119 pages • 3-hour read
No Easy Walk to Freedom
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Part 3Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 3: “The Fight Against Apartheid: Our Tactics and Theirs”
Part 3, Chapter 6 Summary: “Freedom in Our Lifetime”
In this 1956 essay, Mandela discusses the Freedom Charter and its major political significance. He opens with a quote from Albert J. Luthuli noting that the significance and uniqueness of the Congress of the People (COP) that adopted the Freedom Charter lies in its size, multiracialism, and democratic objectives. Mandela provides examples from print publications echoing the opinion that the COP and the adoption of the Freedom Charter constitute a significant and impressive historical and political moment in South Africa. He himself then reiterates that the COP and Freedom Charter are an unprecedented challenge to the racialist policies of the government.
Continuing to explain its significance, Mandela asserts that the Freedom Charter stands apart from previous documents in its demands for democratic reforms, which can only be won through “the organization, launching, and development of mass struggles on the widest scale” but which do not call for breaking up the economy or the polity (40). Thus, it is “a programme for unification [. . .] on a democratic basis” rather than a plan for the development of a socialist state (41). It is intended for everyone’s material improvement, which is why it has received such widespread support and has the potential to draw more people into the mass struggle.
He raises the question of whether South African society has the social forces to unify and bring about the demands of the Freedom Charter, and he answers by explaining the various sectors of the population that would benefit from those demands being met. He emphasizes the working class as the most significant and obvious ally to the movement. Providing statistics on the racial composition of the population and the work sector, he argues that non-European people are the lifeblood of the South African economy (even though wealth is not concentrated in their hands). They therefore stand to gain from the democratic reforms envisioned in the Freedom Charter. Although he sees workers as the principal force of the movement, he also identifies non-European traders and businessmen as potential allies, given how the government’s racialist policies affect their prosperity.
Mandela concludes by stating that opportunities for democratic unity are growing. He attributes the rise of the COP to its consistency in acting on democratic unity and thus constituting the real voice of the South African people. The perpetuation and growth of solidarity among the people will transform the Freedom Charter into a living instrument that creates the South Africa that the people envision.
Part 3, Chapter 7 Summary: “Our Struggle Needs Many Tactics”
In this 1958 essay, Mandela assesses boycotting as a movement tactic. He opens with examples of political organizations in South Africa that have used boycotting against racial discrimination. He concedes that it is a tool recognized and accepted by the people as an effective form of resistance, but he critiques those who see it in limited and inflexible terms as a matter of principle. For Mandela, boycotting is a tactical weapon that must relate to the concrete conditions of the given time. He provides examples of strategic boycotting from 1946 and 1947, and he explains why it was the proper tactic for the given situation. He emphasizes that boycotting is one of many tactics but argues that it is not to be used at all times, especially when it would not be effective.
There are times that require other tactics, such as election participation. Mandela responds to those who feel it is an error to participate in the upcoming election for Coloured Parliamentary seats on the belief that any participation in a racialist political apparatus is harmful to the movement. According to Mandela, these people advocate boycotting as a matter of principle rather than as a tactical weapon. However, Mandela illustrates that boycotting is not always the most effective means of advancing the resistance movement. He notes the correctness of the South African Coloured People’s Organization’s (SACPO) decision to participate in the election because their participation advances the task of defeating the Nationalist government. To boycott would undermine the unity of the SACPO and potentially create enemies within the organization who would then have parliamentary seats and work in opposition to the movement.
Mandela concludes by acknowledging that the ANC chapters are reconsidering the 1947 boycott resolutions in light of new conditions created by the government’s attack on the liberation movement. He identifies those conditions as the semi-illegality of organizations, the exile of African political leaders, the imposition of tribal authority, and the repression of fair media. Thus, the ANC stands to reconsider the parliamentary forum as a tactical weapon in the movement going forward.
