69 pages • 2-hour read
Ian MorrisA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
By the time Marco Polo visited China in the 13th century, China’s “lead was shrinking, from almost twelve points on the index of social development in 1100 to less than six in 1500” (385). One early cause was the Song dynasty’s wars against the Khitans, a group on the northern frontier, which “was a constant financial drain” (386). The Song emperor allied with a Manchurian group, the Jurchens. Once the Khitans were defeated, the Jurchens went against the Song and took over northern China. Even with the turmoil, the Chinese discovered ways to use “cheaper, dirtier coal” (387) to produce iron. With this and other continued development, it was possible that a Chinese Industrial Revolution could have happened under the Song.
However, there would be a spanner in the works, Temujin or Genghis Khan. Surviving a tumultuous and dangerous childhood, Genghis Khan rose to unify all of Mongolia under his rule. Next, Genghis Khan invaded the Jurchens. The Song were saved by the death of Genghis Khan in 1227 and the fact that his son and heir Ögodei was pressured by his own men into campaigning to the west instead.
After briefly raiding central and eastern Europe, the Mongols turned to “a richer target, the Muslim core” (391). In 1258, they sacked Baghdad, the capital of the Islamic Caliphate, and were only stopped by an Egyptian army, which saved North Africa and western Europe from Mongolian raids. Afterward, the new khan Khubilai finally campaigned into southern China, ending the Song. The destructive impact of the Mongols also worsened a number of natural disasters in China, such as plague, famine, and flooding.
The Mongolian conquests created a more interconnected world. The Mongolian Empire saw “enough people moving across it to make the centuries after 1100 the first true age of technological transfer”, but this “worked almost entirely to the advantage of the backward West” (395). The most important technology to come to Europe were paper, guns, a magnetic compass, and “cheap cast-iron tools” (395). Unfortunately, this exchange also facilitated the spread of the Black Death, the plague which “killed a third or even half of all westerners” (397).
Even so, Morris asserts that the havoc wrought by the Mongols and the Black Death was not as severe as the catastrophes that caused the collapse of the Roman and Han empires. Both Eastern and Western cores were “larger” and thus better able “to absorb shocks and larger reserves to hasten recovery” (400). The West had room to economically develop while the East benefited from a wealthy trade network that encompassed East and Southeast Asia. Finally, both sides actually benefited from the fact that they were both collections of states, rather than one large empire whose failures would have many more and further-reaching consequences.
In this era, the Ottoman Empire expanded into the old “heartland” (401) of the Roman Empire and the Islamic Caliphate. Using the new technology of canons brought from the east, they managed to take what was left of the Byzantine Empire and its heavily fortified capital of Constantinople. The spread of artillery technology further westward helped the monarchies of Europe to further consolidate their power and territories, leading to the growth of strong states like France, England, and Spain.
Meanwhile, the Italian city-states experienced “a disadvantage of forwardness” because a few of them, like Venice, were “too rich and powerful to be bullied into any Italian national state, but not rich or powerful enough to stand alone against genuine national states such as France and Spain” (404). Morris argues that the Western core was shifting away from the Mediterranean and into western Europe.
In China, a peasant named Yuanzhang led a rebellion and established himself as emperor. Changing his name to Hongwu, he founded the Ming dynasty. During the reign of the Ming, Chinese trade flourished, which brought with it infrastructure developments and deeper links with Japan and Korea. In 1405, the emperor Yongle sent an admiral, Zheng He, to the Indian Ocean with a vast fleet to establish diplomatic and trade relations and collect tribute.
Morris imagines Zheng He discovering South America and Tenochtitlán, the capital of the Aztec Empire. It was technologically possible for Zheng He’s fleet to sail to the Americas. Morris describes the traditional explanation for why the Chinese did not discover the Americas, which is that the Ming emperors eventually lost interest in naval explorations in the Indian Ocean while European kings, especially the king of Portugal, was motivated to explore the coast of West Africa to find gold and the legendary king, Prester John.
However, Morris argues this was not the only reason. The desire of Italian city-states to improve their status and protect themselves from the encroachments of growing European powers like France led them to turn back to Roman antiquity. This “produced a wildly untraditional culture of invention and open-ended inquiry” (418). Morris points out China had done something similar in the 11th century. Both China under the Song and Renaissance Italy were “in times of rising social development” (420), were attempting to revive Axial Age philosophy, and were applying contemporary ideas to ancient literature and thought.
