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In 1939, Finland refused to agree to the Soviet Union’s territorial demands, as other Baltic states did. As a result, the Soviet Union attacked Finland during World War II. Putting up a fierce resistance, Finland ultimately retained its independence. However, the cost was high, with nearly 100,000 killed, which represented 2.5% of Finland’s population at the time (61). Finland’s successful navigation of the crisis during the Soviet invasion can partly be attributed to the “strength and origins of Finnish national identity; Finns’ ultra-realistic assessment of their country’s geopolitical situation” (62) and their success at making selective changes. It did this despite a lack of freedom of choice, no help from allies, and no models.
Although Finland identifies with Scandinavia, it has a distinct national identity. The Finnish language is unique and difficult to learn, making it a source of national pride and identity. Finland shares a land border with Russia that “is longer than that of any other European country” (62). That geographical reality has caused Finland to maintain “an excellent and trusting relationship” (57) with the former Soviet Union and Russia.
During the 1930s, Finland strengthened its armed forces under General Mannerheim and attempted to remain neutral in foreign affairs. However, the Finns correctly suspected that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and Russia in 1939 ceded Finland to the Soviet Union. The Finns rejected the territorial demands of the Soviets unanimously because they feared that Stalin’s long-term goal was to take the whole country. They also miscalculated, thinking that Stalin was only bluffing and would negotiate. In the event of an invasion, they incorrectly assumed that allies would come to their defense.
On November 30th, 1939, the Soviet Union attacked “along the whole length of the Finnish/Soviet border” (71). The Soviet Union had vastly superior military resources. Finland hoped only to delay the advance and make it costly for the invaders, hoping for outside help to come. Nevertheless, Finland’s defenses held. They made up for their lack of numbers and weapons with guerrilla tactics. While the Finns held out for a long time, they were still “just buying time” (74).
Ultimately, the Soviets broke through the Finns’ defenses at the Mannerheim line. Recognizing the importance of occupying as much territory as possible with peace negotiations under way, Mannerheim nonetheless kept his soldiers fighting despite heavy losses. In the peace negotiations, the Soviet Union imposed harsh conditions, taking an entire province and the uses of ports for naval bases. Had the Finns not resisted, Stalin would have taken all of Finland. The peace did not last long. Once Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Soviet planes began attacking Finnish cities in June 1940.
Finland described themselves as co-belligerents with Nazi Germany. However, they refused to round up Jewish citizens or to attack Leningrad. With the Soviet Union engaged in its own defense, Finland reclaimed the previously ceded province of Karelia. Later in the war, as the tide was turning toward the Allies, the Soviet Union again launched an offensive in Finland. Once again, the Finns made it difficult for them. In July 1944, a treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed, giving the Soviets Karelia again. Additionally, the Finns had to arrest their own leaders for wartime collaboration with Germany, pay heavy reparations to the Soviet Union, and have 20% of their trade be with the Soviet Union.
As a small and weak country with few allies, Finland recognized in the post-war years that it had to maintain the Soviet Union’s trust. Its two post-war presidents, Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen, who led the country from 1946 to 1981, reversed the disastrous policy of ignoring Russia and were willing to sacrifice some political and economic freedoms to retain the country’s independence (85). Finland pursued policies that pacified the Soviet Union and expanded its involvement with the West. It made itself more valuable to the Soviet Union as an independent ally, and therefore reduced Soviet motivation to invade it. Its government and press refrained from criticizing the Soviet Union. In doing so, it combined independence from the Soviet Union with economic growth (89). Finland created a strong educational system and became a leader in technology. It “went from being a poor country to being one of the richest in the world” (91).
Finland thus displayed seven of Diamond’s factors in negotiating this crisis. It accepted responsibility and engaged in an honest self-appraisal. Given its size and lack of allies, it had to keep ties with the Soviet Union. It built a fence or engaged in selective change. It reversed its policy of ignoring the Soviet Union, but retained its independence and ties with the West. Its strong national identity provided motivation to fight occupation. Persisting in efforts to find the right balance in its relation with the Soviet Union, Finland demonstrated flexibility and a willingness to confront failure. That flexibility caused it to do things other democracies would not, such as delaying a Presidential election and press self-censorship. Its core value of independence united the country in these efforts.
When a crisis came to Japan on July 8th, 1853, it prompted a program of selective change. What is known as Meiji Japan selectively incorporated western ways into Japanese culture. Diamond argues that Japan in this era engaged in an honest self-appraisal, exhibited patience experimenting with solutions, and expertly used other nations as models (102-3). Compared to Finland, Japan had more freedom of action and adopted more comprehensive changes.
Until 1853, Japan had very limited contact with foreigners. In that year, Japan was a feudal society ruled by shoguns. Since gold had been discovered in California, there was “an explosion of American ship traffic to the Pacific coast” (108) around this time. When some of the ships got wrecked in waters near Japan, the Japanese killed or arrested the American sailors.
