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Brooks asserts that stock markets are inherently volatile, a truth captured in J. P. Morgan’s retort—which he purportedly made—that the market “will fluctuate.” The social behaviors seen on Wall Street in the 1960s—panic, rumor, and rationalization—were remarkably similar to those documented in the 17th-century Amsterdam Stock Exchange by speculator Joseph de la Vega. This recurring pattern of investor behavior was on full display during the market fluctuation of May 1962.
Although stocks had been declining since the beginning of the year and the previous week had been the market’s worst since 1950, the crisis began on Monday, May 28, 1962, when the Dow-Jones industrial average suffered its second-largest single-day point loss in history, dropping 34.95 points. The immense trading volume overwhelmed the Stock Exchange’s ticker tape, which fell over an hour behind, delaying price information and increasing uncertainty. Brokers were flooded with sell orders, and major stocks like American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) plummeted. That night, an estimated 91,700 margin calls (demands for more collateral from credit customers) were sent out, and Wall Street feared that a wave of selling by mutual funds could trigger a downward spiral of forced selling and further market declines.
On Tuesday, May 29, the market opened even lower, leading to what Brooks calls “the blackest ninety minutes in the memory of many veteran dealers” and a near-complete breakdown of technical and communication facilities (17). Just before noon, however, the market abruptly reversed course. The turning point came at the trading post for AT&T, where floor specialist George M. L. La Branche Jr. was responsible for maintaining an orderly market in the stock. After several smaller transactions had reduced the supply by about half, a bid of 10,000 shares by John J. Cranley of Dreyfus & Co. cleared out the remaining supply of sellers at the key psychological price of $100 per share, sparking a “buying panic.” The market surged, closing with a 27.03-point gain on 14,750,000 shares—the highest one-day volume ever except for October 29, 1929. After a Wednesday Memorial Day holiday, the market rallied again on Thursday, May 31, gaining another 9.40 points and wiping out all the week’s losses to close slightly above its previous level.
A post-mortem analysis by the New York Stock Exchange revealed that, contrary to fears, mutual funds had acted as a stabilizing force by buying stocks during the downturn. The primary sellers were individual investors, particularly those with higher incomes. Although the crash had immediate repercussions for stock exchanges and commodity markets around the world, the crisis demonstrated that while post-1929 regulations had made a prolonged depression less likely, the market’s short-term movements remained shaped by recurring patterns of investor psychology, including fear, speculation, and shifts in confidence.
In 1955, amid a booming automobile market, the Ford Motor Company invested a quarter-billion dollars to create a new medium-priced car to compete in the growing medium-priced market and prevent Ford customers from trading up to rival manufacturers. Internally known as the “E-Car,” the project was led by Richard Krafve, head of Ford’s new Special Products Division. The car’s physical design was developed not by consumer polls but through the conventional Detroit method of pooling the hunches of company committees. The head stylist, Roy A. Brown, aimed for a unique look, creating a distinctive vertical front grille and horizontal rear wings intended to make the car instantly recognizable.
While the car’s styling was developed independently of consumer polling, Ford’s market research director, David Wallace, conducted extensive psychological studies to craft an ideal “personality” for the car. His research concluded that the car should be marketed as “the smart car for the younger executive or professional family on its way up” (45). The naming process involved extensive research, with both of Foote, Cone & Belding’s offices independently identifying “Corsair” as a top choice. However, at an executive committee meeting, company chairman Ernest R. Breech passed over all the finalists—although “Edsel” had been retained as a fallback option—and chose it, saying simply, “Let’s call it that” (48).
Ford launched the Edsel on September 4, 1957, with one of the most expensive and highly publicized campaigns in history. The company recruited a carefully selected nationwide network of dealers who fell just short of the goal of 1,200, many of whom had abandoned profitable franchises for other makes. Despite the immense hype, the car was a commercial disaster. Its launch coincided with the start of an economic recession and a sudden public shift in taste away from large, ornate cars and toward smaller, more practical vehicles. Compounding these issues, the first Edsels off the assembly line were plagued by poor workmanship and significant mechanical defects.
