Charmides

Charmides is a Socratic dialogue by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. Set in Athens, the dialogue takes the form of a narrated conversation in which Socrates recounts to an unnamed companion his encounter with a remarkable young man and the philosophical investigation that followed. The central question is the nature of sōphrosynē, a Greek term encompassing "moderation," "self-control," and "sound-mindedness," here rendered as "sound-mindedness."

Socrates has just returned from the siege and battle of Potidaea and visits the wrestling school of Taureas, a customary gathering place. Chaerephon, an excitable associate, rushes to ask how Socrates survived the fierce battle and leads him to sit beside Critias, the son of Callaeschrus, a well-born Athenian intellectual and prior associate of Socrates. After relating news from the army, Socrates asks about the state of philosophy and whether any young men have distinguished themselves in wisdom or beauty.

Critias points out a group of youths entering the school. They herald the arrival of Charmides, the son of Critias' uncle Glaucon and Critias' own cousin, reputed to be the most beautiful young man of his generation. Socrates knew Charmides as a boy before departing for the war. When Charmides enters, he causes a commotion: Everyone scrambles to make room beside himself, gazing at the youth as though he were a statue. Socrates tells Critias that Charmides would be irresistible if he also possesses a good soul. Critias affirms that the youth is both philosophic and poetic. Socrates proposes examining Charmides' soul, and Critias devises a pretext: He tells a servant to summon Charmides by saying Critias wishes to introduce him to a doctor for headaches Charmides has been experiencing.

When Charmides arrives, Socrates tells him the remedy for his headache is a certain leaf requiring an accompanying incantation. He explains the logic through a medical analogy: Good doctors say one cannot treat the eyes without treating the head, nor the head without the body. A Thracian doctor of Zalmoxis, a god whose physicians claimed even to grant immortality, taught that one cannot treat the body without treating the soul, since all good and bad things flow from the soul. The soul is treated with "beautiful speeches," from which sound-mindedness arises. Once sound-mindedness is present, health follows easily.

Critias insists that Charmides is already reputed to be the most sound-minded of his contemporaries. Socrates poses his challenge: If sound-mindedness is already present, the incantation is unnecessary; if not, it must come first. Charmides blushes, explaining that denying sound-mindedness would contradict his reputation, while affirming it would seem boastful. Socrates proposes they investigate the question together.

Charmides offers his first definition: Sound-mindedness means doing everything decorously and quietly. Socrates tests this with examples from athletics, music, and mental activities, in all of which swift and vigorous action is more beautiful than slow action. Since sound-mindedness must be beautiful, Charmides concedes it cannot simply be quietness.

Charmides proposes a second definition: Sound-mindedness is respectfulness, or a sense of shame (aidōs). Socrates elicits agreement that sound-mindedness must always be good, then cites Homer's line from the Odyssey: "Respectfulness is not good for a needy man" (XVII 347). Since respectfulness is sometimes not good, it cannot be identical to sound-mindedness. Charmides concedes and introduces a third definition he heard from someone else: Sound-mindedness is "doing one's own things." His glance toward Critias reveals the source.

Socrates notes the definition is riddlesome. A writing teacher writes the names of others, not only his own, yet acts properly. A city requiring each citizen to produce only his own goods would not be well managed. Since a sound-mindedly governed city should be well managed, this literal reading fails.

Critias, who has been anxious to compete, can no longer restrain himself, especially after Charmides prods him by pointing out that his definition has been refuted. Taking over the argument, Critias distinguishes between "making" and "doing," citing the poet Hesiod's dictum that "work is no disgrace." Only beneficial makings qualify as genuine "doings." Sound-mindedness, Critias declares, is the doing of good things.

Socrates presses further. A doctor who produces health does good but does not always know when he is acting beneficially. This means someone could be sound-minded while ignorant of his own sound-mindedness. Critias refuses this conclusion and shifts his position: Sound-mindedness is "recognizing oneself," aligned with the famous Delphic inscription "Know yourself." He interprets the inscription not as moral counsel but as a divine greeting equivalent to "be sound-minded."

Socrates reasons that if sound-mindedness is recognizing something, it must be a kind of knowledge. He asks what subject matter this knowledge addresses. Critias asserts that sound-mindedness is unique: It is a knowledge of itself and of the other knowledges, not of any external subject matter. Socrates adds that it must also be a knowledge of non-knowledge. The full definition emerges: The sound-minded person knows what he knows and what he does not know, and can examine others in the same way.

Socrates then investigates whether such a self-directed knowledge is even possible. He tests the concept through analogies: Is there a seeing that sees itself but no color? A hearing that hears itself but no sound? A love that loves itself but nothing beautiful? In each case, Critias says no. Unable to resolve the question, Socrates proposes they provisionally concede that knowledge of knowledge is possible and examine whether it would be beneficial.

Socrates argues that a knowledge of knowledge can distinguish only that something is a knowledge, not what kind it is. A person with this knowledge would know that he knows something but not what he knows, and could not test whether another person's claimed expertise is genuine, since testing a doctor requires knowledge of health and disease, not merely knowledge that doctoring is a knowledge.

Socrates sketches a hypothetical utopia: If sound-mindedness could determine what one knows and does not know, people would do only what they have expertise in and delegate all else to proper experts. But even granting this ideal, acting knowledgeably does not guarantee happiness. When pressed to identify which knowledge makes a person happy, Critias works through candidates before finally identifying the knowledge of good and bad.

Socrates declares that Critias has been leading him in circles: Happiness depends not on knowledge of knowledge but on the specific knowledge of good and bad. Sound-mindedness, as knowledge of knowledge, cannot itself be the source of benefit. Critias argues that sound-mindedness could preside over the knowledge of the good, but Socrates rejects this, since they have established sound-mindedness as a knowledge only of knowledge and non-knowledge, not of any particular subject matter.

Socrates acknowledges that his fear throughout the investigation was justified. Despite generous concessions, sound-mindedness has been shown to be unbeneficial, a conclusion Socrates finds troubling and suspects is wrong. He believes the failure lies with his own inquiry, not with sound-mindedness itself, which he considers a great good. He tells Charmides that if the youth truly possesses sound-mindedness, he should consider Socrates a poor inquirer.

Charmides responds that he does not know whether he possesses sound-mindedness, since even Socrates and Critias could not discover what it is. But he does not entirely believe Socrates' profession of failure and supposes himself in need of the incantation. He invites Socrates to chant it over him daily for as long as needed. Critias endorses the plan, and Charmides agrees to follow Socrates, saying he must obey Critias, his guardian. When Socrates asks whether Charmides will use violence without granting him a preliminary hearing, Charmides confirms he will, since Critias orders it. Socrates concedes that no one can oppose Charmides if he acts by force and yields without resistance.