Instead of asking why Zheng He did not discover the Americas, Morris asks why 11th-century China, if it was so similar to 15th-century Europe in key ways, did not launch explorations that could have reached the Americas. He concludes that Song-era boats would not have been able to sail to the Americas while geography and climate made it easier for Europeans to sail across the Atlantic than for the Chinese to cross the Pacific. Since the 11th century, Chinese thought “did indeed turn increasingly conservative” (422). This shift can be seen in the writings of the reactionary philosopher Zhu Xi and growing restrictions on the rights and economic independence of women, embodied in the practice of footbinding, where girls’ feet are bound in such a way that their feet are forced into a small shape and it becomes very difficult to walk.
Nonetheless, Morris believes that such conservatism only explains why voyages like Zheng He’s were not made earlier. He adds that Westerners were aware of Easterners’ more advanced societies by the time of Marco Polo, which motivated them to discover routes to the east while Easterners had little reason to go west. The fall of the Islamic Caliphate made it easier for Europeans to move eastward. Also, the need to pay for expensive artillery for wars drove European states to look to expand revenue through finding “a route to the riches of the East” (430). Europeans not only discovered the Americas, but the Portuguese were able to sail into the Indian Ocean and bully the regional powers there through the use of artillery.
Morris begins this chapter with a metaphor from a speech given by President John F. Kennedy: “‘A rising tide lifts all the boats’” (434). An example of this is Europeans introducing American crops like “corn, potatoes, sweet potatoes, peanuts” (435) to East Asia, which helped against a population boom that took place from “1450 to 1600” (437), although famine did take place. Along with this, both Europe and China experienced cultural flowerings and workers’ wages grew. However, in both East and West there was also a growing underclass of the poor, which governments in both areas reacted to by imposing draconian laws that outlawed begging and placed homeless individuals in workhouses. At the same time, more members of the nobility and gentry were becoming merchants.
Japan presented an “extreme case” (440) of the political consequences of the massive population growth. It saw a period of civil war, fueled by the introduction of guns from Portugal, and the rise to power of the shogun Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who centralized the state and attempted to address Japan’s problems through military expansion in China.
Similarly, the Ming emperors attempted to reform China through taking censuses and engaging in military expansion. However, conservatives in the government resisted this, telling the emperors “that ideal rulers sat quietly (and inexpensively) at the center, leading by moral example” (441). China wound down its once-massive navy, allowing a black market bringing goods into China from the sea. In the 1570s, a court official, Zhang Zhuzheng, reformed the government and “modernized the army” (442), but after his death court conservatives purged the government of reformers. Despite China’s weaknesses, Hideyoshi’s invasion of China failed, although he may have succeeded if he had not died in 1598.
Just as the Ming Empire dominated the East, the Ottoman Empire was the central power in Europe by the 16th century, with a thriving culture and a strong, centralized government. The only power able to resist the Ottomans alone was the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V. His dynasty, the Habsburgs, rose to prominence from a series of lucky dynastic marriages, giving them Spain, Austria, and much of Germany and the Netherlands.
Charles V came close enough to unifying Europe to his rule that he frightened the other European monarchs and republics into a series of devastating wars against him. Over time, Europe only became more divided, especially with the Protestant Reformation, which saw the birth of a new branch of Christianity that rejected the authority of the Catholic Church.
Another factor was that Eurasia became cooler from 1645 to 1715. This had the effect of driving colonists to new lands and toward practices like deforestation. Political unrest also broke out, leading to monarchies adopting absolutism, the theory that the authority of monarchs was granted by God and superseded the authority of clergy and representative bodies. In turn, this led to violent resistance, especially in the 1640s, like the rise of the Leveller movement in England, who rejected all social distinctions (452). Vicious religious wars broke out in Europe and the plague reemerged in England. In China, revolts brought down the Ming. Despite these calamities, “there was no seventeenth-century collapse” (455).