Part 3, Chapter 8 Summary: “Verwoerd’s Tribalism”
In this 1959 article, Mandela examines the policy of Bantustan under the regime of Verwoerd (who became prime minister in 1958 after serving as minister for native affairs since 1950). Mandela opens the chapter with quotes from the Freedom Charter and a statement issued by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, noting the contrasts between the future South Africa that each envisions. For Mandela, the contrast constitutes two alternative paths for the country, and it is necessary for the people to choose which one they will take.
He begins analyzing the Nationalist government’s Bantustan policy as its plan for the future South Africa. Mandela immediately notes that the name of the policy is misleading and exemplifies the government’s propaganda technique of describing policies with titles that convey the opposite of what the policy enacts. He then lists the components of the White Paper presented to the parliament as an explanation of the policy’s contents. For Mandela, the policy asks African people to endure being treated as outcasts and perpetual servants while uprooting them from their homes in exchange for “self-government.” He notes that the essential elements of self-government—democracy and sovereignty—are absent from the Bantustan plan. The policy contains no provision for elections and calls for a European trustee over Bantustan populations.
Mandela also points out the economic unviability of Bantustan for the African population. With the allocation of only 13% of “the least desirable land area” and no effort to develop industry on the reserves (57), the policy creates a labor force that must travel away from the poverty-stricken reserves for employment to pay rent and taxes. The government has established border towns outside the reserves where white capitalists can set up industries. While Mandela concedes that these border town industries would provide employment for people on the reserves, he asserts that it would not fundamentally change the “single integrated system based upon the exploitation of African labour by White capitalists” (59).
Thus, the Bantustan policy is essentially an apartheid scheme. Furthermore, it entails no self-determination for the African people because they were not involved in formulating or passing it. In light of white politicians claiming that the African people do not demand integration, Mandela is clear that African leadership, with the ANC at the forefront, in no way endorses “segregation, separation, or the partition” of South Africa (60). He notes that while the government and the Liberal Party debate what they think the African people want, they could resolve the debate by allowing the African people to speak for themselves through the submission of the Freedom Charter.
Mandela asserts that the real purpose of the Bantustan policy is to deprive Africans of autonomy and representation in government and to split the African people into tribal units that prevent the people’s development into full nationhood. While the policy certainly affects the peasant populations in the reserves, Mandela identifies urban Africans—factory workers and intellectuals—as the real targets of the policy. In Mandela’s view, the Nationalist government is making a desperate attempt to confine the urban population to the reserves because the working class has been loud in demanding freedom, democracy, and human dignity.
Part 3, Chapter 9 Summary: “A Charge of Treason”
This 1960 essay contains excerpts of Mandela’s statements from the Treason Trial record; an editorial note explains that the Treason Trial began at the end of 1956 after a police raid and arrest of 156 political leaders, which resulted in the ban of the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The accused were charged with “a treasonable conspiracy inspired by international communism to overthrow the South African state by violence” (64). Mandela conducted the defense for himself and the others charged.
When questioned about the aim of the ANC with regard to nationalism and tribalism, Mandela answers that the ANC aims to bring about a united community of the various tribal groups and that they regard the Union of South Africa as a white supremacist government. He also testifies that the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), formed in 1949, constituted a shift in ANC strategy from purely constitutional means of resistance to mass mobilization and militancy, including strikes, civil disobedience, protests, and demonstrations.
Regarding communism, the ANCYL had called for expelling Communist Party members from the ANC, but the ANC rejected the resolution on the grounds that every person over the age of 17 was entitled to become an ANC member regardless of political views. At the time, Mandela explains that he supported the call for expulsion. The ANC also saw the Suppression of Communism Act as an attack on all political organizations that opposed the government’s racialist policies. Furthermore, while Mandela is attracted to the idea of a classless society because of the social ills that arise out of class exploitation, he makes clear that the ANC does not have any policy position on the matter.
