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Upheaval: Turning Points for Nations in Crisis
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Part 2, Chapters 4-5Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 2: “Nations: Crises That Unfolded”
Part 2, Chapter 4 Summary: “A Chile for All Chileans”
With a long history of democratic government, Chileans were shocked when a military government took over in 1973 and stayed in power for 17 years. The regime, led by Pinochet, was brutal, with large numbers of Chileans killed, tortured, and imprisoned during its reign.
Due to its geography and people, Chileans were relatively united prior to 1970. The country is isolated by ocean, desert, and mountains. Its people are relatively homogeneous in ethnic background. However, as a former Spanish colony, there is a significant division among economic classes. The Spanish established large land holdings, which led to an oligarchy controlling “most of the land, wealth, and politics” (145). In the late 1940s, the adoption of a secret ballot and the granting of vote to women changed that balance of power. Left-leaning parties gained more power and competed with centrists and right-leaning parties. Facing gridlock, all three coalitions were frustrated with politics by 1969.
In 1970, Salvador Allende, of the left, was elected President. He received the largest share of the vote, but that was only 36%. Despite his lack of a mandate, Allende “rejected moderation, caution, and compromise” (150). He implemented policies that were unacceptable to the opposition. For example, he nationalized big businesses, converted large estates into peasant cooperatives, and allowed large numbers of Cubans into Chile. The result of his policies, coupled with hostile US policies, was economic chaos, violence, and intense opposition to Allende (151).
On September 11th, 1973, a military coup overthrew Allende. Although the US had been trying to undermine Allende, the coup was carried out by Chileans. Initially, centrist and rightist Chileans welcomed the change and expected a brief transition back to democracy. That did not happen. The junta, which led the coup, selected Pinochet as leader. They expected leadership to rotate. Pinochet had other ideas and stayed in power for 17 years.
Pinochet ordered the deaths of thousands of Chileans, hoping to exterminate the left-wing (156). Under his leadership, all political activities were banned, Congress was closed, and universities taken over by the government. He created a secret police force that made people “disappear” (156) into secret detention camps or to their deaths.
Pinochet reversed previous economic policies and sought to create a free-market economy. Hundreds of state-owned businesses were privatized. The economy improved, with inflation way down. However, the economic benefits flowed to the middle- and upper-classes, with many living in poverty (161). In the 1980s, the US soured on Pinochet because of the mounting evidence of human rights abuses and an economic downturn in the Chilean economy. In 1988, a vote was held on extending Pinochet’s term another eight years. Rallying around the slogan “No!” (163), opposition forces defeated Pinochet. However, despite the horrific human rights abuses, 42% of Chileans voted for him.
In the aftermath of this victory, the opposition learned that it must compromise. Chile therefore returned to being a democracy, “but with a huge selective change: a willingness to tolerate, compromise, and share and alternate power” (165). The new regime also did not change the free-market system put in place by Pinochet. However, social spending increased, enhancing the economic standing of the poor. The country survived the crisis with the return of the rule of law, property rights, a strong economy, and democracy.
The threat of Pinochet’s return to power and his continued role in public life made a reckoning with the past difficult. When a Spanish judge issued a warrant for Pinochet’s arrest for crimes against humanity in 1998 and a US Senate subcommittee revealed that he had hidden 30 million dollars in secret US bank accounts (169), a turning point came. Ultimately indicted for financial crimes and murders, Pinochet was declared unfit to stand trial because of dementia. Later, hundreds of Pinochet’s “torturers and killers” (170) were indicted, with dozens imprisoned.
Applying his framework, Diamond notes that Chile demonstrates several of the factors foretelling success in the resolution of crises. Its changes were selective and large. When Pinochet was ousted, the free-market economy was retained and the opposition changed to be more accepting of compromise. Chileans retained their sense of national identity and pride, considering themselves capable of self-governance. Leading to the crisis, Allende failed to realistically appraise his political authority. In contrast, Pinochet and the junta correctly appraised their strengths. The support of allies, or lack thereof, was evident in these crises as well: The US helped to undermine popular support for Allende and restored aid to Pinochet. The latter move helped Pinochet remain in power. The US economy served as a model for Pinochet to copy. Allende was constrained by the US, even though Chile was distant geographically.
