Dan Wang examines China’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic as a demonstration of both the capabilities and severe limitations of the engineering state. The chapter chronicles three years of China’s zero-COVID policy, which evolved from initial success to catastrophic failure.

The narrative begins with Wang’s personal experience of the pandemic’s early phase in Beijing during 2020. The virus emerged from Wuhan, where local officials initially suppressed information about the outbreak to avoid disrupting political meetings and Lunar New Year celebrations. This pattern of cover-up mirrored previous epidemics (AIDS in the 1990s and SARS in 2003), suggesting systemic political problems despite China’s technically sophisticated disease surveillance infrastructure. The death of Dr. Li Wenliang, who was punished for attempting to warn others about the virus before dying from it himself, sparked widespread anger across Chinese social media.

Wang moved from Beijing to Shanghai at the end of 2020, drawn by the city’s more relaxed atmosphere and commercial vitality. During 2020 and 2021, while much of the world struggled with COVID-19, life in China felt relatively normal. Wang describes attending restaurants and cinemas, cycling around Shanghai, and meeting his future wife Sylvia. The government enforced restrictions gradually—contact tracing apps, mandatory testing, quarantine hotels for international arrivals—but these measures initially seemed tolerable compared to the devastation elsewhere.

The situation deteriorated dramatically in spring 2022 when the highly transmissible Omicron variant reached Shanghai. Despite official denials that the city would lock down, authorities imposed a surprise quarantine on all 25 million residents. The lockdown, initially announced as lasting eight days, extended to eight weeks. Wang argues the government made no actual plans for confining millions of people to their homes, leading to systemic failures. Food supply chains collapsed as truckers faced severe restrictions and delivery services were immobilized. Residents experienced genuine hunger in one of China’s wealthiest cities. Wang’s friend Owen became an informal building representative, organizing group purchases from wholesalers to secure food for neighbors.

The enforcement mechanisms Wang describes reveal the engineering state’s literal-mindedness. Health workers in protective suits (nicknamed “dabai” or “Big Whites”) became symbols of pandemic control. Drones patrolled neighborhoods broadcasting messages to “repress your soul’s yearning for freedom” (138). Authorities tested positive individuals and forcibly removed them to massive quarantine facilities with thousands of beds, then sanitized their apartments. Parents feared separation from young children, pet owners watched as their animals were killed, and people with serious medical conditions struggled to access treatment.

After leaving Shanghai for Yunnan province, Wang reflects on why such extreme measures succeeded. The mountainous, ethnically diverse region of Yunnan, which he characterizes as possibly China’s freest province, provides contrast. The rugged terrain historically protected residents from state control, making strict lockdowns impractical there. This geographic comparison helps Wang understand how the engineering state functions: It can treat urban populations as controllable units but struggles in remote areas.

By fall 2022, after Xi Jinping secured his third term at the Party Congress, protests erupted across China. The deaths of 10 people in an Urumqi fire, where pandemic barricades prevented rescue efforts, catalyzed demonstrations.

In December 2022, the government abruptly abandoned zero-COVID with no explanation or transition planning. The reversal occurred during winter without accelerated vaccinations or adequate preparation of medical facilities. Fever medications remained scarce because authorities had previously restricted them to prevent people from hiding their symptoms. Wang caught COVID on December 23. He estimates China experienced nearly two million excess deaths, though the government reported only 125,000 COVID-related deaths.

Wang concludes that the pandemic experience damaged public trust, particularly among younger Shanghai residents who experienced their first direct encounter with the state’s coercive power. The neighborhood committees that enforced lockdowns have since been repurposed to encourage recently married women to have children, directly linking the surveillance infrastructure developed for zero-COVID to the government’s new pro-natalist agenda.