Regarding the 1949 Programme of Action, Mandela shares that up until 1949, the ANC believed that constitutional and legal methods of political action would prompt the government to meet ANC demands. Given the government’s refusal to meet those demands, the Programme of Action advocates other methods of political action. One of those forms of action was the Defiance Campaign. In response to a question about the effects of the Defiance Campaign, Mandela testifies that he believes the formation of the Congress of Democrats and of the Liberal Party (LP) were direct results of the campaign. In addition, he shares that he still holds his previous views on the LP’s allyship, but he concedes that the LP is shifting and working more closely with the Congress movement, especially regarding the question of who is qualified to vote.
He also believes that the government’s Bantustan policy and talk of “self-government” were responses to the Defiance Campaign. When the judge questions Mandela about whether the accused’s freedom is a direct threat to the European population, Mandela clarifies that the ANC is not against white people, but rather against white supremacy. Defeating white supremacy requires the support of the European population, and the ANC has consistently preached a message of racial harmony and condemned racialism. He is also clear that the ANC is against imperialism, given the amount of suffering that imperialism has caused globally. For Mandela, the question of party system is not a question of form but rather a question of democracy. He advocates for whatever party system most effectively brings about and upholds democracy.
Part 3 Analysis
In these four chapters, Mandela focuses on the tactics of the resistance movement and the government. The sharp contrast between the multiracial, multiclass, and democratic ideals of the resistance movement and the racialist and segregationist ideals of the white supremacist government becomes evident through Mandela’s discussion of tactics. The chapters also build on the themes of mass mobilization, shifting strategies, and the ANC’s relationship to political parties and other organizations.
The section opens with Mandela’s discussion of the significance of the COP and the Freedom Charter in introducing the principles on which the resistance movement stands. Above all, the elimination of racialism and the establishment of democratic society are the goals, and unity around these goals is what marked the COP and the adoption of the Freedom Charter as an unprecedented and significant moment in South African politics. Mandela emphasizes:
For the first time in the history of our country the democratic forces irrespective of race, ideological conviction, party affiliation or religious belief have renounced and discarded racialism in all its ramifications, clearly defined their aims and objects and united in a common programme of action (40).
He goes on to write:
The democratic struggle in South Africa is conducted by an alliance of various classes and political groupings amongst the non-European people supported by White democrats. African, Coloured, and Indian workers and peasants, traders and merchants, students and teachers, doctors and lawyers, and various other classes and groupings; all participate in the struggle against racial inequality and for full democratic rights (42).
With these two excerpts, the theme of mass mobilization is clear: Common goals prompt solidarity across various identities and affiliations. Mandela demonstrates an acute awareness that the struggle could not be won by the Black African population alone and therefore required coordination between multiple groups. In Chapter 6, he identifies non-European workers, traders, and business owners as significant allies to the movement. Despite their class differences, they stood to gain from the elimination of racialism and the establishment of a democratic society. Similarly, the identification of “non-Europeans” indicates that the struggle extended beyond the Black population.
Mandela reiterates the importance of mass cooperation and potential allyship in Chapter 9 with his Treason Trial statements, extending the mass struggle to include white people: “We are not anti-White, we are against White supremacy and in struggling against White supremacy we have the support of some sections of the European population” (67). He then states, “It is quite clear that the Congress has consistently preached a policy of race harmony and we have condemned racialism no matter by whom it is professed” (67). This statement reflects Mandela’s pragmatism as he seeks to allay white fears—tinged with racism though they might be—that they would become second-class citizens in a democratic South Africa.
Furthermore, Mandela makes clear that the ANC and the movement at large went beyond interracial solidarity and embraced solidarity towards common goals regardless of political ideology or party affiliation. In Chapter 7’s discussion of the movement’s tactics, he supports SACPO’s decision to participate in the parliamentary election, despite opposition from some of the Black population who felt that any participation in the parliamentary system endorsed the racialist institution. He clarifies why he views the SACPO’s decision to participate as an effective tactic towards common goals:
The principle and most urgent task facing the Congress movement today is the defeat of the Nationalist Government and its replacement by a less reactionary one. Any step or decision which helps the movement to attain this task is politically correct. The election of four additional members to Parliament, provided they agree with the general aims of the movement and provided that they are anti-Nationalist, would contribute to the defeat of the present Government (48-49).
