SS Major Sepp Krafft, commander of a small Panzer Grenadier Training and Reserve Battalion, was unexpectedly ordered to vacate his position in the village of Oosterbeek. Though his unit was awaiting 1,000 SS recruits and was already split between Oosterbeek and Arnhem, Krafft resisted the order, which came not from an SS superior but a Wehrmacht major. (The Wehrmacht or the armed forces of Nazi Germany was separate from the SS, which was a paramilitary organization.) The reason soon became clear: Field Marshal Model’s headquarters was relocating to Oosterbeek. Krafft quickly complied to avoid conflict with Model but chose to relocate his battalion only a short distance away, along the Wolffezé road. Unintentionally, this move placed his forces directly between the future landing zones of the British 1st Airborne Division and their key objective—Arnhem—creating a significant obstacle the Allies did not anticipate.

Henri Knap, a key Dutch underground intelligence officer in Arnhem, continued gathering and relaying enemy activity reports through a covert phone network. Operating from a doctor’s office under the guise of a medical assistant, Knap oversaw a broad network of resistance informants. Though the German presence had been minimal weeks earlier, Knap now observed growing enemy strength, particularly panzer activity. Multiple sources pointed to a massive buildup around Arnhem and the nearby village of Oosterbeek, including the arrival of high-ranking officers. A key breakthrough came when a young agent, Wouter van de Kraats, bluffed his way past guards to spot the checkerboard pennant of a German army group commander outside the Tafelberg Hotel. Based on this and other reports, Knap identified the 8th SS Panzer Division and deduced that Field Marshal Walter Model had likely taken up residence in Oosterbeek.

General Wilhelm Bittrich, commander of the German II SS Panzer Corps, faced worsening conditions as his forces were depleted and reassigned. At a headquarters meeting near Doetinchem, he informed his two division commanders—Heinz Harmel (10th Frundsberg) and Walter Harzer (9th Hohenstaufen)—that the Hohenstaufen would be pulled back to Germany to refit, while the Frundsberg would remain in the Netherlands. Harzer, skeptical, secretly sabotaged the equipment transfer order by disabling vehicles on paper. Meanwhile, rumors of a coming Allied airborne drop spread through German command, though many—especially Field Marshal Model—dismissed them. A captured Dutch double agent, “King Kong” Lindemans, confirmed the rumors, but his intelligence was downplayed due to his reputation. The Germans remained largely unprepared for what was about to come.

As Operation Market-Garden neared launch, growing evidence suggested significant German forces—including SS panzer divisions—were present near Arnhem. Kenneth Strong, an intelligence officer with SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force), alerted General Bedell Smith, who urged Eisenhower to reinforce or revise the plan. Eisenhower declined to overrule Montgomery, who dismissed the intelligence and remained confident in his original strategy. Meanwhile, Major Brian Urquhart of British I Airborne Corps confirmed the presence of tanks through aerial photos, but his concerns were ignored by General Browning. Urquhart was deemed overly anxious and removed from duty just before the operation.

On Saturday, September 16, a German proclamation was posted across Arnhem threatening the execution of hostages if the saboteurs responsible for damaging a local railway viaduct were not identified by noon the next day. The sabotage, carried out by members of the Dutch resistance, had failed to do significant damage but risked grave consequences. In an emergency underground meeting, resistance leader Pieter Kruyff gathered input from key members, some of whom advocated surrendering to prevent innocent deaths. Ultimately, Kruyff ordered the organization to remain intact, refusing to sacrifice the network even at the cost of civilian lives. Intelligence officer Henri Knap felt a sense of dread, expecting the Germans to follow through with executions as they had in the past.

On Sunday, September 17, 1944, the first wave of Operation Market-Garden began with an enormous airborne assault. In broad daylight, waves of Allied planes and gliders carrying paratroopers crossed the English Channel and Dutch countryside. Civilians in the Netherlands, initially confused and terrified, quickly realized the invasion had begun and responded with elation. From Eindhoven to Arnhem, people lined the streets, waved flags, and cheered the low-flying planes. Many Germans were caught off guard, mistaking the massive airlift for bombing raids. Despite their surprise, some German troops quickly began organizing a response.