weakest sense of national identity when confronted with a crisis in the 1960s. As in Chile, political opponents were cast as enemies with no common bonds, and a murderous campaign took place under Suharto. Diamond notes that great strides have been made since then in developing a national identity in Indonesia.

“Within three days, military commanders began a propaganda campaign to justify round-ups and killings of Indonesian communists and their sympathizers on a vast scale.”

Once Suharto took control of the Indonesian army following the failed September movement, he moved quickly to crush the opposition. At least half a million people were killed in these round-ups. The few generals killed in the failed movement became the excuse for these mass killings. Suharto thus took advantage of the crisis to consolidate power and crush his political opponents.

“Instead, the government’s focus was overwhelmingly on the urgent tasks of feeding and housing tens of millions of underfed and homeless Germans, rebuilding Germany’s bombed cities and ruined economy, and re-establishing democratic government after 12 years of Nazi rule.”

Here, Diamond describes the extent of the crisis that Germany faced in the aftermath of World War II. Faced with these challenges, the first chancellor of West Germany did not investigate the extent of ordinary Germans’ involvement in Nazi crimes. Later, however, there were prosecutions of ordinary Germans and wider societal acceptance of responsibility for the atrocities committed in the Nazi era.

“The U.S. and Western Europe reached the conclusion that West Germany was now to be trusted as a democracy and dependable ally. The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc partners reached the conclusion that West Germany was now to be valued as a major trade partner, and was no longer to be feared as a military or territorial threat.”

As a result of Brandt’s policies, specifically his acceptance of Germany’s permanent loss of territory and his apology in Warsaw, West Germany was able to have beneficial relations with the east. Given the Cold War and the changes made to reverse authoritarianism in German society, the country was also considered a reliable ally in the west. Brandt set the stage for the reunification of Germany, which did not occur until years after he left office. Such acceptance of personal responsibility is one of the Parallels Between Personal Therapy and Collective Adaptation that Diamond highlights throughout his analysis.

“World War Two started to bring to the surface Australians’ recognition that their long-held self-image of being a second Britain halfway around the world was becoming out-of-date and no longer fitted Australia’s changed circumstances.”

According to Diamond, Australia faced a crisis of national identity. Prior to World War II, the country was ethnically homogenous and identified as British. Beginning with World War II, Australians began to realize that their future was more with Asia than Europe. Additionally, the country gradually dropped its exclusionary immigration policies toward people who were not European.

“The percentage of Australians who were born in Britain is rapidly decreasing. It seems only a matter of time before there will be another referendum on whether Australia should become a republic, and the chances of a ‘yes’ vote will be higher.”

In 1999, 55% of Australians voted to retain the British monarch as their head of state. This is one feature of Australia that represents the selective nature of changes: It kept this affiliation with Britain, while diversifying and trading more with Asia. Diamond speculates that, in time, a majority of Australians will reject even this affiliation.

“Instead, Japan’s dilemma is that it suffers from widely acknowledged problems that other countries mitigate by means of immigration, but that Japan hasn’t figured out how to solve without resorting to immigration.”

Examining Japan’s unfolding crisis, Diamond highlights its lack of willingness to model other countries, such as Canada, which have faced similar problems, pointing to the importance of Learning from Comparative History. Japan is instead in denial about its unfolding crisis of an aging population and therefore is not adequately planning for it. This behavior and attitude are found as well in its approach to other crises, such as its lack of support for sustainable resources.

“Until they are practiced in Japan, Chinese and Koreans will continue to disbelieve Japanese scripted apologies, and to hate Japan. And as long as China and Korea are armed to the hilt while Japan remains without the means to defend itself, a big danger will continue to hang over Japan.”

Unlike Germany, Japan has not issued an unconditional apology for the atrocities it committed against Korea and Japan in World War II. Nor has it educated its citizens about these atrocities, as Germany has done. This failure to accept responsibility for its actions could lead to a crisis down the road if either North Korea or China decided to act against Japan. Japan’s refusal to embrace Learning from Comparative History thus heightens its crisis instead of resolving it.

“However, the phenomenon is even broader: polarization, intolerance, and abusiveness are also increasing in other spheres of American life besides the political sphere.”

According to Diamond, the biggest challenge that the US faces is the increasing polarization among the citizenry and the resultant lack of ability to compromise. This is a crisis unfolding that could undermine the American system of government. As of 2019, there was no acknowledgment of this problem and therefore nothing was being done to address it.

“We tend to have strong inhibitions about being rude to a live human who is two feet away from us, and whom we can see and hear. But we lose those inhibitions when people are reduced to words on a screen.”

Explaining the causes of polarization in American society, Diamond partly blames the increase in non-face-to-face communication. Additionally, he cites the divergent sources of news consumed by liberals and conservatives. These and other factors have led to a decline in social capital, which is fueling an unfolding crisis.

“All of these selective obstacles contribute to the fact that voter turnout is over 80% for Americans with incomes exceeding $150,000, but under 50% for Americans with incomes under $20,000.”

Another challenge facing the US is its elections. Since the US places obstacles in the path of voting, such as registration and photo identification requirements, turnout is lower than in other wealthy democracies. There is a class dimension to that as well, with poorer people less likely to vote. This disparity will make unfolding crises more difficult to tackle, as the elected representatives have less incentive to address economic inequality as they answer mainly to wealthy voters.

“To that answer, I’d add: when powerful rich Americans realize that nothing they do will enable them to remain physically safe, if most other Americans remain angry, frustrated, and realistically without hope.”

Pondering what it will take for Americans to acknowledge its unfolding crisis and undertake an honest appraisal of what needs to change, Diamond argues that wealthy Americans will have to feel the negative impact of inequality. At present, they are more likely to build gates, buy homes in safe foreign countries, or build underground bunkers. Until they feel unsafe, Americans are unlikely to confront the crisis.

“In short, as world human population and consumption rise, we can expect many, many more conflicts caused by international competition for limiting resources.”

As the world’s resources become taxed, there is likely to be wars over them. Already, there have been wars over access to fossil fuels, such as oil. It is thus important to address the problem of global resource depletion. Unfortunately, the world does not have the factors associated with The Nature of Successful Navigation During National Crises. Diamond notes, however, that there has been some progress made on world problems nonetheless.

“World recognition of our problems, and world efforts to solve them, have also increased markedly since 2005. It still isn’t clear which horse will win the race.”

Since world problems have increased significantly as well as efforts to solve them, Diamond notes that it remains unclear which will prevail. He argues that in a few decades, it will become clear if problems overtake the world, or if solutions are found. His framework does not provide much optimism for the solution of world problems.

“[E]ven as fear of the Chilean army receded, Chilean leftists in power, while continuing to hate Pinochet’s supporters, adopted a conciliatory policy of building ‘a Chile for all Chileans’ […] That’s a remarkable achievement.”

After democracy returned to Chile, the country’s political leaders made the selective change of tolerance. They were willing to compromise with political opponents, even ones who supported the murders of their friends and family. That adjustment enabled Chile to return to democracy and put its crisis behind it. Diamond compares this willingness to the unwillingness to compromise in the US in the 21st century, urging the US to embrace Learning from Comparative History to avoid a crisis of polarization.