119 pages 3-hour read

No Easy Walk to Freedom

Nonfiction | Biography | Adult | Published in 1973

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Themes

Mass Mobilization and Unity

The central theme of No Easy Walk to Freedom is mass mobilization and unity. The opening chapter of the book consists of Mandela’s 1953 presidential address, which describes the Defiance Campaign of 1952 as “an effective way of getting the masses to function politically” and notes that the spirit of the day was direct action (4). He goes on to discuss the formulation of the “M” Plan, noting that its main objective was to consolidate the Congress machinery by “extend[ing] and strengthen[ing] the ties between the Congress and the people” (11). This relationship between the Congress machinery and the masses was all the more important in light of the government’s outlawing of earlier forms of political movement that the ANC and other organizations relied on, such as meeting amongst themselves and legally submitting resolutions to the parliament. 


As Mandela describes it, a principle of unity among various sectors of the population undergirded this mass mobilization strategy; his writings emphasize that multiracial, inter-class, inter-political, and international solidarity would be key to the strategy’s effectiveness. For example, his Chapter 2 criticism of the Liberal Party and their convergence of interests with the Nationalist government closes by noting the resistance movement’s openness to since and committed white allies (18). Chapter 6 begins with a quote in which Luthuli expresses that the multiracial nature of the Congress of the People who adopted the Freedom Charter was one of its most significant aspects (39). Chapter 11’s analysis of the general strike lauds the white student population for their role, noting that their “support showed that even amongst the Whites the forces of challenge and opposition to White supremacy exist” (83). Mandela also notes the show of support from the Coloured and Indian populations (84).


The embrace of multiracialism in the mass mobilization strategy, which was an outgrowth of resistance to racial domination of any kind, reflected Mandela’s personal ideals as well as the political ideals of the ANC. His opening arguments for his defense trial included an important declaration: “I am no racialist, and I detest racialism, because I regard it as a barbaric thing, whether it comes from a Black man or a White man” (105). Speaking on behalf of the ANC, he would later assert, “Political division, based on colour, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one colour group by another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy” (169).


Out of multiracial solidarity grew interclass and inter-political solidarity as key factors in the mass mobilization strategy. Mandela’s writings emphasize the importance of workers to the resistance movement on the grounds that “a political organization that does not receive the support of the workers is in fact paralysed” (10). Chapter 6 identifies workers as “the principal force upon which the democratic movement should rely (43), but Mandela also viewed “non-European traders and businessmen” (43)—i.e., the middle class—as potential allies; they too were oppressed by the racialist policies of the Nationalist government. Chapter 14’s trial testimony further highlights this latter group’s investment in the movement against white supremacy, as Mandela used his cross-examination of Moolla to draw out the effects of the Group Areas Act on the Indian population.


Perhaps the most important indications of inter-political solidarity were the ANC’s and Mandela’s views on the Communist Party. Chapter 15’s trial testimony includes Mandela’s acknowledgment of his initial resistance to admitting Communists to the ANC as well as his explanation that the ANC ultimately rejected the expulsion proposal on the grounds that the ANC was a “Parliament of the African people, accommodating people of various political convictions, all united by the common goal of national liberation” (161). He went on to explain that for many decades the Communist Party was the only group to “treat Africans as human beings and their equals [. . .] [and] work with Africans for the attainment of political rights” (162). There was thus a convergence of multiracial and inter-political solidarity towards the common goal of eradicating the Nationalist government. 


Other indications of inter-political and multiracial solidarity in the mass mobilization strategy include the fact that the SAIC collaborated with ANC in the formulation of the “M” Plan and that the Congress of the People consisted of over 2,000 delegates and “democratic forces irrespective of race, ideological conviction, party affiliation or religious belief” (40). Similarly, the All-In African conference resolutions were “unanimously adopted by more than 1,500 delegates” (73), including members of the “Liberal Party, the Inter-Denominational African Ministers’ Federation, the Eastwood Advisory Board, the Zenzele Club, and scores of other organizations from all over the county” (73). The collaboration of multiple political organizations reflected the implementation of the “M” Plan articulated in Chapter 1.


The mass mobilization strategy, however, extended beyond populations and organizations within South Africa to political allies on an international level. Mandela saw international solidarity as an important means to defeat the government. Chapters 10 and 11 discuss the All-In resolutions and the noncooperation campaign, which called on democratic people from all over the world to support the internal struggle by imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on the South African Government. In Mandela’s later PAFMECA address, he expressed gratitude for the various nations that enforced those sanctions and provided asylum for South African refugees (92). He also mentioned the pressure that African countries put on the UN to expel South Africa and impose economic sanctions (97-98). Chapter 15’s explanation of Umkonto organization includes attention to international support in the form of military training from other African countries and financial support from communist countries.