Steppe nomads riding out and conquering settled societies had often been a major cause of societal collapse. With the use of guns, Russia and China under the rule of a new dynasty, the Qing, were able to crush what was left of the steppe nomads. Europeans took over the Americas, gaining mass profit from new techniques for silver mining, with China being a major importer of the silver taken from the Americas. The populations of Indigenous Americans were decimated by diseases brought over from Europe and the violence brought by the settlers.
Northwestern European states, namely England and the Dutch Republic, also enjoyed the advantages of backwardness they gained from neighboring France and Spain. In those countries, people increasingly worked for wages and, by 1750, “the world’s first consumer culture” (468) emerged. Changes in the society and the economy encouraged a “clockwork model of nature” (469), with scientists and other scholars turning from the ancient classics like Aristotle to scientific observation of the natural world.
The concept of using reason to understand nature also encouraged the view that political and social institutions could also be approached scientifically. Nor were these discussions restricted to elites, but instead they also spread to an increasingly literate public enjoying a growing print media of newspapers. Some monarchs who embraced this movement, the Enlightenment, became “enlightened despots” (472). Philosophers including Voltaire in France looked at China as an admirable model, namely the idea of a “truly wise despot, ruling in consultation with a rational civil service, abstaining from pointless wars and religious persecution” (472).
Like in Europe, the technology of printing led to the spread of ideas in China. For example, the scholar Gu Yanwu “tried […] to understand the world by observing the physical things that real people actually did” (473). Still, Yanwu and other Chinese intellectuals turned to Han-era classics more than observation. Morris argues this led to a “Second Renaissance” (474) instead of something like the Enlightenment in Europe.
This leads Morris to addressing “Needham’s Problem” (475). Named for the scientist Joseph Needham, it is a historical question asking why Europe became more scientifically advanced than China despite centuries of Chinese scientific progress. Morris’s own answer is that societies develop the knowledge that is necessary to address their own social development. Since Europeans needed new technology and knowledge to address their colonization of the Americas, they developed advancements like two-handed clocks, which in turn motivated questions and analysis about the natural world. Chinese intellectuals were motivated by the Qing government and the civil service exam to remain conservative in order to enjoy “profitable niches as state servants” (477).
The Qing emperor Kangxi spoke with the Jesuits, a group of learned Catholic missionaries, and learned from them Western mathematical and technological principles. Still, he determined, not incorrectly, that the Chinese were still ahead of them. Justified fears that European missionaries were politically subversive led China and Japan to cut ties with the West. In the meantime, although Chinese scholars did make new discoveries, they “always grounded” their “arguments in ancient texts” (481).
China and Japan greatly restricted Western trade, finding that they needed to avoid exporting resources to deal with their own large populations. In the West, England and the Dutch Republic developed national banks, which allowed the already-bellicose European nations to pay for war more easily. Unfortunately, reliance on credit led to the British demanding “the American colonists to pick up part of the check” (488), leading to the American War of Independence. The trend also started a series of economic and political crises in France that eventually culminated in the French Revolution. Morris argues this age of intense warfare did not change society much, but it did shift Western power away from the Ottoman Empire to western Europe.
According to Morris’s social score system, by the 18th century the East and West were on an equal level. Further, Morris says that “Western social development had clawed its way just forty-five points since Ice Age hunter-gatherers had prowled the tundra in search of a meal; within the next hundred years it soared another hundred points” (491). This was due to one “breakthrough” (493), the Industrial Revolution.
Devices powered by coal had been used before for processes like ironmaking or draining water from mines, but only in limited ways. In 1765, the scientist James Watt developed a more efficient steam engine for devices used to pump water out of mines. Cotton cloth manufacturers then adopted Watts’s engine. Britain’s cloth industry greatly benefited from the circumstance that large amounts of cheap cotton were being produced in North American plantations. Over time, Watts’s engine became applied to other industries like ironmaking, The way the steam engine improved energy capture was “the biggest and fastest transformation in the history of the world” and it “shattered the hard ceiling” (497).
At first the Industrial Revolution was “very like the upswings in earlier history” (498) and it may have stalled like social development in the Roman Empire and Song China. However, Europe had the cumulative knowledge of previous societies, the problem of migrating nomads disrupting advanced settled societies was no longer an issue because of the conquest of the steppes, and technology had advanced enough that ships could sail anywhere, “allowing western Europeans to create an Atlantic economy unlike anything seen before” (500).
