Cindy Storer was given a role at the National Photographic Interpretation Center, southeast Washington. NPIC analyzed satellite and spy plane imagery to verify Soviet treaty compliance. Older male colleagues harassed Storer by showing her pornography, but she maintained professionalism and took what she could from her situation, learning imagery analysis and strategic thinking. In 1989, more young women joined NPIC, including Jennifer Matthews and Kristin Wood, who faced harassment but helped establish women’s support networks. When Storer correctly identified a secret missile program, she was prevented from publishing her findings; her response to the subsequent intelligence failure earned her a reputation for being “emotional.”

After three years, Storer transferred to CIA headquarters and, in 1992, was promoted to senior political-military analyst for Afghanistan, a small backwater account after the Soviet withdrawal and USSR collapse. Reviewing old files, Storer discovered a 1982 paper predicting that the Arab mujahideen who had fought the Soviets would become problematic. She noticed these fighters were spreading to unstable regions, often connected to a wealthy Saudi financier named Osama bin Laden (also transliterated as “Usama” bin Laden). Using newly computerized databases and Boolean searches, Storer created a visual map showing the expanding network of training camps. Despite her efforts, colleagues dismissed Afghanistan as a closed chapter.

In the mid-1990s, Cindy Storer connected with Barbara Sude, a senior analyst with a Princeton PhD in Islamic intellectual history. Despite her credentials, Sude had been relegated to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a backwater unit. Her expertise in medieval Islam enabled her to understand the fundamentalist jihadists’ ideology.

Storer and Sude joined informal interagency meetings organized by Gina Bennett, a former clerk-typist who was quickly promoted to State Department analyst after demonstrating exceptional ability. Her approach to understanding terrorist movements was shaped partly by childhood sexual abuse, which taught her what it meant not to be believed. The three women formed a core group tracking foreign fighters.

In early 1993, Bennett went into labor at her desk while completing a memo. Three days after giving birth, the first World Trade Center bombing occurred. Bennett’s memo detailed the global fighter network and identified Osama bin Laden as a leading financier of al-Qaeda. Despite Bennet’s warnings, Washington officials enjoying a post-Cold War “peace dividend” had remained skeptical. When Storer had previously presented her findings at a State Department briefing, attendees laughed in the hallway afterward, accusing the CIA of fabricating threats.

The 9/11 attacks would place the team of women analysist at the center of US intelligence. On January 25, 1993, Heidi August had witnessed a gunman open fire on commuting CIA employees, killing two officers. The shooter, Mir Aimal Kansi, fled to Pakistan. Four weeks later, terrorists bombed the World Trade Center. Cindy Storer rotated to the Counterterrorist Center, an unpopular career backwater: For the first time, she worked with an almost entirely female team.

The CTC had been created in 1986 by Dewey Clarridge, who proposed breaking down traditional firewalls between analysts and operations officers. This “fusion” approach was controversial, and the center was known as a dumping ground. When Storer joined it was led by Michael Scheuer, a brilliant but difficult analyst, and focused on Osama bin Laden, Scheuer assembled an overwhelmingly female team, later nicknamed “the Manson Family” or “the coven.” They faced condescension from male colleagues who saw them as “junior analysts in tennis shoes” (228).

In 1996, Scheuer’s branch became Alec Station, the first CIA station focused on a single individual: bin Laden. Storer worked as the unit’s lone conventional analyst. The station established a wiretap in Pakistan that revealed al-Qaeda’s administrative operations but, lacking its own case officers, Alec Station had to beg regional stations to collect intelligence. Jennifer Matthews led early targeting efforts, and Alfreda Bikowsky later joined as chief of operations.

By 1995, the women in Scheuer’s unit worked with foreign intelligence services to amass information about bin Laden’s network. Through liaison partnerships, they obtained incorporation documents, financial records, and membership rolls. Storer realized the network was a formal, bureaucratic organization with detailed accounting. She created organizational charts revealing a clear hierarchy, leading to her epiphany: It was a terrorist organization. In May 1996, a high-level defector, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, confirmed Storer’s analysis. Around 1997, she attempted to write a definitive 70-page paper on al-Qaeda but could not obtain the necessary approvals from other branches. Rivalry between the CIA and FBI further hampered investigations.