Mandela’s support of the SACPO decision not only indicates the ANC’s relationship to political parties and other organizations, but it also demonstrates his attention to the concrete realities that necessitated the use of varied political tactics. He defends the strategy of election participation on the grounds that a SACPO boycott of the election could undermine the strength of the overall movement. In other words, the discussion implies his awareness of the ways that strategies and tactics must shift in response to reality and the conditions that the majority of the population face.
Chapter 9 also indicates the extent to which the fight for democracy and against racialism took precedence over political differences. Although Mandela, along with other ANCYL members, advocated the expulsion of communists from the ANC, the “resolutions were defeated by an overwhelming majority” on the basis that communist expulsion defied the ANC’s commitment to solidarity regardless of political affiliation (65). Mandela is clear that he himself is not a communist, but he eventually came around to the majority view and began working with communists in the ANC around 1960 (65). This again builds on the theme of the ANC’s relationship with other groups.
Another indication of solidarity regardless of political affiliation was the ANC’s view towards the Suppression of Communism Act. Mandela testifies in the Treason Trial:
. . .the ANC took the view that the Act was an invasion of the rights of our political organizations, that it was not only aimed against the Communist Party of South Africa, but was designed to attack and destroy all the political organizations that condemned the racialist policies of the South African Government (66).
In addition, he indicates in Chapter 9 that by the time of the trial the ANC had begun working more closely with the LP, which in an earlier chapter Mandela regarded as a non-ally given their collusion with white supremacist forces. As is indicated elsewhere in Mandela’s essays and speeches, Mandela felt that inflexibility must not hamper the overarching goals of the movement. The policies of the government had far-reaching implications for the majority of the population, and thus, Mandela argues, the majority could and should rally together in opposition; the movement he describes centers around principles that do not privilege one group over any other.
The Nationalist government, on the other hand, used tactics that indicated the extent to which white supremacy was their central principle. Mandela’s analysis of Bantustans policy in Chapter 8 makes this most clear. He identifies the primary tactics of the government as deception and isolation of the masses through segregation. The misleading titles that the government gave to their racialist policies illustrate the former. For example, the Abolition of Passes Act intensified pass laws, while the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill abolished African representation in the parliament and the Cape Provincial Council (52). Mandela saw a similar deception in the Bantustans Policy. He explains that the word “Bantustans” derives from the partitioning of India into Hindustan and Pakistan, where each population constitutes “separate and politically independent states” but still enjoyed equal rights in the others’ territory (52). Furthermore, both the Hindu and Pakistani populations were involved in and approved of the partition. The Bantustans policy, however, did not partition South Africa into separate, self-governing states; did not guarantee equal rights for Africans outside of the reserves; and did not involve any Africans in the formulation or approval of the policy.
Thus, the policy, from Mandela’s view, was actually an isolationist tactic meant to confine the majority of the population (66%) to 13% of the land, reinforce tribalism, and strip Africans of democracy and self-determination. He asserts:
Thus we find, if we really look into it, that this grandiose ‘partition’ scheme, this ‘supremely positive step’ of Dr Verwoerd, is like all apartheid schemes— high-sounding double-talk to conceal a policy of ruthless oppression of the non-Whites and of buttressing the unwarranted privileges of the White minority, especially the farming, mining, and financial circles (59).
Chapter 8, along with Mandela’s discussion of the POC, the Freedom Charter, and the ANC in other chapters, emphasizes the contrast between the majority’s devotion to democracy and equal rights and the minority’s commitment to autocracy and white supremacy. He makes the contrast clear with the opening of Chapter 8, where he indicates that the two groups “have nothing in common, except that both of them look forward to a future of affairs rather than that which prevails at present” (51). For Mandela, the people of South Africa must choose between two diametrically opposed paths.
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