The Industrial Revolution dawned in Britain because Britain benefited from having a relatively large, commercial middle-class with access to political and social institutions and a relatively weak monarchy. The Industrial Revolution might have instead happened in the Netherlands or France, but if it had occurred without Britain’s geographical advantages, it would have taken longer to unfold. In that case of a slower-moving Industrial Revolution, Morris poses the question of if China could have still had its own Industrial Revolution while Europe was still developing. Morris determines that because incentives “to invest in machinery were weak” (501), it would not have.
As industrialization took hold, further change was driven by the emergence “of a new, steam-powered class of iron chieftains” (503). Social critics like the communists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and the novelist Charles Dickens attacked this class of disrupting old cultural and social ties that encouraged compassion for the downtrodden and caring only about their own wealth. Others praised the industrialists for making former luxuries more widely available.
Morris agrees that, while wealth and wider availability of goods were made possible, “the workers who made the money saw precious little of it” (504). Morris also argues that, by the 1830s, industrialists were beginning to find it more profitable to raise workers’ wages and compromise with them than let them be hired by competitors. This was accompanied by middle-class reformers taking a “revolutionary” (506) interest in improving the lives of the poor.
These technologies drove globalization. This especially became true as industrialization spread from Britain to Belgium, northern France, Germany, and the United States. Industrialized transportation “annihilated distance” (507) and facilitated colonial expansion, while new technologies like the telegraph made communication between continents much faster.
Government policies turned to free trade (trade with few or no tariffs), and it improved industrial and financial development. The rising movement of “liberalization” saw enslavement, serfdom, and “legal restrictions on movement and occupation” (513) come to an end in much of the world. From the perspective of those who experienced it, the Victorian era was one of rapid social and cultural change, not a period of conservatism.
This was especially true as the economic and social forces unleashed by industrialization spread outside the West. By the 1830s, British merchants profited from trading opium grown in India to China in exchange for Chinese tea. Concerned about an epidemic of opium dependency in the country, the government of the Chinese emperor Daoguang tried to crack down on the opium trade. When a large supply of opium held by the British was confiscated by government officials, it triggered a war between Britain and France. Steam-powered iron ships gave the British navy a decisive victory. Afterward, Britain and other Western powers were able to force devastating concessions out of China, and yet more violent clashes between the West and China followed.
In 1853, the United States forced Japan to allow access to their ships, with Britain and Russia soon following in making similar demands. With the help of their new advanced ships, Europeans were able to easily colonize faraway places like Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. By 1900, almost all of Africa was controlled by Western powers. Atrocities took place in the African country of Congo under the colonial rule of King Leopold of Belgium, demands for food exported to the West worsened drought and famine in South Asia, and in “North America and Australia, white settlers almost exterminated the natives” (520). While some Westerners were disgusted by colonialism, many came to believe that the West’s dominance was natural and inevitable.
Morris argues that Western supremacy began to be undone by “the logic of their own market-driven imperialism” (521) as Easterners were incentivized to emulate the West. Japan successfully imitated the technology and institutions of the West, embraced liberalization, and became a major imperialist power of its own. Regions that were not colonized and had high social development like Japan had the least difficulty industrializing, while China, which was somewhat colonized but also had high social development, took longer to industrialize.
The outbreak of World War I further changed societies. Morris suggests that the demands of 20th-century warfare led both West and East to eventually reject “dynastic empires,” which had been “history’s most enduring form of government” (528), in favor of liberal democracies. This era saw the emergence of the United States as a “subcontinental empire” (529) and the Soviet Union which combined modernity with a non-democratic, illiberal government and a centralized economy.
In response to the economic pressures of the Great Depression, Japan, Germany, and other countries likewise abandoned liberalism for more authoritarian and militaristic governments. However, World War II ended both many authoritarian and colonial governments while leaving the United States and the Soviet Union as the world’s great powers. At the same time, World War II did not significantly damage social development long-term “because the core was by now so big that not even the greatest war ever fought could wreck all of it” (533).
