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Brooks begins this essay by illustrating the initial resistance to office copying technology, using the example of the mimeograph machine, which failed to find a market in 1887 because businesses saw no need for mass duplication. This historical reluctance contrasts sharply with the eventual widespread adoption of copying technologies during the mid-20th century. The technological breakthrough that fueled this change came from Chester F. Carlson, a patent department employee and inventor who, in a makeshift laboratory in Queens, New York, in 1938, developed a dry-copying process he called electrophotography.
In 1944, after being rejected by numerous major corporations, Carlson persuaded Battelle Memorial Institute, a nonprofit research organization in Columbus, Ohio, to undertake further development in exchange for three-quarters of any royalties. By 1946, Battelle’s work had come to the attention of various people at the Haloid Company, a small photographic paper manufacturer in Rochester, New York. Among them was Joseph C. Wilson, who was about to assume its presidency. Wilson brought in lawyer Sol Linowitz to investigate, and after trips to Columbus, the company secured rights to the process. Renamed “xerography” (from the Greek for “dry writing”), the technology gradually became Haloid’s central focus. Between 1947 and 1960, the company undertook an immense financial gamble, spending around $75 million on research and development—a sum that was roughly double its total earnings during that period. This do-or-die commitment was financed through heavy borrowing and the widespread issuance of stock.
In 1958, the company was renamed Haloid Xerox, and in 1960, it launched its first automatic office copier, the 914, which became the first plain-paper copier to achieve widespread commercial success. Its success was immediate and revolutionary, transforming office work and propelling the company into a corporate phenomenon. Sales surged from $33 million in 1959 to over half a billion by 1966, creating several hundred “Xerox millionaires” out of early investors, including company executives and the University of Rochester. (In 1961, the company was renamed Xerox Corporation.)
Alongside its financial success, Xerox cultivated a reputation for corporate social responsibility, donating a high percentage of its pre-tax income to educational and charitable causes. This ethos was tested when the company sponsored a television series about the United Nations and refused to back down despite an organized letter-writing campaign against the project. However, the widespread adoption of xerography also created significant legal and social challenges, particularly copyright infringement. The ease of making copies presented an overwhelming temptation for individuals, libraries, and schools to illegally reproduce protected materials, posing a threat to authors and publishers. By the fall of 1966, Xerox faced its first major period of adversity as new competitors entered the market, causing its stock to lose more than half its value—though it recovered fully within little more than a month. The essay concludes with Wilson’s concern that, despite the company’s remarkable growth, Xerox must preserve the values and sense of responsibility that had shaped its success.
On Tuesday, November 19, 1963, Morton Kamerman, a partner at the brokerage firm Ira Haupt & Co., reported to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that his firm had fallen below its minimum capital requirements. The crisis was triggered by an enormous speculation in vegetable-oil commodity futures undertaken for a single client, Allied Crude Vegetable Oil & Refining Co. Allied soon defaulted on its debt to Haupt and filed for bankruptcy. The situation then escalated into a full-blown catastrophe when it was discovered that many of the warehouse receipts that Allied had used as collateral were forged, meaning that much of the oil they represented did not exist.
The NYSE suspended Haupt, freezing the accounts of its 20,000 customers. Williston & Beane, which was also suspended because of its exposure to Allied, quickly secured financial assistance and resumed operations. The crisis worsened sharply on Friday, November 22, when the stock market plunged into panic following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This threatened to leave customers with as little as 65 cents on the dollar if Haupt went into bankruptcy and its assets were liquidated at panic prices, turning a firm-specific failure into a potential public disaster.
In response, NYSE President G. Keith Funston proposed a virtually unprecedented solution: Funds from the Exchange’s own treasury would be used to repay Haupt’s customers in full, with member firms assessed afterward to repay the Exchange. Over a tense weekend overshadowed by national mourning, Funston and other Exchange representatives negotiated a complex deal. First, they persuaded Haupt’s major creditor banks to defer collecting on their loans until after the customers had been made “whole.” Next, NYSE Governor Gustave L. Levy—selected because his firm Goldman, Sachs & Co. had a long association with Kleinwort, Benson Ltd. and he was personally on good terms with its partners—flew to London and eventually persuaded four British banks, which had made unsecured loans to Haupt, to join the agreement.