Thus, the mass mobilization strategy of the resistance movement from 1949 forward indicated the extent to which the resistance movement was not merely a movement of Black people or the ANC alone, but one that relied on the solidarity of people, organizations, and governments at home and abroad. Mandela was clear in his speeches and writings that petty differences had to be put aside in order to defeat the racialism and fascism of the South African government and bring about democracy, equality, and human dignity in South Africa.

Shift in Strategies and Tactics

Another important theme, which grows out of theme of mass mobilization, is the shift in strategies and tactics. The responsiveness of Mandela and other political leaders to the concrete conditions of the South African situation reflected the dynamism an effective resistance movement required. An important example of this dynamism and responsiveness lies in Chapter 7’s discussion of boycotting. Defending the decision of SACPO to participate in the upcoming election, Mandela argued:


In some cases, therefore, it might be correct to boycott, and in others it might be unwise and dangerous. In still other cases another weapon of political struggle might be preferred. A demonstration, a protest march, a strike, or civil disobedience might be resorted to, all depending on the actual conditions at the given time (47).


The attention to “the actual conditions at the given time” was the crux of shifting strategies and tactics in order to win the freedom struggle (47). For Mandela, political strategies and tactics were not matters of principle but rather weapons to leverage in the struggle. From his earliest writings, Mandela indicated that the Congress machinery must be responsive to the concrete situation the people faced: “A political movement must keep in touch with reality and the prevailing conditions” (6). Thus, in the face of government repression, Mandela advocated that the ANC shift from constitutional means and older forms of resistance to militancy and direct action:


Long speeches, the shaking of fists, the banging of tables, and strongly worded resolutions out of touch with conditions do not bring about mass action, and can do a great deal of harm to the organization and the struggles we serve. We understood that the masses had to be made ready for the new forms of political struggle (6). 


Chapter 2’s critique of the Liberal Party’s stance on political involvement underscores this point: “Talk of democratic and constitutional means can only have a basis in reality for those people who enjoy democratic and constitutional rights” (16). He goes on to say: 


To propose in the South African context that democrats limit themselves to constitutional means of struggle is to ask the people to submit to laws enacted by a minority parliament whose composition is essentially a denial of democracy to the overwhelming majority of the population. It means that we must obey a Constitution which debars the majority from participating in the government and other democratic processes of the country by reason only of race, colour, or creed (17).


These analyses laid the foundation for the call for a national convention and the campaign of noncooperation in the face of the government’s nonresponsiveness. The majority of South African people were not represented by the country’s parliament or constitution, and the government had enacted various measures to repress forms of political cooperation that the ANC had tried to employ. 


While mass mobilization and direct action were indeed a responsive shift in the movement, yet another shift was required. The government’s violent and forceful response to the nonviolent strategies and tactics of political resistance created new conditions to which the ANC had to respond for the sake of the people they represented. The text furnishes many examples of the government’s violent tactics, including the enactment of policies designed to further impoverish and repress the African people, as well as the mobilization of the army and police and the arming of the European population. Chapters 13, 14, and 15 all articulate how the government’s violence prompted the ANC’s shift to illegal and violent tactics. For example, discussing Umkonto’s bombing of government buildings in December 1961, Mandela notes:


It was still a small beginning because a Government as strong and as aggressive as that of South Africa can never be induced to part with political power by bomb explosions in one night and in three cities only. But in a country where freedom fighters frequently pay with their very lives and at a time when the most elaborate military preparations are being made to crush the people’s struggles, planned acts of sabotage against Government installations introduce a new phase in the political situation and are a demonstration of the people’s unshakeable determination to win freedom whatever the cost may be (101). 


Chapter 14 likewise implicates the government’s failure to respond to the peaceful resistance of the ANC and the majority of the South African population: “[T]hey set the scene for violence by relying exclusively on violence with which to answer our people and their demands” (134). Mandela had thus made clear the rationale behind the creation of Umkonto and the ANC’s adoption of more aggressive tactics well before his trial, where he would again justify these shifts in light of government violence. 


