As British airborne units began moving toward Arnhem on the afternoon of September 17, delays and confusion hampered their progress. Poor radio communications, difficult terrain, and unexpected German resistance caused the three-pronged advance to splinter. Only Lieutenant Colonel John Frost’s 2nd Battalion, advancing along the southern route, managed to reach the northern end of the Arnhem bridge by nightfall. Frost quickly set up defensive positions in surrounding buildings, determined to hold until reinforcements could arrive. Meanwhile, the two other battalions under Lt. Cols. Fitch and Dobie were stalled or engaged by German units, including armored forces. Frost and his men faced increasing fire but remained resolute. Their foothold at the bridge marked a critical moment in Operation Market-Garden—though success depended on speed, delays were already proving costly.

As the 101st Airborne Division approached their drop zones near Eindhoven on September 17, 1944, they encountered intense anti-aircraft fire despite Allied efforts to neutralize German defenses. Camouflaged flak positions caused devastating losses among the transport planes, many of which were hit or destroyed midair. Troopers like Pfc. John Cipolla and Lt. Robert O’Connell experienced chaos and terror but managed to jump safely. Several aircraft burned before or after releasing their paratroopers, with many crew members and soldiers killed. Despite heavy casualties among IX Troop Carrier Command crews and glider forces, the 101st completed an almost fully intact jump. General Maxwell Taylor later described the operation as “unusually successful,” with rapid troop assembly and most objectives within reach. Their mission was to seize the key bridges and hold the corridor for advancing British ground forces.

As Allied airborne operations began on September 17, 1944, German leaders in the Netherlands were caught off guard. Colonel General Kurt Student and his staff observed in disbelief as waves of Allied aircraft flew overhead and paratroopers dropped near key Dutch towns. Lacking air support and cut off from communication, Student realized too late that a large-scale operation was underway. Meanwhile, at the Tafelberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, Field Marshal Walter Model abruptly fled his headquarters upon learning that gliders were landing just miles from his location. In a scene of comic disarray, Model and his staff evacuated hastily, leaving behind crucial items like war maps and personal belongings.

The British 1st Airborne Division began landing in the Netherlands with remarkable success. Glider and parachute troops arrived in waves near Renkum Heath and Wolfheze, experiencing little resistance due to effective pre-assault bombings. Despite heavy aerial traffic and scattered glider crashes—some fatal—most troops landed safely. Equipment unloading proved more difficult than in training, and some key gliders were lost. The soldiers encountered eerie calm and surreal sights, including escaped patients from a bombed psychiatric facility. As troops assembled efficiently and prepared to move out, a sense of unease emerged among some officers who felt the operation seemed to be going “too well.” Meanwhile, Major Freddie Gough’s reconnaissance mission to seize the Arnhem bridge was hampered by missing vehicles, but the mission pressed on.

Thousands of British gliders and paratroopers descended with remarkable precision, and although some gliders crashed and cargo was lost, many units assembled quickly and without immediate resistance. The chapter details the chaotic, sometimes darkly humorous moments on the drop zones—missed landings, broken equipment, and eccentric characters like Colonel Frost blowing a hunting horn. Meanwhile, German SS General Harmel received word of the attack and began a hurried return to counter it—signaling that the brief Allied advantage might soon evaporate.

Ryan details the critical collapse of British radio communications during the opening hours of Operation Market-Garden. Major Anthony Deane-Drummond, overseeing signals for the 1st Airborne Division, became increasingly alarmed as his teams lost contact with advancing brigades—despite their relatively short distance from headquarters. Efforts to remedy the issue, including deploying relay jeeps and utilizing American radio teams, proved futile. In one especially damaging failure, American jeeps meant to coordinate air support arrived with incompatible frequencies, rendering them useless. The failure to maintain reliable radio contact hampered command coordination and left field commanders isolated, even as German forces began to mobilize.

During the 82nd Airborne Division’s landing near Groesbeek and Overasselt, intense antiaircraft fire and scattered German resistance met the paratroopers, who had to secure key bridges and protect against possible counterattacks from the Reichswald. General Gavin’s strategy relied on calculated risk, including dropping artillery by parachute and limiting visible drop zone markers to confuse the enemy. Despite chaos and danger, including mid-air firefights and scattered glider landings, the paratroopers rapidly secured their objectives. One critical success was Lieutenant Thompson’s capture of the Grave bridge, accomplished with only part of his platoon. Meanwhile, communication failures—particularly with the British 1st Airborne at Arnhem—began to reveal a growing vulnerability in the overall Market-Garden operation.

The British XXX Corps, led by General Brian Horrocks, launched its ground offensive to link up with airborne forces, beginning with a massive artillery barrage and an armored advance led by the Irish Guards. Initially smooth, the advance was abruptly halted by German anti-tank ambushes that destroyed multiple tanks and blocked the narrow road. Intense fighting and rocket attacks from Typhoon aircraft were required to clear the path. Meanwhile, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division rapidly captured key bridges in Veghel and St. Oedenrode but suffered a major setback when the main bridge at Son was destroyed just before capture. Despite heavy resistance and delays, the Allies built a makeshift bridge, but the operation was already falling behind schedule.

In the wake of the airborne assault, German commanders scrambled to assess and respond to the Allied strategy. Field Marshal Walther Model, caught off guard by the landings, initially misjudged the objective of Operation Market-Garden. While General Bittrich correctly identified the bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem as key targets, Model refused to authorize their destruction, believing they could be held. Meanwhile, a stroke of luck gave Colonel General Kurt Student access to the Allies’ complete operational plans when a glider carrying them crashed near his headquarters. Communication delays prevented immediate use of this intelligence, but once relayed, it clarified the Allies’ intentions. German reinforcements were rapidly mobilized, and some units unknowingly positioned themselves in the path of the British advance, while others left key routes inadvertently unguarded.

