Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking

Malcolm Gladwell

Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking

Malcolm Gladwell
63 pages2-hour read
Nonfiction
Book
Adult
Published in 2005

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Chapters 3-4Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Content Warning: This section of the guide includes discussion of racism, gender discrimination, death, and illness.

Chapter 3 Summary: “The Warren Harding Error: Why We Fall for Tall, Dark, and Handsome Men”

Dignified, good-looking, deep-voiced, and affable, Warren Harding resembled a Roman Senator. Though not known for intelligence, Harding was a much-admired Ohio senator who radiated presidential dignity and common sense. However, when Harding was elected president in 1920, he proved “one of the worst presidents in American history” (129). The problem, Gladwell notes, is that Harding appealed to stereotypes of what a good leader looks like, which encouraged voters to reach quick conclusions based on biases. This type of error lies behind much prejudging and social discrimination.


Implicit-association tests measure the effects of bias. One such exam asks test takers to place a series of words and pictures into one of two categories, “European American or Bad” and “African American or Good” (141). The items are Hurt, Evil, Glorious, a picture of a Black man, a picture of a white man, and Wonderful. The test is repeated, except the categories are reversed: “European American or Good” and “African American or Bad” (141). Most people, Black or white, are much faster at sorting the second test, where “European American” is associated with “Good.” It turns out that “more than 80 percent of all those who have ever taken the test end up having pro-white associations, meaning that it takes them measurably longer to complete answers when they are required to put good words into the ‘Black’ category” (142-43). This also includes about half of all African Americans who have taken the test.


Such tests also reveal that there’s a big difference between stated values and unconscious associations. This type of bias is hard to avoid. One Harvard psychologist notes, “All around you, that [white] group is being paired with good things. You open the newspaper and you turn on the television, and you can’t escape it” (145). These biases also have real-world effects. In the US, less than 15% of men are six feet or taller, but over half of Fortune 500 CEOs are that tall, and only 10 are shorter than five foot six inches. Likewise, in a test of bias in car sales, volunteers—both Black and white—walked into dealerships, represented themselves as college-educated systems analysts from wealthy neighborhoods, and bargained for a low-priced car. Black people and women wound up with offers up to $800 more expensive than offers to white men. Sales personnel who have an instinctive bias against Black people and women as “lay-downs”—that is, easy to cheat—behave like 1920 voters who fell for Warren Harding without really thinking.


Finally, Gladwell turns to how such bias can be fixed. With respect to prejudice against marginalized groups, it’s possible to overcome if “[you] change your life so that you are exposed to minorities on a regular basis and become comfortable with them and familiar with the best of their culture” (166).

Chapter 4 Summary: “Paul Van Riper’s Big Victory: Creating Structure for Spontaneity”

In 2000, planners of the Millennium Challenge war games approached Paul Van Riper—a career Marine commander whose relentless tactics during the Vietnam War gave him notoriety. They wanted him to play a rogue Middle East military leader who threatened American forces.


Van Riper’s “Red Team” was to face the US “Blue Team,” which had access to advanced computer systems, simulations, joint interactive planning processes, enormous databases, and “a formal decision-making tool that broke the enemy down into a series of systems—military, economic, social, political” (179). Theoretically, this was to enable careful thinking to control the progress of war. Van Riper, on the other hand, believed “that war was inherently unpredictable and messy and nonlinear” (182) and that calm rationality doesn’t work in the heat of battle.


In the simulation, Blue Team sailed an armada into the Persian Gulf, issued ultimatums, and knocked out Red Team’s communication antennae. Red Team responded by using couriers to communicate, then sent out small boats to monitor the Blue Team’s ships, and finally launched a surprise attack, firing cruise missiles that overwhelmed the armada and sunk 16 vessels. In a real war, 20,000 soldiers and sailors would have died. Riper’s in-the-moment decisions beat the US military’s carefully thought-out logical plans.


In another example, improvisational comedy groups take topic suggestions from the audience and immediately perform skits that they make up on the spot; this form of comedy “involves people making very sophisticated decisions on the spur of the moment, without the benefit of any kind of script or plot” (193). Yet improv is not simply random, and has rules that require hours of practice. The main rule is for the actors to accept everything that happens onstage; though this may seem counterintuitive, it results in gifted performances. 


Similarly, Van Riper gave his Red Team plenty of leeway to innovate in the field and didn’t hold long meetings where his teammates explained their thinking. Based on such examples, Gladwell argues that explanations—“verbal overshadowing”—often interfere with the ability to see a situation clearly rather than serving as clarification. It’s easy, for example, to recall a face but hard to describe it; in fact, the act of describing interferes with the memory of the face, thereby displacing it. More broadly, Gladwell claims that trying to think through a fast-moving problem interferes with the mind’s ability to generate sudden, useful insights. In the case of Van Riper’s victory, the Blue Team was so absorbed in the minutiae of battle that it failed to creatively view the situation as a whole. 


