59 pages • 1-hour read
Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942–1943
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Part 2Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 2: “Barbarossa Relaunched”
Part 2, Chapter 5 Summary: “General Paulus’s First Battle”
A chain of events led to General Friedrich Paulus being given command of the Sixth Army. Hitler’s disappointment in Army Group South led to replacements among the generals and Paulus’s promotion to Sixth Army commander.
In Paulus’s previous career, he had fought in the German army during the First World War, where he had been competent but uninspiring as a leader. He became a devoted follower of Hitler because of his dislike of Bolshevism and respect for the chain of command. However, his previous experience in high-level command had been solely centered on military planning. He had not yet commanded even a division in combat. Paulus was also notable for his sensitivity when it came to the well-being of his soldiers and his canceling of orders that encouraged atrocities against Jews and partisans, but this was countermanded during the Stalingrad campaign. Taking command of the Sixth Army, he controlled a force that had rounded up 33,771 Jews during the capture of Kyiv; it was a force already inured to committing atrocities. Hitler remained unusually skilled at manipulating his generals into following Nazi doctrine, supported by ideological belief in the ranks. This, and the social pressure against cowardice in the army, manifested as excessive violence against Russians, including starving and murdering prisoners. Only a third of prisoners captured by the Germans were able to survive the war.
Meanwhile, the Russian general, Semyon Timoshenko, was leading an offensive against Army Group South. Timoshenko was hoping to encircle the German forces in the Donbas region and Paulus responded by focusing on his defenses—an overly timid move according to his contemporaries. In the spring, Army Group South received a large amount of reinforcements and new equipment, revealing to most Germans that it was going to be the focus of a new offensive. The plan, codenamed Case Blue, was for a push toward the Volga River and then a drive south toward the Caucus oilfields so fuel could be taken for the army. Before this could be launched, Timoshenko again attacked Army Group South, but Hitler ordered a timely counterattack which depleted Timoshenko’s forces. Paulus began to view Hitler as a strategic genius, ignoring the potential danger of a military amateur meddling in strategic and tactical decision-making.
Part 2, Chapter 6 Summary: “How Much Land Does a Man Need?”
On June 1, 1942, Hitler flew to Poltava, the Army Group South headquarters to plan for Case Blue. At this conference, Hitler focused on the Caucus oilfields, emphasizing their importance to the war effort. The initial plan was to capture the city of Voronezh and then trap Soviet forces in a pincer West of the Don River. From here, the Sixth Army would move toward Stalingrad while the First Panzer and 17th Army would occupy the Caucuses. Hitler felt certain that Soviet strength had been spent following their winter offensives, so he moved forces meant for Case Blue to other fronts and planned for an invasion of the Middle East afterward.
Case Blue launched on June 30 after two preparatory offensives. German forces were quickly able to surround Voronezh, which the Soviets believed was the first step in an attack on Moscow. The Soviets reinforced the city while Hitler detached units from the siege, ensuring that it did not fall immediately. The German advance continued, with mechanized divisions forging ahead of the army, but stops were needed frequently for oil. Villages on the path of advance were looted by German soldiers.
Soon, fuel shortages prompted Hitler to change the plan for Case Blue. Instead of an encirclement of Timoshenkov’s army and a subsequent drive against the Caucuses, Hitler demanded that both goals occur concurrently: Army Group South was split into Group A (aiming for the Caucuses) and Group B (to defeat Timoshenkov’s army). By July 24, Hitler had again changed the aim of Group B to the capture of Stalingrad. Hitler also weakened Army Group South by sending the 11th Army northward and withdrawing other divisions to France. German generals worried Hitler was underestimating the Russians, but Hitler argued that they were being reinforced by Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian armies. These were mostly poorly supplied and undermotivated.
Beevor then tells the story of Leo Tolstoy’s tale How Much Land Does a Man Need, in which the thoughtless ambition of a man named Pahon leads to his ruin. Hitler, Beevor claims, had clearly never taken the lesson of this to heart.
Part 2, Chapter 7 Summary: “Not One Step Backwards”
On July 28, while Hitler was celebrating the capture of Rostov, Stalin realized the danger Russia was in. If the Germans were able to cut the Volga River, they would stop Anglo-American supplies from reaching Russia, critically weakening its war effort. In response, he issued Order No. 227, known as the “Not One Step Backward” order, which made withdrawal or dissent punishable by death. Penal detachments made of those who had previously retreated were given near-suicidal tasks, meant to “redeem” their failures in a brave death. The NKVD (the Soviet ministry of internal security) was given the role of enforcing and interrogating prisoners of war to gain information.
As the German advance continued across the Don steppe, Russian units destroyed supplies and natural resources on their path of retreat. Stalin blamed this retreat on his commanders for poor leadership, prompting another purge of officers. A new generation of more energetic commanders was now beginning to take office, with Zhukov as their model. General Vasily Chuikov, the new leader of the 62nd Army, was exemplary of this.
Army Group B’s attack toward Stalingrad was slow enough that Hitler reinforced it with the Fourth Panzer Army. Soon after, Paulus’s forces were able to encircle Red Army units in another pincer maneuver, with the flanks meeting at the town of Kalach, located on the Don River. Despite this advance, the land yet to be taken by the German plan was vast.
Beevor explores the history of Stalingrad. It had previously been called Tsaritsyn until the Russian Revolution, during which Stalin was able to survive a siege within the city. After this, it became known as Stalingrad in his honor. As the Germans advanced against the city, the population was mobilized to make defenses or be given basic training for a civic militia. Civilians who refused were sent to labor camps, as were those who engaged in other anti-party activities such as openly practicing religion or commenting on the speed of German advance.