Chile’s problems arose from internal pressures. It suffered from intense political polarization, a lack of willingness to compromise, and disagreement over core values. In this case, violent revolution became a means to address crisis and, later, peaceful protests became a means to remove a military dictator. Chile additionally highlights the significant impact that one leader can have. Since the military government stepped down peacefully, military leaders still had power. Out of fear of the military’s return to power, the democratic government had to proceed cautiously and “didn’t dare” (176) indict the military criminals at first.
Part 2, Chapter 5 Summary: “Indonesia, The Rise of a New Country”
Like Chile, Indonesia had a “breakdown of political compromise, a leftist effort to gain control of the government, and a military coup that ended that effort and installed a long-lasting dictatorship” (181). Indonesia has thousands of islands over an enormous expanse. It is extraordinarily diverse, with 700 different languages. It was not until 1850 that Europeans named the archipelago Indonesia. Its inhabitants at that time did not share a national identity. The Dutch colonized these islands. Around 1910, an independence movement began to emerge. However, it was fragmented ideologically, geographically, and religiously.
In December 1949, Indonesia gained independence. The new nation was poor, with high population growth. Sukarno, who had issued Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence in 1945, was Indonesia’s founding president. He set forth a set of five principles called “Pancasila” which serves as a unifying ideology for the country. The principles are “belief in one god, national unity, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice for all Indonesians” (189). Blaming Indonesia’s problems on the Dutch, he created a state-centered economy and civil bureaucracy. In so doing, he contributed to a culture of corruption from which his family benefitted.
With little experience of democracy, the country quickly fell prey to stalemate and gridlock. In 1957, Sukarno declared martial law and introduced the concept of “guided democracy” (190). He appointed more than half the seats in the legislature and declared himself president for life in 1963. He then ordered military campaigns to annex two territories, Dutch New Guinea and parts of Malaysia.
In the 1960s, there was a three-way power struggle in Indonesia between Sukarno, the armed forces, and the Communist Party. The Communist Party lacked military power. With Sukarno’s blessing in 1965, the Party wanted to arm peasants and workers. In response, anti-communist military officers established a Council of Generals to deter this threat. In the early hours of October 1st, 1965, leftist commanders and some 2,000 troops were sent to capture these generals in their homes. They called themselves “the September movement” and claimed to be protecting Sukarno from corrupt generals. However, this coup was bungled (194-195). Its participants killed several generals instead of capturing them, and they failed to secure the headquarters of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve.
The Commander at the Reserve was Suharto. He was able to crush the September 30th Movement by the night of October 1st. He publicly announced that he was in control of the Indonesian military and that he would protect Sukarno. Three days later, military leaders rounded up and killed “Indonesian communists and their sympathizers on a vast scale” (197). At least a half million and as many as two million people were killed in 1965 and 1966, making this targeting “one of the world’s biggest episodes of mass murder since World War Two” (200). Diamond argues that the speed and organization of this response suggests prior planning. The military also launched a sophisticated propaganda campaign, marching the generals’ coffins through the streets and blaming their deaths on the Communist Party. In actuality, units within the military carried out the killings. The goal was to destroy the military’s strongest opponents.
Although Suharto maintained publicly that he was acting on Sukarno’s behalf, he gradually assumed power. In March 1966, Sukarno ceded his authority to him. Suharto formally assumed the Presidency in 1968 and remained in power for over 30 years. Once in power, Suharto abandoned Sukarno’s territorial ambitions and aligned with the West. He instituted free-market reforms. However, the military also engaged in economic planning, with corruption and extortion practiced on “a huge scale” (202).
Suharto established a military state with no toleration for dissent. Suharto not only presided over the killings of at least a half-million people, he also imprisoned thousands. He authorized the brutal war in East Timor. However, Diamond notes as well that Suharto attracted foreign investors, grew the economy, promoted family planning, improved agriculture, and created a sense of national identity (208).