The US wanted its sailors protected and wanted its ships to buy coal in Japan. On July 8th, 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry sailed a fleet into what is now Tokyo Bay and delivered these demands to the Japanese government. He promised to return the following year with his warships for an answer. A crisis had arrived in Japan, as past coping methods would not work to resolve it. The following year, Japan signed its first treaty with a western country, followed by treaties with others. Ending a 215-year policy of isolation, Japan opened two harbors to American ships (109).
At a military disadvantage, these initial treaties were unfair to Japan. The country’s leaders sought to delay and undermine these treaties, while appearing to obey them. The idea was to win time to acquire Western knowledge and equipment to compete with the West. There was, however, conflict among local leaders or domains about whether to expel foreigners or to wait until Japan became stronger. Two powerful domains, Satsuma and Choshu, conspired to end the shogunate. They gave power, under the fictional guise of a restoration, to a new emperor. This event, which took place on January 3rd, 1868, was called the Meiji Restoration.
The first order of business for the new regime was to gain control of the country. After a civil war, the imperial government prevailed and was recognized by foreign powers in June 1869. The Meiji leaders followed three principles. First, they were realists who recognized that Westerners could not be expelled until Japan strengthened itself by adopting far-reaching reforms. Second, the goal was to revise the unequal treaties imposed upon them after gaining strength and adopting a Western-style constitution (116). Third, the Meiji leaders adopted different foreign models for specific areas. The “borrowing from the West was massive, conscious, and planned” (117). These innovations were presented to the Japanese people as a return to old traditions.
Selective changes included the creation of a modern army, the abolition of feudalism, the founding of a national system of education, and tax reform. The educational system was especially important because it ensured a loyal citizenry and led to the abolition of hereditary positions. In each area, the Japanese chose foreign models compatible with their views but also likely to give them respect from the West. As a result, Japanese culture developed into “a mosaic of new Western elements and traditional Japanese elements” (124). The Meiji leaders kept the nation unified by developing a sense of public duty among its citizenry, with the virtues of fraternal love, loyalty, and sincerity valued.
Japan’s military expansion in the Meiji Era was successful because it was guided by a realistic self-appraisal of strengths and weaknesses. A milestone of success came with Japan’s defeat of Russia in the 1904-05 war. Diamond compares this period in Japanese history to World War II. Unlike in the Meiji Era, Japanese leaders lacked experience with foreign countries and did not engage in an honest self-appraisal. That turned out to be “disastrous for Japan” (132).
Japan, among all the case studies, excelled at borrowing from different foreign models. Additionally, it is in Finland’s company in its realistic self-appraisal. There was consensus about the reality of a crisis when Perry came with his ultimatum. Japan built a fence and introduced selective changes. They accepted help from foreigners and exhibited patience working out solutions. They were able to retain core values and build a sense of national identity.
In the case studies of Finland and Meiji Japan, Diamond focuses on the national resolutions of crises that emerge from sudden and external threats, leaning upon Learning from Comparative History to determine common factors. These two nations have many differences in history, culture, and form of government. Typically, political scientists compare nations with much in common, such as Western European nations. They do this to isolate a factor, such as gun laws, and highlight its role. When there are myriad differences, it is more difficult to isolate one factor that explains differences. While Diamond is solely focused on the resolution of crises, he runs the risk of understating the impact of political and economic institutions in comparing dissimilar nations.
The Soviet Union invaded Finland and Commodore Perry arrived in Japan promising force if the country did not comply with his demands, with both Finland and Japan facing an external threat as the trigger for their crises. Diamond then attempts to apply Parallels Between Personal Therapy and Collective Adaptation to see which therapeutic factors were relevant in the resolutions to these crises. In doing so, Diamond demonstrates that not all 12 factors are required for the successful resolution of a crisis. In the case of Finland, for example, there was no support from allies and they lacked a model to emulate. In spite of these disadvantages, Finland coped through a guerilla resistance that ultimately ensured the country’s post-war independence, then followed up with selective changes based on a realistic appraisal of the country’s strengths and weaknesses.
In the case of Meiji Japan, the missing factors from Finland’s portfolio proved crucial to the resolution of its crisis. Like Finland, Meiji Japan acknowledged the crisis, accepted responsibility, and engaged in a process of selective change. However, Meiji Japan benefitted enormously from financial support from the West and the use of Western models. It identified the best models in the West for various institutions, such as schooling and the army. As an island archipelago, it additionally had substantially fewer geopolitical constraints than Finland.
Both countries benefitted as well from the other factors. For example, each had a strong sense of national identity and core values. Both also exhibited flexibility. In these two cases, there are some important leaders but no dominant one. Rather, a consensus on the approach to each crisis was reached within both countries. In post-war Finland, for example, two consecutive leaders adopted the same approach to the country’s relationship with the Soviet Union and the West.
These cases additionally present clear results, reflecting The Nature of Successful Navigation During National Crises. Meiji Japan was able to strengthen its international position by drawing selectively on Western models. Ultimately, it was able to renegotiate unfair treaties with the West and win a war against Russia. Likewise, Finland went from being a poor to wealthy country with a high standard of living and remained independent. Diamond thus argues that both countries weathered their crises successfully, even though they faced certain disadvantages while doing so.



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