Achen and Bartels assert that the principles of conventional democratic theory do not accurately describe how politics functions in the real world. They describe the “folk theory” of democracy, which suggests that citizens’ policy preferences lead to them voting for political candidates who hold similar views, thereby creating a framework for citizens to directly govern themselves. By contrast, Achen and Bartels argue that most people are generally apathetic toward political issues and lack analytical thinking skills to formulate meaningful policy decisions. Instead, most citizens’ voting choices are based on party loyalty and/or family ties rather than analyzing the specific policy positions of candidates. Achen and Bartels also note that although elections may still allow citizens to express some level of dissatisfaction with government performance and leadership, elections cannot be viewed as mechanisms of collective decision-making.

As alternatives to these failed models, Achen and Bartels suggest that democratic politics can best be explained through reference to social identity and group affiliations. They believe that how one identifies with others and associates with groups defines one’s thinking processes, beliefs, and alignment with particular political ideologies.

The authors compare democracy as an idealized concept against the ambiguity of its definition in practical terms. They refer to extensive global survey data that show that many democracies throughout the world have not met the expectations of democratic ideals. Furthermore, the authors acknowledge that despite widespread recognition that democracy is not functioning in reality as well as it should be, both citizens and experts continue to adhere to democracy as an aspirational goal. 

Achen and Bartels also draw upon a long line of scholarly criticisms from thinkers such as Bryce, Lowell, Lippmann, Niebuhr, and Schumpeter, who have demonstrated through surveys that the average citizen is generally uninterested in politics, ideologically inconsistent, and generally unprepared to make informed decisions about complex political issues. The chapter concludes by comparing democracy’s legitimacy as a governing philosophy to the defunct concept of “the divine right of kings” (18), i.e., a justification for authority that continues to maintain power even after being proven invalid.

Achen and Bartels explore what they call the “populist” or “electoral democratic” notion, which states that elections should be able to reveal what policies the people want and implement those preferences into government practice. They discuss how ideas about electoral competition as a method for implementing the will of the people have persisted throughout democratic thought, from Dahl to populists and progressives. Achen and Bartels argue that such ideas have both logical and empirical problems.

Achen and Bartels examine the “Spatial Model,” a way of looking at elections where all voters are located somewhere on an ideological scale, and all parties locate themselves somewhere on that same scale. Parties move toward the middle of the voter distribution. This model is simple and appealing because it allows for clear communication about candidate positions. However, when the issues become complex, the Spatial Model becomes extremely difficult to work with. Voters’ majorities may result in no consensus among the group, or may create a consensus among some groups but create confusion among other groups. 

More fundamentally, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem suggests that even if voters could express their preference orderings clearly, there would still be no guarantee that any procedure for aggregating those orderings would produce a single ordering of alternatives that represent the preference ordering of all members of society. While deliberative mechanisms such as public forums and institutions like Congress can provide some guidance on how to resolve conflicting preferences, they cannot overcome the fundamental problem of how to choose among competing collective choices.

After reviewing the spatial model, Achen and Bartels turn to empirical research that suggests many citizens lack the knowledge, ideological clarity, and stable issue preferences required by the “folk theory,” with most voters identifying more strongly with parties than with a set of political principles. Achen and Bartels also dismiss the possibility that individuals can compensate for informational deficits through heuristic decision-making or aggregation processes. Rather than viewing ignorance and common error as irrelevant to democratic representation, they believe that they can significantly affect election outcomes. 

They also contest the idea of “issue voting,” suggesting that voters typically take the position advocated by their preferred candidate regarding issues, rather than selecting a candidate based on prior beliefs about which policies would best achieve their objectives. They conclude that the policy implications of elections are determined far more by who controls the parties than by fidelity to the median voter’s preferences.

Achen and Bartels analyze major efforts to provide greater direct public control of government through US institutions. They also consider how those efforts have created unintended, counterproductive consequences. 

The authors start out by comparing the Founding Fathers’ views of the potential dangers of direct democracy with the subsequent emergence of a political culture in which “greater democracy” is perceived as the most effective remedy for the failures of democratic government. In this view, reformers continually attempt to diminish the role of intermediaries (e.g., parties, elected officials, legislative bodies) in favor of providing direct access to decision-making processes to ordinary citizens. The authors claim that the desire for direct access to decision-making processes is reflective of the folk theory of democracy, and that it has influenced party reform as well as direct democracy within the US.

Achen and Bartels explore the democratization of party nomination processes, particularly the transition from party-controlled nominating conventions to direct primaries and subsequent reforms (e.g., open primary systems). Reformers believe that these changes will eliminate boss control and lead to more responsive nomination processes among ordinary citizens. However, the authors demonstrate that even after the adoption of these reforms, party professionals, passionate minorities, wealthy special interest groups, and strategic individuals continue to shape nomination outcomes. Furthermore, the authors argue that voters do not possess sufficient information to make decisions based upon the type of criteria that reformers expect them to use.

The authors discuss initiatives and referendums as mechanisms that were originally intended to restore the “absolute sovereignty of the people” (51). They contend that these mechanisms generally transfer power from ordinary citizens to professional politicians, organizational interests, and wealthy elites who create and market ballot measures. Additionally, when a voter-approved initiative appears to reflect a preference held by a majority of citizens, the policy that results from it can be poorly formulated and/or detrimental to society. They cite examples including fluoridation, tax revolts, term limits, and fire protection to illustrate that when citizens vote on issues using initiatives and referendums, they generally base their votes on misinformation/confusion, symbolic concerns, and incomplete knowledge rather than rational assessments.

The authors conclude that there exist very significant costs associated with granting greater direct popular control over governance, specifically when reformers overestimate the capabilities of ordinary citizens and ignore the ongoing need for intermediaries in a representative democracy.