Compare Kripke’s argument for the necessity of origin for individuals, such as Queen Elizabeth II, to his argument for the necessary substance of natural kinds, such as water being H₂O. How do these arguments functions similarly? How are they different?

How does Kripke’s argue that scientific discoveries are necessary truths about the world? How do rigid designators play into his argument?

Kripke’s work is presented as a refutation of the Frege-Russell descriptivist tradition. What failures does Kripke find in the Frege-Russell framework, and how does he argue against them?

Examine the tension within Kripke’s causal-historical theory of reference. Using the “Madagascar” example from the Addenda, analyze how the theory accommodates reference shifts, and discuss whether the power of communal consensus to override an original “baptism” poses a significant challenge to the theory’s core principles.

The text of Naming and Necessity originated as three lectures. Analyze the rhetorical function of Kripke’s informal, conversational tone and direct address to his audience. How do these stylistic choices work alongside his reliance on intuitive reasoning?

Explore the logical relationship between Kripke’s thesis of rigid designation and his defense of metaphysical essentialism. Is it possible to accept that names are rigid designators without also committing to the view that objects have essential properties?

Dissect Kripke’s final argument against the mind-body identity thesis. How does the entire conceptual apparatus developed in the book, including rigid designation and the necessary a posteriori, culminate in his claim that “[P]ain is […] the stimulation of C-fibers” is untenable in a way that “[H]eat is molecular motion” is not (99, 132)?

This guide notes that Ruth Barcan Marcus’s formal proof of the necessity of identity prefigured Kripke’s philosophical argument. In what ways does Kripke’s work go beyond a purely formal proof to build a comprehensive philosophical worldview?