Sales collapsed almost immediately. In January 1958, Ford dismantled the independent Edsel Division, merging it into a larger division where the car became a neglected “stepchild.” Minor redesigns for the 1959 and 1960 models failed to revive interest, and on November 19, 1959, a Ford Foundation stock-sale prospectus disclosed in a footnote that the Edsel had been discontinued, a fact confirmed the same day by a Ford spokesman. Having sold only 109,466 cars, the project resulted in an estimated net loss of $350 million—arrived at by adding the $250 million pre-launch expenditure to roughly $200 million in post-launch losses and subtracting about $100 million in salvageable plant and equipment. The Edsel became a classic case study in corporate failure, illustrating that even with vast resources, exhaustive research, and careful planning, success can still be undermined by changing economic conditions, shifting consumer preferences, and other unforeseen factors. Most of the executives involved, however, suffered no career setbacks and went on to other successful positions.
In “The Fluctuation,” Brooks establishes one of the book’s central concerns by juxtaposing the 1962 stock-market crisis with the 17th-century Amsterdam Stock Exchange. By drawing this historical parallel, Brooks argues that financial markets, despite their modern technological and regulatory frameworks, are fundamentally driven by recurring patterns of human behavior. Brooks uses the anecdote of J. P. Morgan’s supposed quip that the market “will fluctuate” to frame market volatility as an inherent feature of financial markets. The essay’s narrative structure emphasizes this point by documenting how market mechanisms and communication systems break down under pressure. The ticker tape, which ordinarily provides investors with current price information, becomes a source of chaos as its delay creates an information vacuum, fueling panic rather than providing clarity. Brooks presents the crisis as a case study in investor behavior, demonstrating that fear, rumor, and shifting confidence persist across centuries, placing sustained strain on even modern financial systems.
Brooks employs a character-focused narrative that presents the market crash through the experiences of key individuals and institutions. By narrowing the sprawling crisis to specific individuals and institutions, he grounds broader market movements in identifiable decisions and actions. He locates the market’s turning point in a key trading episode involving George M. L. La Branche Jr., the floor specialist for AT&T. His management of the stock at the key psychological price of $100 per share together with John J. Cranley’s large purchase order illustrate how individual actions and market sentiment can shape broader market movements. Similarly, the essay highlights the collective fear of a mass sell-off by mutual funds, which ultimately proved unfounded as the funds became a stabilizing force during the downturn. This narrative technique breaks the crisis into a sequence of decisions and reactions, revealing the interaction of individual agency and mass psychology that defines Human Nature in Finance.
“The Fate of the Edsel” presents a case study that complements Brooks’s examination of the limits of prediction and planning. While Chapter 1 examines how financial markets become difficult to control during periods of uncertainty, the Edsel story examines the limitations of corporate planning in a large-scale business project. Ford’s attempt to develop a successful product through exhaustive market research, demographic targeting, and a massive promotional campaign reflects confidence that careful planning could anticipate consumer demand. However, the project’s failure exposes The Illusion of Expert Control. The company’s efforts to create a car with a specific “personality”—“the smart car for the younger executive or professional family on its way up” (45)—couldn’t overcome changing economic conditions, shifting consumer preferences, and early manufacturing problems. The Edsel illustrates the limits of corporate planning, demonstrating that even a quarter-billion-dollar investment and a team of experts couldn’t guarantee commercial success.
The Edsel narrative also critiques corporate bureaucracy, showing how internal dynamics can undermine systematic decision-making. The decision to name the car provides a key example. After an exhaustive, data-driven search involving advertising agencies and even a poet, the final choice was made when the board chairman, Ernest R. Breech, discarded the research and declared that the car should be named Edsel. This moment reveals how hierarchical power can override systematic planning. Furthermore, the aftermath of the failure highlights how corporate structures can distribute the consequences of failure unevenly. Despite a net loss of $350 million, the key executives responsible for the Edsel didn’t suffer career setbacks; most moved on to other high-level positions. By contrast, thousands of employees lost their jobs, and some dealers who had abandoned profitable franchises to sell Edsels went bankrupt. This contrast suggests that within large corporations, the consequences of failure aren’t always borne equally, with senior decision-makers often experiencing fewer personal repercussions than those lower in the corporate hierarchy.



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