The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States quickly followed World War II. While the United States lost several proxy wars fought against governments ideologically aligned with the Soviet Union, it won through its massive cultural and economic influence, sustained by vast consumerism. Morris writes, “The twentieth century was the age of everything, of material abundance beyond the dreams of avarice” (537). The world population expanded massively and people began living longer lives even in Africa, which was inflicted with AIDS and malaria. The greater life flexibility afforded by technology and medical advances helped women find economic independence by the 1960s.
The Soviet Union fell behind the United States in terms of both cultural influence and technological convenience. The West especially benefited from the new technology of computers by the late 1970s. Japan likewise thrived through adopting Western-style entertainment and technology.
For China, the Communist leader Mao Zedong sought to “sweep away the ‘Four Olds’—old customs, old habits, old culture, and old thinking” (544). These efforts backfired, especially by causing a famine that killed 20 million people (545). After Mao’s death in 1976, the new leader Deng Xiaoping changed course and sought to integrate China into the global economy and allowed some liberalization. Similarly, the premier of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, reformed his government to allow more liberalization and reform. Despite his efforts, the Soviet Union dissolved, meaning that the “United States had won the War of the West” (550).
As Morris’s narrative enters the modern era, the question of human agency versus The Role of Geography in Social Development comes to the fore, especially with two individuals, Genghis Khan and Zheng He. In fact, Morris even concedes that Genghis Khan’s traits that made him “history’s greatest conqueror […] owed something to his early family experiences” (388). It is clear that the military and political decisions of Genghis Khan and his successors had tremendous consequences for both China and Europe. Specifically, the Mongolian Empire led to the Second Old World Exchange, which Morris describes as “the first true age of technological transfer” (395). Later, Morris speculates that if Genghis Khan had died at a young age “instead of growing up to be Genghis Khan, who knows what might have happened?” (575-576). If it had not been devastated by the Mongolians, Song China might have had an Industrial Revolution, although Morris is quick to add that the “odds against an Eastern takeoff in the twelfth century were, I suspect, very long” (576).
Zheng He plays another starring role in Morris’s narrative. However, Zheng He’s significance, at least in Why The West Rules—For Now, rests on a hypothetical, namely Zheng He’s ability to reach the Americas with his fleet. Morris assumes that, if Zheng had made contact with the Aztecs before Europeans, then it would have ended with violence, much like it has in actual history (410-412). Like in the beginning when he imagines Britain instead being colonized by the Chinese (3-6), Morris’s hypothetical alternate histories play out not unlike real-world history, with assumptions like any meeting between a Mesoamerican and a Eurasian society would end with violence.
In the introduction of Why the West Rules—For Now, Morris downplayed the significance of cultural and intellectual history, stating that “culture, values, and beliefs were unimportant” and “brute material forces” are the “reason why the West rules” (29). Still, in Morris’s presentation of The Interplay of Innovation, Environment, and Power, he remarks that “[m]aybe it was culture, not great men or bungling idiots, that sent [Hernan] Cortés rather than Zheng [He] to Tenochtitlàn” (417). The “culture” Morris is referring to is the argument that both 11th-century China and 15th-century Europe experienced their own Renaissances, but the European Renaissance kickstarted a culture of “bold exploration” (421) that would fuel both colonization and the Industrial Revolution.
Whether or not one sees this argument as Morris finding significance in cultural history after all, he still argues that both Renaissances were driven by “rising social development” (420). Also, for Morris the real important factor is material, namely the fact that geography “made it easier for western Europeans to cross the Atlantic than for Easterners to cross the Pacific” (421). The argument for similar Renaissances also fits Morris’s view that human societies are fundamentally the same in how they respond to specific circumstances.
Nonetheless, Morris ties social development to culture in other ways, such as in the treatment of women. Wu Zetian, the only woman to rule the Chinese Empire in her own right, is seen by Morris as having a sense of “protofeminism” (340) in 7th-century China. This is something Morris credits to social development, especially “unprecedented social mobility” and “Buddhist attitudes toward female abilities” (339). Similarly, Morris sees the practice of footbinding as an example of “conservative retrenchment” that is driven by “stagnation” and a “decline of social development” (426). Overall, he ties the history of women’s freedoms or their restriction to his social development model.



Unlock all 69 pages of this Study Guide
Get in-depth, chapter-by-chapter summaries and analysis from our literary experts.