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In the fourth chapter of World Order, Kissinger discusses the complex relationship between the United States and Iran as well as Iran’s place in the regional order of the Middle East and North Africa. The author focuses on the following subjects: “The Tradition of Iranian Statecraft,” “The Khomeini Revolution,” “Nuclear Proliferation and Iran,” and “Vision and Reality.” Kissinger believes that this relationship is particularly challenging and, therefore, requires a separate chapter.
What was called Arab Spring in the West, was actually the “Islamic Awakening,” according to Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. It is this awakening that will put an end to centuries of Western domination because “the universal religious principles, not national interests or liberal internationalism, would dominate the new world” (148). However, decisive global actions did not follow this radical declaration.
Kissinger briefly reviews Persian history, in which its imperial project “represented a form of world ordering in which cultural and political assurance played as great a role as traditional military conquests” (149). After this, the author summarizes the Iranian Revolution of 1979. At this time, Iran was in the American sphere of influence and a part of the Westphalian system. It was also a secular state ruled by Shah Reza Pahlavi. The Ayatollah Khomeini revolution transformed that country into the Islamic Republic, and “the Middle East regional order was turned upside down” (149). The author points out that many of the grievances during the initial revolt were authentic—caused by the Shah’s arbitrary tactics and modernization.
Khomeini’s doctrine was novel for the West because it perceived the state as a tool in a religious struggle. For international relations, argues Kissinger, the Iranian Revolution led to challenges to an existent order. After all, Iran, in its new form, had a seat at the United Nations and “asserted its ‘Westphalian’ rights and privileges” (153) while seeking to overthrow this very system. One of its violations—of diplomatic immunity—was the storming of the American embassy and holding its staff hostage. Furthermore, argues Kissinger, that despite religious differences, the Shia and Sunni Muslims agree “on the need to overthrow the existing world order” (155).
At the same, Kissinger argues that the West needs to remain open to establishing a cooperative relationship with the Islamic Republic. One of the key matters of discussion should be the question of nuclear proliferation. In the Cold War period, the issue of nuclear weapons was framed around deterrence. Today, Kissinger argues that even if a country does not meet the criteria of a rogue state, the spread of nuclear weapons has serious consequences for the world. He raises the question of Iran’s nuclear program and cites the UN Security Council resolutions since 2006 demanding that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities. In 2013, Iran and six key powers reached an interim agreement to temporarily halt Iran’s nuclear program. At the same time, such agreements are complicated by the fact that Iran and the West attach different meanings to the notion of negotiations. Overall, the question of nuclear weapons is one of the key areas needed for peace in the Middle East.
The question of Iran is part of the Middle Eastern regional politics because of its geographic location and religion. However, Kissinger dedicates a separate chapter to this country. He does so because Iran is a major power in the MENA. The challenging and, at times, hostile relationship between Iran and the United States also requires detailed coverage. As with the previous chapters, Kissinger examines the history of Iran to understand its present. He considers the Persian Empire—a major global player in the past—to be important to Iran’s current geopolitical position and self-perception.
Because the relationship between the US and Iran is so complex, Kissinger suggests dealing with this question in the most practical manner possible. Throughout this book, Kissinger is often critical of America’s excessive reliance on moralizing messianism and attempts to export American values abroad. This trend in US foreign policy cannot be fruitful in the relationship with Iran. The author underscores how the cultural differences led to the divergent views on foreign policy, for instance, the Iranian perception that the state is a mere instrument in a greater religious framework.
One key area of cooperation is Iran’s nuclear program. Kissinger examines the question of nuclear proliferation throughout this book: in the context of the Cold War, in the context of Iran and other states like North Korea, and in the context of technological and scientific development. Central to this question is the so-called Iran Deal (2015), or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designed to restrict Iran’s nuclear program while lifting some sanctions against that country. Negotiations occurred for years prior to the 2015 variant, and the US withdrew three years later. The difficulty of negotiating matters like this displays the importance of this nuclear question and demonstrates the US perception of Iranian influence in the region. Furthermore, the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists between 2007 and 2022 with the possible involvement of foreign intelligence, undermine the negotiation process.



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