The End of Everything

Victor Davis Hanson examines how entire civilizations can be abruptly destroyed through wartime force of arms. Through four case studies spanning nearly two millennia, he argues that the modern world is not immune to the catastrophes that erased classical Thebes, Carthage and its Punic (Phoenician-derived) civilization, Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Constantinople, and Aztec Tenochtitlán. Each case involved a final siege targeting a capital city, resulting in the death or enslavement of most of the population and the erasure of an entire way of life. Hanson distinguishes these sudden wartime annihilations from gradual internal decay, such as fifth-century Rome's slow dissolution, or the mysterious collapses of civilizations like the Mycenaeans. He contends that recurring human failings, including naïveté, hubris, flawed assessments of power, and retreat into fantasy, explain why these catastrophes keep occurring, and that modern institutions such as the United Nations and nuclear deterrence do not render these precedents irrelevant.

The first case study examines the obliteration of the Greek city-state of Thebes by Alexander the Great in 335 BC. After the assassination of Alexander's father, King Philip II of Macedon, the Thebans revolted against Macedonian occupation, incited by false rumors that Alexander had been killed campaigning in Illyria. Alexander, far from dead, marched his army 300 miles in two weeks and arrived with over 30,000 veteran soldiers. The Thebans' hoped-for allies never appeared: Southern Greek armies turned back on learning Alexander was alive, and Athens sent no troops despite supplying money and arms. Alexander waited three days, offering lenient terms. The Thebans rejected the terms and insulted him from the walls. In the ensuing battle, the longer Macedonian pikes and fresh reserves exhausted the defenders. A Macedonian detachment discovered an unguarded gate while the trapped garrison inside the acropolis simultaneously broke out, crushing the Thebans between two forces. Alexander then unleashed troops from neighboring cities that Thebes had previously destroyed; these auxiliaries conducted much of the killing of civilians. Approximately 6,000 Thebans died, over 30,000 were enslaved, and the city was leveled. Hanson identifies four fatal miscalculations: The Thebans overestimated their military power based on outdated glories, believed the rumor of Alexander's death, trusted in allies who proved impotent, and insulted Alexander, turning a political revolt into a matter of personal honor. The destruction marks the end of the era of independent Greek city-states.

The second case study traces the annihilation of Carthage by Rome in 146 BC, after 118 years of rivalry across three Punic Wars. Carthage, founded by Phoenician colonists around 814 BC in modern-day Tunisia, had grown into a major Mediterranean commercial and naval power. During the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), the Carthaginian general Hannibal crossed the Alps and destroyed four consecutive Roman armies, but Rome prevailed through attrition and reduced Carthage to city-state status. Over the following decades, the senator Cato the Elder campaigned relentlessly for Carthage's destruction, ending his speeches with the phrase Carthago delenda est ("Carthage must be destroyed"). When Carthage launched an unauthorized retaliatory war against its neighbor Numidia, Rome seized the pretext. The Romans issued escalating ultimata: Carthage surrendered hostages, weapons, and its fleet, complying each time. The final demand, that the Carthaginians abandon their 700-year-old city and relocate at least 10 miles inland, triggered furious resistance. The first two years of siege saw Roman failure, as Carthage's massive walls and aggressive sorties frustrated the besiegers. The officer Scipio Aemilianus distinguished himself, was elected consul despite not meeting the minimum age requirement, and took supreme command, systematically cutting off supply lines. In 146 BC, the Romans stormed the citadel and demolished the city block by block. Of roughly 500,000 residents, only 50,000 survived to be enslaved. The historian Polybius recorded that Scipio wept over the ruins, fearing Rome might one day share Carthage's fate. Hanson argues that this destruction, occurring the same year Rome razed the Greek city of Corinth, transformed Rome into an aggressive imperial juggernaut.

