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In 1962, Donald W. Wohlgemuth, a spacesuit engineer at the B. F. Goodrich Company, accepted a higher-paying position with a competitor, International Latex. When Wohlgemuth announced his resignation, Goodrich executives warned that his knowledge of the company’s confidential spacesuit processes could benefit Latex. In a heated exchange with Goodrich’s Wayne Galloway, Wohlgemuth lost his temper and declared, “Loyalty and ethics have their price, and International Latex has paid it” (341)—a remark he later called rash. A subsequent confrontation with Goodrich’s legal department, where he reportedly replied, “How are you going to prove it?” (342), when asked whether he intended to use confidential information, further hardened the company’s position. After Latex agreed to cover any legal costs, Goodrich filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction—a court order—to stop Wohlgemuth from doing spacesuit work for a competitor and from disclosing any confidential processes related to space suits.
The subsequent trial, presided over by Judge Frank H. Harvey, ultimately narrowed to two key questions: whether a court can restrain a former employee from disclosing alleged trade secrets before any disclosure has occurred and whether it can prevent a former employee from taking a new job simply because it creates an opportunity to disclose confidential information. Wohlgemuth’s defense introduced the legal concept of “one free bite” (338), arguing that he shouldn’t be restrained from changing jobs before committing an overt act of disclosing trade secrets. Judge Harvey ultimately agreed, denying Goodrich’s request to block the move to Latex because there was no evidence of wrongful intent on Wohlgemuth’s part.
Goodrich appealed this decision to a higher court. The appellate court partially reversed the initial ruling. It affirmed Wohlgemuth’s right to work for a competitor but also granted an injunction restraining Wohlgemuth from disclosing to Latex the processes and information claimed as trade secrets by Goodrich. Wohlgemuth continued his work at Latex, including in its spacesuit department, but under a court order prohibiting him from disclosing Goodrich’s claimed trade secrets.
This essay follows the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s efforts to defend the British pound sterling during the summer and fall of 1964. Faced with a growing balance-of-payments deficit and political uncertainty surrounding an upcoming election, international speculators began selling off the currency, fearing that its value would be officially lowered in a process known as devaluation. At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, President Alfred Hayes and his vice-president for foreign operations, Charles Coombs, monitored the growing instability. The speculative pressure intensified after Labor won the October election, and a massive speculative attack on November 20 brought the Bank of England to the brink of exhausting its reserves.
The Bank of England raised its lending rate on a Monday instead of the customary Thursday, initially triggering a strong rally. However, by Tuesday, Continental bourses set unfavorable rates, and market participants decided that the Monday timing itself signaled panic, renewing the speculative attack on the pound. With Britain losing reserves at an unsustainable rate, Hayes and Coombs orchestrated a historic international rescue. After securing a $1-billion commitment from the US, they, along with Lord Cromer of the Bank of England, spent a frantic morning on November 25 convincing the central banks of 10 other nations to contribute. They successfully assembled more than a $3-billion credit package, and the announcement immediately restored confidence in the pound.
However, this and subsequent efforts only postponed the inevitable. After three and a half years of fighting to maintain its value, the pound was devalued to $2.40 on November 18, 1967. The speculative pressure immediately shifted to the US dollar, causing a massive run on the US gold supply. France, which had already withdrawn from the gold pool months earlier and was excluded from the crisis talks, was reluctant to participate in the efforts to rescue sterling. To prevent a global monetary collapse, the international “gold pool,” a consortium of central banks that sold gold to stabilize its price, was disbanded in March 1968. This established a new two-tier system: a fixed official price for gold exchanges between central banks and a separate, fluctuating free-market price. While the immediate crisis subsided, the system was fundamentally altered, and the dollar itself was left in a precarious position.
In Chapters 11 and 12, Brooks examines the limits of institutional efforts to manage uncertainty through legal and financial intervention. The legal dispute over trade secrets and the international defense of the sterling are both situations in which organizations attempted to anticipate and control future outcomes despite incomplete certainty. Brooks argues that legal systems and financial institutions can influence events, but their ability to prevent future risks remains inherently limited. The essays further develop the theme of The Illusion of Expert Control, showing that institutional authority cannot eliminate the uncertainty that shapes business and financial decision-making.
Brooks examines the Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth case by focusing on the legal and ethical questions surrounding trade secrets and employee mobility. Rather than treating the dispute solely as a question of legal doctrine, he shows how individual actions and statements shaped the court’s assessment of the case. His heated, “rash answer” that “[l]oyalty and ethics have their price, and International Latex has paid it” is significant because it raises questions about his intentions (341), even though the court ultimately found no evidence of wrongful conduct. Brooks presents the concept of “one free bite” as a way of examining whether legal intervention should prevent potential future misconduct before any actual disclosure has occurred (338).
Brooks examines the coordinated intervention by central bankers such as Alfred Hayes and Charles Coombs, who assembled an unprecedented $3-billion rescue package to stabilize the pound sterling during the 1964 crisis. The temporary recovery in market confidence initially suggests that coordinated international action can stabilize financial markets during periods of speculation. However, the chapter’s conclusion shows that the intervention didn’t resolve the underlying economic weaknesses or speculative pressures, leading to the pound’s eventual devaluation three and a half years later. This outcome suggests that coordinated institutional intervention can delay the effects of deeper structural problems without permanently resolving them. The sterling crisis therefore illustrates the limits of financial intervention when market confidence is shaped by broader economic conditions.
Brooks presents the 1964 sterling crisis through the actions of the central bankers responsible for managing it, grounding complex monetary policy in identifiable individuals and institutional decisions. By focusing on figures such as Hayes and Coombs, he connects international financial policy to the practical challenges of coordinating a multinational response under severe time pressure. Details such as Coombs sleeping at the bank, Hayes balancing professional responsibilities with family life, and the search for a Dutch official on a train illustrate the demands placed on those directing the intervention. This emphasis on individual decision-making makes the operation of international monetary institutions more accessible, showing that large-scale financial systems ultimately depend on the judgments and actions of the people responsible for managing them.
Both essays further develop Brooks’s exploration of Human Nature in Finance by examining how information acquires value through the ways people interpret and respond to it. In Wohlgemuth’s case, the dispute centered on confidential technical knowledge, where the legal issue wasn’t the information itself but whether its possible future use justified judicial intervention. In the sterling crisis, market expectations became equally significant, as speculation was driven by fears of devaluation rather than by the immediate condition of the currency itself. The announcement of the international credit package therefore sought to influence confidence as much as financial conditions, demonstrating that market behavior depended not only on available resources but also on how investors interpreted new information. These essays show that information alone does not determine financial outcomes; its significance depends on the expectations, judgments, and decisions of the individuals who act upon it.



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