This chapter examines the mass emigration of Chinese citizens during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, exploring why individuals across different economic classes chose to leave China and what their departures reveal about Xi Jinping’s governance. Dan Wang introduces the concept of “rún,” a Chinese slang term that emerged during the pandemic to describe both fleeing lockdown-heavy cities and emigrating from China entirely.

Wang spent time in Chiang Mai, Thailand, observing young Chinese emigrants who had previously lived in Yunnan province. These individuals—journalists, artists, and tech workers—initially moved to Yunnan seeking relief from Beijing and Shenzhen’s corporate culture and strict pandemic controls. However, as even Yunnan became more restrictive, many relocated to Thailand, where short-term visas are accessible and educational visas can be obtained through taking language or Muay Thai classes. Wang describes how these emigrants balanced seeking pleasure after years of COVID restrictions with pursuing spiritual practices, including intensive meditation retreats and psychedelic experiences.

Through conversations with software developer Yiju and others, Wang learned that emigration decisions stemmed from a fundamental shift in worldview during Xi’s decade of rule. These educated urbanites had expected meaningful careers, expanding freedoms, and greater global integration. Instead, they experienced increasing political controls, menial work despite pleasant city amenities, and pervasive feelings of catastrophe. Many participated in protests against COVID restrictions, faced police questioning, or lost jobs during Beijing’s crackdown on digital platforms and domestic media. Wang describes how some emigrants maintain elaborate deceptions with their parents, pretending to study in Europe while actually living in Thailand.

Wang observes that Shanghai’s foreign population declined substantially even before the pandemic, losing a quarter of long-term residents between 2010 and 2020, with further decreases following lockdowns. Business executives no longer view China postings as pathways to leadership positions, given the country’s political complexities and data controls.

The chapter documents emigration patterns across economic classes. Immigration estimates suggest nearly 14,000 millionaires left China in 2023 and over 15,000 in 2024. Investment-based permanent residency applications doubled in both the United States and Canada between 2019 and the early 2020s. Meanwhile, less affluent Chinese took dangerous routes across the southwestern US border, with border officials apprehending 38,000 Chinese nationals in 2024 (up from 450 in 2021) (176).

Wang connects these emigration trends to Xi’s governance failures. The engineering state creates violent policy swings—from zero-COVID lockdowns to property collapses—that leave citizens feeling unmoored. Xi promotes national greatness, Wang says, without delivering economic growth or enrichment. Wang attributes his own departure to missing pluralism, American friendliness, limited government interference, and the ability to freely access books without censorship.

The chapter concludes with Wang’s evolving perspective on China’s future. When he moved to Hong Kong in 2017, he considered it plausible that the 21st century would be an “Asian century,” with China and India potentially restoring Asia’s historical economic dominance. By 2024, after living through zero-COVID and witnessing Xi’s regulatory assault on digital platforms, Wang better appreciates China’s self-limiting features. The Communist Party’s distrust of its own people restricts their potential for flourishing. Wang argues that while China will succeed in many areas, its system fundamentally limits what the country can achieve.