The adoption of organized violent tactics served not only to display the movement’s strength but to protect the people whom the ANC represented. The atmosphere of violence created by the government had the consequence of the people turning violence inward on their own communities, thereby assisting the government in the annihilation of African people and the taking of innocent lives. Thus, the organization of “properly controlled violence” was an attempt to curb unorganized terrorism and prevent further senseless violence by providing a proper outlet for the masses (151). 


Mandela’s writing illustrates the responsibility and responsiveness of the ANC and other political leaders to concrete conditions impacting the people they represented. The shifts took place with the dual purpose of protecting the masses and defeating the government, and they are a testament to the dynamism with which Mandela and the ANC led the South African struggle against apartheid.

The ANC’s Relationship to Other Political Parties

Another important theme that emerges from the theme of mass mobilization was the ANC’s relationship to other political parties and organizations, including the Nationalist Party, the Liberal Party, and the Communist Party. 


Mandela’s writings make clear that the ANC unequivocally opposed the Nationalist Party (NP). His scathing critiques of the NP and the Verwoerd Republic are the central subject of Part 2, Chapter 8, and Part 5. In Part 2, “Living Under Apartheid,” each chapter is devoted to a discussion of NP tactics and legislation that oppressed the majority of the people. Chapter 3 identifies the NP as a fascist regime that subordinated the nation to its retention of power and suppressed individual liberties (24). Chapter 5 again identifies the party as fascists inspired by Hitlerite Germany (30), calling on the people to stand in solidarity against the NP (35). Opposition to the NP formed the basis of the solidarity that defined the ANC’s relationship to other organizations and parties and that undergirded the mass mobilization strategy.


The ANC’s relationship to the Liberal Party (LP) was not as clear cut as their opposition to the NP. Mandela critiqued the LP (e.g., in Chapter 2) on the basis that their constitution merely paid lip-service to democracy and freedom for the African people while facilitating “the adoption of more subtle systems of oppression and exploitation” (17): “[Their] high-sounding principles [. . .] are essentially reactionary in content” (17). Because of this, Mandela argued at the time (1953) that they could not be counted on as allies to the movement. However, later parts of the text indicate some fluidity in the relationship. For example, during the Treason Trial, Mandela said that he continued to hold his view of the LP but also acknowledged that they had “shifted a great deal” from their original position (68), worked “more closely with the Congress movement” (68), and “accepted a great portion of the policy of the Congress movement” (68). Chapter 10 also mentions them as one of the diverse organizations that unanimously adopted the All-In resolutions and “spoke with one voice and jointly faced the political changes thrown out by the Nationalist Government” (73). Thus, it appears that while Mandela was wary of the LP because of their apparent commitment to white domination and class exploitation, a tenuous relationship between the ANC and Liberal Party formed on the basis of opposition to the NP.


Similarly, the ANC’s relationship to the Communist Party (CP) was based on their convergence against the NP, but it also included shared goals that were not integral to the relationship with the LP. Nevertheless, Mandela was clear that the ANC and Communist Party remained distinct. Chapter 9 shows that while Mandela himself initially opposed CP membership in the ANC, the ANC rejected the resolution for Communist expulsion on the grounds that all African people above the age of 17 were welcome to join the ANC “irrespective of the political views” (65). The ANC also stood in solidarity with the CP regarding the Suppression of Communism Act, which the ANC saw as an attack on all political organizations opposing the government (66). In his defense argument, Mandela posited that cooperation with the CP was “merely proof of a common goal—in this case the removal of White supremacy” (160). Although the CP openly supported Umkonto (160), Mandela articulated the distinctions between the ANC and CP to dispel the prosecution’s claims that the groups were identical and that Umkonto was a CP creation:


The ANC, unlike the Communist Party, admitted Africans only as members. Its chief goal was, and is, for the African people to win unity and full political rights. The Communist Party’s main aim, on the other hand, was to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government. The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst they ANC seeks to harmonize them. This is a vital distinction (160). 


Elsewhere, the text emphasizes that while Mandela and other ANC members were socialists, they had no plan of action to institute a socialist state. Furthermore, where the CP apparently regarded the parliamentary system as undemocratic, Mandela himself had—and articulates throughout his writings—great respect for the parliamentary system and other Western democratic institutions (163). 


The ANC’s relationship to these three political parties demonstrates their strategic dynamism in terms of eradicating apartheid and establishing a democratic system. While they unequivocally opposed the NP because it advocated autocracy and fascism, their willingness to collaborate with the LP and the CP to advance common goals indicates the extent to which those goals took precedence over political and ideological differences. Such collaboration and allyship was key to the mass mobilization strategy that Mandela’s writings emphasize.

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