Part 2, Chapter 8 Summary: “The Volga is Reached”
On August 21, 1942, German infantry companies crossed the Don River. The next day, Panzer divisions moved across and the German advance continued toward the Volga. On August 23, a huge air raid was launched against the city of Stalingrad. During a week of bombing, 40,000 Russians were killed—most of them women and children as men had been conscripted. The death toll was increased because Stalin forbade an evacuation, reasoning that soldiers would fight harder for a populated city.
On August 23, German forces had reached the Volga just north of Stalingrad. This advance caught the Russians by surprise. As the German push continued, Stalin decreed that the city of Stalingrad would not be allowed to fall. All citizens were mobilized for military purposes, though in some units men had to share weapons because of equipment shortages. Stalin demanded another large offensive to stop the German advance, but Zhukov was only able to delay German forces and give time for the Russian 62nd and 64th armies to retreat into Stalingrad. The Russian defenders of Stalingrad faced an immense challenge: They had just 40,000 people to hold off the German Sixth Army and Fourth Panzers. However, the weather was growing colder and the bombing campaign had not been able to destroy Stalingrad.
Part 2 Analysis
Having established essential context in the first part, Beevor moves his narrative to the German approach toward Stalingrad in Part 2. Following Beevor’s chronological presentation of the events, this part focuses on the opening stage of Case Blue, culminating with the German arrival at Stalingrad and the aerial bombardment. Throughout this section, Beevor argues Hitler’s micromanagement was a fatal flaw in the German army that turned the Stalingrad campaign into a disaster. The theme of The Dynamics of Warfare and Strategy under a Dictatorship is developed here. Beevor shows that the personal traits of Hitler—namely his excessive ambition and lack of military expertise—changed the course of the war. Beevor continues to emphasize that Hitler’s decision-making was based on an overestimation of what his army could achieve and an underestimation of Russian capability. Beevor considers this to be demonstrated by Army Group South being split in two and the aims of each part expanded based on Hitler’s whims. Beevor’s narrative here focuses on the whims and hubris of an autocratic ruler, explicating how Hitler’s personal failings translated directly into military failure. Beevor shows that this became especially dangerous in the Sixth Army, as Paulus’s belief in Hitler’s “genius” and his unwavering loyalty meant the army became more reliant on orders from above than its own understanding of strategic situations. This same combination of timid military leaders and the incorrect assumptions of a dictator was shown to be massively damaging to the Soviets in their response to Operation Barbarossa. With Paulus’s command of the Sixth Army, this fatal combination is created which, as Beevor intimates, will lead to Germany’s defeat on the Eastern Front. This layering of evidence and the consideration of multiple factors to explain complex events is an essential part of Beevor’s method.
Beevor’s broader criticism of the military leadership of dictators is further emphasized by the reference to Tolstoy’s How Much Land Does a Man Need. This story acts as a parable and Hitler’s ambition and Pahom’s are compared directly, showing Hitler’s inability to learn lessons or take advice. Beevor’s choice of a Russian classic is both apt and ironic as it belongs to the culture of Hitler’s enemy. The subject and title of land-based greed is a wry comparison between the actions of a landowner and an aggressive dictator seeking Lebensraum. This is the first of several cultural references included by Beevor which form part of his book’s approachable tone and broad social and cultural perspective.
Stalin’s wartime role is also criticized in this section, though for actions both he and Hitler take. Stalin’s ill-advised winter offensives damaged his army to the point it could not resist the German advances in the summer of 1942, as Hitler’s ill-advised refusal to give up ground instead of men damaged his army. Similarly, both Stalin and Hitler blame their generals for military failures that stem from their own decision-making and remove their generals from office. As Beevor shows, dictators often enforce harmful decisions and deflect blame in order to maintain power. However, Beevor differentiates Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union by exploring the emergence of a Soviet officer corps that could respond energetically to challenges. The disastrous early Russian defeats in the war allowed for talented generals like Zhukov to gain political sway with Stalin, while Hitler continued to ignore the advice of his most talented officials.
The Brutality of the Eastern Front is also developed in this section. Beevor continues to show the consequences of Nazi propaganda by exploring the culture of violence in the Wehrmacht. He is unsparing in his description of the German army, calling it a “semi-criminal organization” (58), while highlighting its massacre of Jewish populations and poor treatment of Soviet prisoners. Beevor traces the willingness to murder within the Wehrmacht to several causes—including a social pressure to demonstrate bravery which manifested through excessive violence, nine years of propaganda expressing the need to eliminate Bolshevism, and Hitler’s manipulation of generals so they felt reliant on the Nazi Party for military success. By showing these factors, Beevor demonstrates the methods by which totalitarian government can induce citizens to violence, showing the didactic center of the book. Moreover, Beevor is eager to dispel the “Clean Wehrmacht” myth that has been built up in common history since the end of the Second World War. This myth claims that while the SS and police divisions of the German army participated in the Holocaust, the Wehrmacht itself was removed from this. As Beevor shows with primary-source evidence, this is false; the Wehrmacht played an active role in the genocides enacted by Nazi Germany. Throughout Stalingrad, Beevor seeks to not just prove this, but explore what motivated it. This forms part of his approach to war history as an exhortation and warning for the future.
Beevor shows that the Soviet system promoted a culture in which people were treated as disposable. Conscripts were sent against trained Panzer divisions to slow down their advance and, following Order 227, Soviet citizens were frequently arrested or executed. The Soviet willingness to kill their own citizens was a key component of their war against the Germans and is essential to the theme of Morale and the Humanity of the Soldier.
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