As Brigadier Lathbury’s 1st Parachute Brigade began its advance toward Arnhem, its three battalions took different routes—code-named Leopard, Tiger, and Lion—with the goal of converging on and capturing the critical highway bridge. Frost’s 2nd Battalion, on the Lion route, was to lead the main assault. Initial progress was promising, but communications soon broke down. Miscommunication led General Urquhart to believe that Major Gough’s reconnaissance squadron had been lost in glider crashes, disrupting the planned attack on the bridge. While Gough’s unit was actually advancing and later ambushed, civilian enthusiasm and crowds hampered troop movements. Soon, fierce and unexpected German resistance—including snipers, mortars, and armor—halted the advance. Both the 1st and 3rd Battalions suffered casualties and were forced to reroute. Confusion, poor maps, and lack of contact made coordination difficult, with British troops shocked by the intensity of German opposition.

General Urquhart attempted to regain control of the deteriorating situation by tracking the progress of the British battalions advancing toward Arnhem. Unable to locate Major Gough and dealing with poor communication and German resistance, Urquhart joined Brigadier Lathbury on the Tiger route, only to be caught in a heavy mortar bombardment. Both men realized they had lost effective command due to radio failures and mounting German opposition. Meanwhile, Colonel Frost’s 2nd Battalion on the Lion route continued advancing, avoiding the fate of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, which had been stalled and fragmented by fierce Waffen-SS resistance. (The Waffen-SS was the combat arm of the Schutzstaffel.) Frost’s C Company attempted to secure the railway bridge near Oosterbeek, but the Germans detonated explosives just as the platoon reached the span. Though the bridge was destroyed, Frost remained focused on the two remaining objectives.

Captain Paul Gräbner, commander of the Hohenstaufen Division’s reconnaissance battalion, led a 40-vehicle armored column south from Arnhem toward Nijmegen to assess the scope of the Allied airborne presence. Despite extensive patrols along the highway and in the city, he encountered no opposition and repeatedly radioed that there were no signs of enemy troops. Meanwhile, Colonel John Frost’s 2nd Battalion had quietly entered Arnhem and was approaching the northern end of the bridge, just missing a direct encounter with Gräbner’s force by about an hour. Although General Bittrich had previously ordered the bridge be protected, Harzer failed to secure it, leaving the critical crossing point undefended as Frost’s troops moved into position.

As darkness fell, Colonel Frost and his 2nd Battalion pushed into Arnhem, aiming for the pontoon bridge—only to find it dismantled. Forced to reroute, they headed toward the primary Arnhem bridge, reaching the northern end after nearly seven hours of fighting. Despite scattered resistance, they secured key buildings and cleared the northern ramp using flamethrowers and PIATs (Projector, Infantry, Anti Tank—a portable anti-tank weapon). Efforts to contact other units failed due to the ongoing communications breakdown. Frost remained concerned about missing companies and potential charges on the bridge but maintained confidence that reinforcements would arrive within 48 hours. Meanwhile, General Urquhart remained stranded, and Major Gough, after a fruitless search for leadership, settled near the bridge. Though isolated, Frost and his men dug in to hold the bridge against growing German opposition.

The German high command reeled from the surprise of Operation Market-Garden. Initially confused by the combined air and ground assault, many officers—especially Field Marshal Von Rundstedt—struggled to believe Montgomery was behind such a bold maneuver. Field Marshal Model, located dangerously close to the British drop zones, rapidly scrambled to respond. While Bittrich raced to assess and reclaim lost positions, Model received the full Market-Garden battle plan—captured earlier—and studied it with skepticism, suspecting it may be disinformation due to its precision. Nevertheless, his staff began to act on its details, ordering defenses around anticipated drop zones. Bittrich, unaware of the captured plans, resolved to sever the corridor between the British and their airborne units. German uncertainty was slowly giving way to countermeasures that threatened the Allied advance.

While British paratroopers secured the Arnhem bridge, the American 82nd Airborne Division focused on key objectives near Nijmegen. General Gavin’s forces successfully captured the Grave bridge and canal crossings near Heumen, securing much of the route needed for the British Second Army’s advance. However, confusion in orders and delays caused the 508th Regiment to miss the opportunity to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge before it could be defended. A night assault into the city resulted in fierce street fighting, including close combat and a stalled attempt to reach the bridge. A platoon managed to sabotage the supposed detonating mechanism in the post office but was cut off. By midnight, paratroopers across the corridor had achieved many objectives but were facing determined German resistance, especially from the unexpectedly early arrival of SS forces in Nijmegen.

Major General Heinz Harmel, commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, returned from Berlin to chaos. Briefed by his exhausted staff and then by General Bittrich, Harmel learned that British and American airborne forces had seized key positions across the Netherlands, with British troops already holding the northern end of the Arnhem bridge. With the bridge blocked and no alternative crossing nearby, Harmel was forced to ferry his armor and troops across the Rhine at Pannerden—an extremely slow process. As Bittrich laid out their orders to hold Nijmegen at all costs and retake Arnhem, the gravity of the situation became clear. Harmel proposed destroying the Nijmegen bridge to hinder the Allies, but Bittrich refused, citing Field Marshal Model’s wish to preserve it for a possible German counterattack.