In May 1998, Suharto’s regime finally collapsed due to the Asian financial crisis, Suharto’s declining political skills, and anger at widespread corruption. The military yielded to the “wave of protests” (205), and Suharto resigned. Since 1999, Indonesia has conducted free elections and, in 2014, an anti-establishment civilian was elected President. Corruption has decreased.
Applying his framework to Indonesia, Diamond argues the country built a fence, or engaged in selective change. It retained its territorial integrity, religious toleration, and a non-communist government, while replacing civilian government with a military dictatorship and then reversing that. Initially, Indonesia had weak national identity and lacked a history of successful changes. Sukarno did not engage in realistic self-appraisal, while Suharto did. Internal constraints of poverty and population growth limited freedom of action.
As an island archipelago, Indonesia was largely free of external constraints. It benefitted from foreign investments and its economists were able to draw on foreign models in transforming to a free-market economy. Leaders played a key role in Indonesia’s crises. Unlike in Chile, there was no reckoning with the “murderous cruelty” (211) of Suharto, as the armed forces were too powerful.
Part 2, Chapters 4-5 Analysis
In comparing the resolution of crises in Chile and Indonesia, Diamond focuses on sudden crises that arise from internal sources. Once again, these nations have very distinct histories, institutions, and cultures, which is an unusual combination when Learning from Comparative History. For example, Indonesians had virtually no experience with democracy, while Chileans did. Nevertheless, Diamond identifies and examines common factors: Brutal dictators took advantage of crises in both Indonesia and Chile, each remained in power for lengthy periods, and ultimately left office peacefully. Democracy returned to each country, but with a lingering threat and fear of military intervention for some time.
These case studies create some ambiguity around how Diamond defines The Nature of Successful Navigation During National Crises and when, exactly, a crisis begins and ends. For example, while Diamond notes that Suharto of Indonesia and Pinochet of Chile used a crisis to assume power, his accounts of mass murder and widespread oppression over several decades, ultimately leading to popular protests, suggest that these dictators also created other crises that endured for many years. Since a crisis is usually supposed to denote a specific and generally short-term problem, it is not entirely clear whether Diamond’s analysis covers multiple succeeding crises, or what he regards as one long crisis with multiple facets or episodes that can unfold over decades.
Likewise, it is not always clear what counts as a definitive, successful resolution to a crisis in Diamond’s analysis. Diamond suggests that both dictators had some success in making selective changes and strengthening their economies, at least in terms of bolstering the middle- and upper-classes—while Diamond does acknowledge the serious poverty for many other citizens, he does not clarify how that fits into his model of success. Similarly, Suharto improved Indonesia’s economy and stopped the foreign wars of Sukarno, but it still remains unclear whether these factors count as a resolution of a crisis, or a perpetuation of it by raising other issues, such as extreme human rights abuses. If success is defined to mean only that the nation survives, then the criterion is met. However, that definition leaves much room for poor outcomes for the majority of the citizenry. The bitter disagreement over core values when Suharto and Pinochet came to power could alternatively be seen as causing a failure to navigate the country’s crisis, as each leader simply decided to murder or imprison those who disagreed with them.
Ultimately, both countries returned to democracy with the dictators yielding to popular votes and leaving office. The factors most important to ending the crisis of Pinochet’s dictatorship and ensuring the survival of democracy in its aftermath were a realistic appraisal of the situation, a strong sense of national identity, and the introduction of selective change. The new regime did not seek to punish those who supported Pinochet, kept the free market economy, and embraced political compromise.
In Indonesia, Suharto’s regime and the return to free elections did not result from the opposition successfully navigating this crisis. Rather, it came about due to Suharto’s advanced age and declining political skills, a financial crisis, and anger at rampant corruption. Thus, these case studies potentially highlight factors contributing to the continued existence of the nations but do not provide as much insight into what factors could have prevented the crisis of mass murder or, at least, shortened the time these dictators remained in power.
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