Upheaval: Turning Points for Nations in Crisis

Diamond reviews how well his 12 factors applied to his sample countries. Nations, like individuals, must acknowledge that they are in a crisis. Finland and Meiji Japan did so when faced with an external threat. Chile and Indonesia agreed on the existence of a crisis, but different groups identified different threats. Others, such as Germany and Australia, spent a long time denying the existence of a crisis, but ultimately reached that realization. 

Second, there must be an acceptance of responsibility for the crisis. The seven nations in Diamond’s study “illustrate acceptance as well as denial of responsibility” (426). Finland and Meiji Japan, for example, accepted responsibility, while Australia blamed the British for their crisis initially. The six countries that have dealt with their crises all built a fence and adopted selective changes. The US, confronting a crisis currently, has not done as much in this regard.

All but one country, Finland, received help from other nations in dealing with a crisis. All but Finland and the US used other nations as models. Diamond’s factor of national identity was strong in all cases except Indonesia. However, he notes that national identity has been “growing rapidly” (432) there. Another factor, honest self-appraisal, requires that the nation has accurate knowledge and evaluates that knowledge honestly (435). In Finland and Meiji Japan, there was an honest self-appraisal. Such an appraisal took time to reach in Australia. There is a lack of honest appraisal in both Japan and the US about crises in the 21st century.

Several of these countries have historical experience of previous crises. Finland provides an obvious example. As the “youngest country” (438) in the study, Indonesia has the shortest history of coping successfully with a past crisis, but still has some experience from which to draw confidence. Patience with national failure was demonstrated in all cases except the modern US. Not “steeled to crushing defeat and occupation” (439), Americans are more likely to seek quick solutions instead of being patient. National flexibility, in most cases, is “situation-specific: a country is flexible in some spheres but rigid in other spheres” (441). A nation’s core values can make it “easier or harder for a nation to adopt selective change” (443). The core value of independence allowed Finland to manage the crisis of Soviet invasion, while Japan’s core value of unlimited exploitation of resources in the 21st century is harming the country’s national interests.

Diamond’s last factor, freedom from geopolitical constraints, historically had “the widest variation” (444) among the sample. The US was historically unconstrained, protected by two oceans, while Finland was the most constrained, given its border with Russia. While all countries have vulnerabilities in the modern era because of nuclear weapons, geographical advantages still matter.

Diamond next addresses two questions that did not motivate his study. First, he considers whether countries need a crisis to motivate action, or if they can act in anticipation of problems. His case studies showed that countries can do both. However, “[s]omething big and bad suddenly happening” (449) creates more of a motivation to act. Second, he considers whether leaders make a difference. He argues that leaders “sometimes make a difference. But it depends on the type of leader, and on the type of effect examined” (452). In his case studies, Pinochet was impactful, as was Brandt in post-war Germany. Overall, his case studies conform to the conclusion of other scholars that there is a greater effect of leaders in autocracies (454). In wartime, democratic leaders potentially have fewer constraints and therefore a greater ability to wield influence. Another hypothesis is that leaders make the most difference when they face strong opposition but nonetheless prevail in fulfilling their agenda.

Going forward, Diamond suggests scholars study a “larger and more random sample” (456) and that they operationalize his factors into measurable variables. From studying history, one can learn about the behavior of a given country. Additionally, themes, such as the predicament of small countries bordering large aggressive ones, emerge. His study of the resolution of historical crises has exposed the factors that have helped nations navigate them. Though these factors might seem obvious to some, he claims that they have often been ignored and continue to be so today (462).