In Chapter 1, Wang contrasts China’s “engineering state” and America’s “lawyerly society” (2). Wang establishes this framework through personal observations made during his time living in both Silicon Valley and China from 2017 onward, noting the stark differences in infrastructure quality and construction capability between the two nations.

Wang argues that China operates as an engineering state, where leaders with technical backgrounds prioritize building and production above all else. He provides detailed evidence of this orientation by pointing out that by 2002, all nine members of China’s Politburo Standing Committee had trained as engineers. General Secretary Hu Jintao studied hydraulic engineering and spent years building dams, while Xi Jinping studied chemical engineering at Tsinghua University. This pattern has continued, with Xi filling leadership positions in his third term with executives from aerospace and weapons ministries. This engineering mindset translates into massive infrastructure achievements: Since 1980, China has built a highway system twice the length of America’s, a high-speed rail network 20 times more extensive than Japan’s, and produces between one-third and one-half of most manufactured goods globally.

In contrast, Wang characterizes the United States as a lawyerly society in which legal professionals dominate government and prioritize process over outcomes. He notes that five of the last ten American presidents attended law school, and at least half of Congress typically holds law degrees, while only a handful of members studied science or engineering. This legal orientation emerged in the 1960s as a necessary corrective to environmental destruction, discriminatory practices, and unchecked corporate power. However, Wang contends that this correction has created two major problems: an obsession with procedural requirements that prevents action, and a systematic bias toward protecting the interests of the wealthy.

Wang illustrates these competing approaches through a concrete comparison: In 2008, both California and China began planning high-speed rail lines of approximately 800 miles. China completed its Beijing-Shanghai line in 2011 for $36 billion, transporting 1.35 billion passengers in its first decade. Meanwhile, California has spent 17 years building only a small segment connecting two Central Valley cities, with current cost estimates reaching $128 billion and projected completion between 2030 and 2033.

The author acknowledges significant problems with China’s engineering approach, particularly its treatment of people as aggregates rather than individuals. He examines this through a thought experiment about two hypothetical citizens: someone born in 1949 who endured the Great Leap Forward famine, the Cultural Revolution, the one-child policy, and zero-COVID lockdowns; versus someone born in 1959 who benefited from university reopenings, economic reforms, and housing privatization. This dramatic variation in life outcomes reflects what Wang calls the “peculiarly jerky rhythms” of the engineering state (9).

Wang also critiques the engineering state’s recent missteps, including the prolonged zero-COVID policy, regulatory crackdowns on technology companies that erased a trillion dollars in corporate value, and policies that triggered a property sector collapse. These actions demonstrate the dangers of concentrated decision-making power and lack of citizen input.

However, Wang maintains that America’s lawyerly society has become equally dysfunctional, though in different ways. He describes how proceduralism has infected not just government but universities and corporations, creating endless committee meetings and compliance requirements that obscure original goals. The system primarily serves wealthy interests, as evidenced by high-rise construction for the rich proceeding smoothly while public transit expansion stalls.

Wang concludes by framing the China–US relationship as a competition between these two governance models, warning that America’s inability to build poses serious strategic risks. He notes that while the United States has deployed lawyers and legal controls against Chinese technology companies, China has responded by elevating more engineers to power. Despite his criticisms of both systems, Wang expresses optimism that both nations can reform and improve their governance approaches.