The third case study examines the fall of Constantinople to Ottoman forces under Sultan Mehmet II on May 29, 1453, ending the Byzantine Empire after more than a millennium. Hanson traces Byzantium's survival to geography, particularly the narrow Bosporus strait separating Europe from Asia; the city's position as a nexus of East-West trade; a cohesive identity built on Roman political heritage, the Greek language, and Orthodox Christianity; and the Theodosian Walls, a tripartite defense of moat, outer wall, and towering inner wall never breached in over a millennium. By 1453, however, the population had dwindled from perhaps 800,000 to roughly 50,000, ravaged by plague and Ottoman territorial absorption. Mehmet II came to power in 1451 at 18 and prepared for the siege despite assuring Emperor Constantine XI he had no hostile intentions. He amassed up to 200,000 men and commissioned enormous siege cannons. Western Christendom sent minimal help: Only about 2,000 Europeans arrived, most notably 700 Genoese veterans under the mercenary captain Giovanni Giustiniani. More Christians fought for the sultan than defended the walls. During the 55-day siege, defenders repaired breaches nightly, and the outnumbered Christian fleet defeated Turkish ships. On May 21, Mehmet offered Constantine terms, including safe departure with property, but the emperor refused, vowing to defend the city to the death. On May 29, after two assault waves were repulsed, a third wave of elite Janissaries stormed the walls. The Janissaries were infantry drawn from the devshirme system, in which Christian children from conquered Balkan populations were forcibly conscripted and converted to Islam. At the critical moment, Giustiniani was severely wounded and his contingent abandoned their posts, allowing the Janissaries to pour through. Constantine reportedly tore off his imperial insignia, charged the attackers, and was killed. Hagia Sophia, the largest church in Christendom for a millennium, became a mosque within days. Some 4,000 to 5,000 were killed, and nearly 50,000 were enslaved. The fall accelerated Western European efforts to find maritime routes around Ottoman-controlled trade, contributing to the Age of Exploration.

The fourth case study covers Hernán Cortés's destruction of the Aztec Empire and its capital Tenochtitlán in 1521. Cortés landed on the eastern Mexican coast in 1519 with roughly 500 soldiers. After fighting through the hinterland, the Spanish entered Tenochtitlán in November and were stunned by the island metropolis on Lake Texcoco, a city of 200,000 to 400,000 residents interlaced with causeways and canals. Within six days, the Spanish occupied Emperor Montezuma II's palace and held him hostage. When Cortés left to deal with a rival Spanish force sent to arrest him, his lieutenant Pedro de Alvarado massacred hundreds of unarmed Aztec aristocrats during a religious festival, igniting a general uprising. Montezuma was killed, and the Spanish fled along the causeways on the catastrophic Noche Triste ("Sorrowful Night"), losing 400 to 700 men. Fewer than 800 survivors defeated a pursuing Aztec army at the battle of Otumba when Cortés's cavalry killed the enemy commander. Over the following months, Cortés rebuilt his forces, allied with the Tlaxcalans, fierce enemies of the Aztecs, and other subject peoples. He had 13 brigantines, small armed warships, built and transported overland to the lake. A devastating smallpox epidemic further weakened the city. Hanson identifies multiple reasons for the Spanish victory: superior steel weapons and cavalry, the Aztec practice of capturing rather than killing enemies for sacrifice, disciplined unit tactics, the Tlaxcalan alliance, the epidemic, and Cortés's extraordinary generalship. The final siege lasted from late April to mid-August 1521, as Cortés destroyed the city block by block. The last emperor, Cuauhtémoc, surrendered on August 13. At least 200,000 had perished. Cortés rebuilt Mexico City atop the ruins. The Aztec civilization ceased to exist as a living entity, though the Nahua people survived and gradually assimilated over subsequent centuries.

In the epilogue, Hanson synthesizes common patterns. Every targeted civilization had declined from its peak and concentrated in its capital while its attacker was ascendant. The besieged relied on allies who never arrived, placed excessive confidence in their fortifications, suffered from internal factionalism, and failed to assess the capabilities of their attackers. Notably, the conquerors, all self-proclaimed men of letters, expressed regret for the annihilation they had unleashed. Hanson applies these lessons to the present, surveying nuclear threats from Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, and warning that biological agents and artificial intelligence carry potentially greater dangers. He concludes that the modern world faces a toxic paradox: The more advanced mankind's destructive capability becomes, the more it clings to the conceit that total war is obsolete.