That same year, bin Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan. Gina Bennett correctly predicted this made him more dangerous. When bin Laden declared war on America in 1997 the CIA’s strategic focus adjusted publicly, although internally the area was still marginalized. Bennett left State, and she and Jennifer Matthews pioneered targeting techniques, tracing terrorist travel and communication networks. In 1996, Heidi August became CTC chief of operations, advocating for dedicated career tracks and supporting women balancing family responsibilities.

On May 30, 1997, Patricia Moynihan, chief of base in Karachi, reported that walk-ins claimed to know shooter Mir Aimal Kansi’s whereabouts. Working with FBI agent Scott Jessee, Moynihan verified information, including a photograph showing Kansi’s distinctive nicked earlobe. Heidi August secured approval and a joint team successfully apprehended Kansi in Pakistan.

The celebration was brief. In spring 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa (religious edict) calling for the killing of Americans. On August 7, 1998, simultaneous bombings struck US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people. An Alec analyst correctly identified the perpetrators as al-Qaeda. Storer was finally permitted to use the term “al-Qaeda” in a President’s Daily Brief.

Political and legal obstacles complicated targeting bin Laden. Alec Station developed a detailed plan to capture him at his Tarnak Farms compound, but senior officials canceled it over collateral damage concerns. After the embassy bombings, a female analyst confronted CIA Director Tenet about delays, who later described her as “quivering with emotion” in his memoir (262). The CTC’s analytic unit remained tiny, with only two dedicated al-Qaeda analysts managing overwhelming amounts of fragmented intelligence. In 1999, Tenet replaced Scheuer with Rich Blee and installed Cofer Black as CTC director. Alfreda Bikowsky formally became Alec Station’s chief of operations.

In summer 2000, Rich Blee recruited semi-retired Lisa Manfull Harper to join Alec Station, warning her that a major attack was imminent. Harper focused on African al-Qaeda cells and helped refine the emerging discipline of targeting.

A critical failure had occurred in January 2000 when two al-Qaeda members, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, were tracked to a Malaysia summit but not watch-listed, allowing them to enter the United States. Gina Bennett predicted an attack on the USS The Sullivans in Yemen; when it did not occur, the analysts were ridiculed. Years later it was revealed the attack had been attempted but the terrorists’ boat sank. In October 2000, al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole, killing 17 sailors.

The incoming Bush administration, focused on state actors, was slow to recognize the cross-national al-Qaeda threat. In fall 2000, Tenet appointed Pattie Kindsvater to head the CTC’s analytic unit. Summer 2001 brought overwhelming threat chatter and Rich Blee warned National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that a “spectacular” attack would occur.

Barbara Sude was tasked with writing a PDB item about a homeland attack. After calling the FBI and learning of 70 active bin Laden investigations in the US, she produced the August 6, 2001, brief titled “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,” detailing his intent, capability, and preparations for hijackings (289). The administration did not hold its first cabinet-level meeting on al-Qaeda until September 4. Kindsvater’s unit reinforcements arrived September 10, 2001.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, Pattie Kindsvater was managing a workplace personnel issue when her secretary told her to turn on the television. She watched the first tower burning and saw the second and third plane strike. When the CIA was ordered to evacuate, the CTC was directed to remain at their posts.

Susan Hasler, a CTC branch chief, worried about her husband working elsewhere in headquarters. Lisa Harper shepherded a foreign delegation to safety using her tradecraft. Cindy Storer saw the second plane hit on a colleague’s computer screen and immediately told everyone to activate call lists, concluding they were at war. She volunteered for night shifts and slept on cots for weeks. Barbara Sude wrote talking points for the director, facing her fear while remaining at her post. 

When passenger manifests arrived, they confirmed the presence of al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, the two men from the Malaysia summit who had been lost in the system. Mary Margaret Graham, the New York station chief, evacuated the New York station before World Trade Center 7 was destroyed. Three weeks later, Heidi August returned from Europe to find America transformed.