In 1995, struggling with a shoestring budget, the emergency department at Chicago’s Cook County Hospital was overcrowded with patients, many of whom complained of chest pain but only 10% of whom were actually having a heart attack. Medicine department chairman Brendan Reilly found that doctors’ evaluations of patients’ heart risks were all over the map; even when physicians administered extra tests and otherwise gathered more data, their conclusions were essentially random. Reilly used cardiologist Lee Goldman’s new decision-making algorithm that combined the readout from an electrocardiogram with three urgent-risk factors: “(1) Is the pain felt by the patient unstable angina? (2) Is there fluid in the patient’s lungs? and (3) Is the patient’s systolic blood pressure below 100?” (230) The results are 70% better at detecting which patients are not suffering a heart attack. Cook County was one of the first hospitals to benefit from the Goldman algorithm.


Both the Blue Team defeat and the Cook County Hospital experience demonstrate that having more information is not always better. For instance, psychologists who receive more data about an individual become more certain of their evaluations, but their diagnostic accuracy remains the same. Gladwell suggests that too much information can also become a hindrance, observing that when people suffer from information overload, they tend to avoid making decisions. A store’s tasting booth with six types of jams generated sales from 30% of visitors, but when the booth displayed 24 different jams, sales dropped to 3%.


Gladwell returns to the Millenium Challenge war games. After the Blue Team defeat, the US military rewrote the rules so Red Team was unable to use any of the tactics it had employed. Blue Team won in a rout, and the Pentagon believed its new system worked just fine.

Chapters 3-4 Analysis

Chapters 3 and 4 focus on How Fast-and-Frugal Thinking Can Go Wrong. The Warren Harding error is Gladwell’s name for snap decisions based on bias. Harding looked presidential, so he must be presidential—even though he was not. This error occurs everywhere—in assessments of politicians, celebrities, potential employees, etc. Gladwell implies that its pervasiveness stems from the nature of intuition itself. One of the benefits of snap decisions is that they economize and simplify daily problems. Instead of poring through endless reams of data on an individual, one may take a single look and form a quick judgment. However, this efficiency becomes a liability when the information itself is skewed—for example, by cultural conditioning. Though Gladwell does not make the link explicit, his contextualization of bias in terms of automatic mental processes bears some resemblance to a perspective on racism grounded in evolutionary psychology—namely, that human biases against outsiders were once adaptive in that they protected tribes from danger but have since become obsolete, interfering with human ability to get along in crowded, diverse cities.


Gladwell’s discussion of bias is an example of how he uses anticipation, bolstering his rhetorical case by responding to potential objections that his advice risks perpetuating prejudice. However, Gladwell’s other examples show that he is not simply concerned with inequalities like racism or sexism. Rather, he contextualizes these within a broader human tendency toward bias—hence the Warren Harding example, or the discussion of the height of CEOs. This reflects Gladwell’s focus on bias as a psychological phenomenon, though it risks eliding the systemic nature of racial and gender discrimination.


Another failure Gladwell considers in these chapters has less to do with using fast thinking improperly and more to do with not using it at all. This is the case with the Blue Team in the war game, which focuses on being analytical, dedicated to the imposing logic of their data-gathering and evaluation systems. However, while Blue Team poured over spreadsheets, Red Team sunk their ships. The distinction Gladwell draws here bears some resemblance to the traditional distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning. Thinking things through is a process that makes use of deductive logic—the same kind that figures out arithmetic problems or winnows out essential options in buying a house or a car. The other mental process involves inductive reasoning—essentially, seeing patterns in masses of data. Inductive reasoning can itself be painstaking, but Gladwell’s examples suggest that it can also happen in an instant, especially if one possesses a great deal of experience with the issue at hand. Thus, the deductive techniques used by the Blue Team ended up failing in a contest with the quick, intuitive grace of Red Team’s thinking. 


A related form of failure is by-the-book reasoning. It’s one thing to obey the rules; it’s quite another to do so mechanically, heedless of special cases where human judgment is needed. The Blue Team, carefully following their rulebook, had no answer to the fast-moving enemy; the Red Team, doing what they shouldn’t, championed the day. To hammer home the danger, Gladwell closes the chapter by revealing that the military was so committed to its preferred methodology that it ignored the results of its own study when they failed to back up its preconceptions.

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