Utopia for Realists: And How We Can Get There

In 2009, the city of London began an experiment in which it provided money to some of its homeless citizens, without conditions. Bregman notes that the results were encouraging in terms of both expense and results. The program was far less costly than establishing a network of social services that people may or may not use, and giving people discretion over how to spend their money enabled them to target their own needs, whether that was education, housing, rehabilitation, or repaying debts. Conventional wisdom ties social welfare to employment, on the premise that pay without work incentivizes laziness. Social experiments instead suggest that giving money to poor people results in their becoming more productive and less prone to social troubles such as crime, alcoholism, or dropping out of school. Furthermore, they do so without all the expenses and red tape that come with traditional humanitarian aid, which funnels through large bureaucracies that often have rigid requirements. Programs focusing on education are expensive and often leave people with skills but still lacking basic necessities.

A free basic income for everyone is a utopian idea that may be far more practical than current policies. In the small town of Dauphin, Canada, the provincial government paid its citizens a basic free income from 1973 to 1977, when a conservative government terminated the program despite its clear record of success—especially with respect to the health of the community. Bregman notes that similar experimental programs in the US resulted in a slight reduction in paid work hours for those receiving cash, though people likely compensated for that time with other productive activities like spending time with family and developing skills for higher-paying jobs. The concept of a basic income garnered widespread support among economists, newspaper editorial boards, and even the White House during Richard Nixon’s presidency, although President Nixon was unable to pass a plan through Congress. The main objection was an apparent correlation between providing money and a rise in divorce rates, which suggested that women were gaining greater financial independence; however, later analysis suggested that this data was faulty.

The plan for a universal basic income receives many of the same criticisms that most bold social programs typically do. The first is that the plan could not work, but Bregman shows how wealthy modern societies can easily afford such a program and that they would probably save money in the long run. Countries that do the most to eradicate poverty tend to show the best results. The next criticism is that such a program would be risky, in this instance incentivizing people not to work. Even if this is true, the author points out, freeing up certain people for other forms of productivity may be beneficial, and most will still want to work. The final criticism is that it would generate unintended consequences and worsen the problem it aims to solve, but Bregman notes that this description is more fitting for the current welfare system’s byzantine bureaucracy and arbitrary rules. The political left, he holds, should embrace a program likely to enhance economic equality, and the right should welcome a program needing far less government intervention. A basic income can help workers handle the traumatic effects of globalization, which has made the middle class far less attainable than in previous generations. It provides a chance to reinvest in social capital and redirect capitalism toward the common good rather than wealth accumulation for its own sake. Implementing this policy measure deserves great care, but it can provide the basis for a new way of tackling poverty.