By early Tuesday morning, all parties, including the now-insolvent Haupt partners, had signed the deal. The NYSE initially committed $7.5 million and ultimately paid out $9.5 million dollars, making virtually all customers “whole” and helping to avert a wider panic. The action was widely praised as a demonstration of Wall Street’s sense of public responsibility. However, the Exchange was torn between accepting congratulations and insisting that what it had done was not a precedent—that it wouldn’t necessarily do the same thing again.
Brooks opens his essay on Xerox by introducing the public’s initial rejection of the mimeograph, the predecessor of xerography. This narrative choice establishes the historical resistance to office-copying technology, providing context for the eventual “mania” for xerography. The account of A. B. Dick’s “enormous missionary effort” required to convince offices that they needed mass copies illustrates how technological adoption often depends on persuading consumers of a technology’s value and creating demand for new ways of working (166). Brooks further develops this idea by exploring the historical distrust associated with the word “copy,” which was once synonymous with “counterfeit.” This background frames Xerox’s success as a broader cultural and psychological shift in attitudes toward duplication. The widespread acceptance of copying reflects changing perceptions of authenticity, efficiency, and technological progress, illustrating how technological innovation can reshape everyday practices and social attitudes.
Brooks frames the story of Xerox’s rise as a narrative of innovation, risk, and long-term commitment. He describes the narrative as having an “old-fashioned, even a nineteenth-century, ring,” complete with a “lonely inventor in his crude laboratory” (175), a risk-taking family company, and a successful outcome that affirms the value of the patent system and free enterprise. This narrative approach emphasizes the human elements of sacrifice and perseverance, including the financial risks undertaken by company executives. Brooks also examines Xerox’s commitment to corporate social responsibility through its philanthropy and its support for the United Nations television series. By connecting commercial success with corporate responsibility, Brooks suggests that sustained institutional values contribute to long-term business success.
Brooks examines the unintended consequences of technological innovation by exploring the legal and ethical challenges created by xerography. The commercial success of xerography also contributed to the widespread and casual violation of copyright law. Brooks shows how the ease of xerography encouraged routine copying, putting schools, libraries, and individuals in direct conflict with authors and publishers. The essay examines how technological innovation can develop more rapidly than the legal and ethical frameworks governing its use. Xerox itself occupied the dual position of developing copying technology while holding publishing interests that depended on copyright protection. This tension reflects the challenges of balancing technological innovation with the protection of intellectual property.
Brooks examines the interconnectedness of financial institutions by showing how the failure of a single brokerage firm can threaten confidence in the broader financial system. The discovery of fraud at Ira Haupt & Co. exposed vulnerabilities that extended well beyond the firm’s own operations, illustrating the extent to which financial stability depends on public confidence and institutional trust. Brooks further develops this idea by placing the Haupt crisis within the wider context of the market panic following President Kennedy’s assassination, demonstrating how external events can amplify existing financial instability. The essay ultimately presents the NYSE as an institution whose responsibilities extend beyond regulating private markets to maintaining confidence in the financial system itself.
Chapter 6 foregrounds the roles of specific individuals to analyze the institutional response to the Haupt crisis. Brooks presents figures such as NYSE President G. Keith Funston and Governor Gustave L. Levy as central to the Exchange’s response, emphasizing how institutional decisions ultimately depend on individual judgment and leadership. Their actions reinforce the theme of Corporate Hierarchies and the Diffusion of Responsibility, illustrating how institutional outcomes emerge through the decisions of individuals operating within complex organizational structures. The core conflict examines the legal duty of creditor banks to their own stakeholders alongside the responsibility to protect the public and stabilize the market. The unprecedented decision to make customers “whole” is presented as a conscious and difficult choice. The essay further shows how responsibility is distributed across individuals, organizations, and financial institutions during periods of crisis. The Exchange’s subsequent reluctance to call the bailout a precedent reflects its effort to preserve public confidence while recognizing the exceptional nature of its intervention.



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