The Great Contradiction: The Tragic Side of the American Founding

Joseph J. Ellis
51 pages1-hour read
Nonfiction
Book
Adult
Published in 2025

A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.

Part 2, Chapters 6-7Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Content Warning: This section of the guide includes discussion of death, racism, physical abuse, and emotional abuse.

Part 2: “Contexts”

Part 2, Chapter 6 Summary: “The Epilogue”

Following the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the ratification process revealed a deeply divided and provincial America. Rather than a unified national debate, what ensued was a “Great Cacophony” of local arguments, with each state viewing the proposed Constitution through the lens of its own interests. The Anti-Federalists, who favored state sovereignty over a strong central government, initially seemed to hold a majority. However, James Madison, a key Federalist leader, skillfully maneuvered the process. The Convention had established that ratification by just nine states would be sufficient, and Madison recognized that this threshold could create momentum that pressured larger, hesitant states like Virginia and New York. He also took the lead in insisting that all state-proposed amendments were merely non-binding recommendations, forcing a simple “aye” or “nay” vote on the original document. The ratification struggle also led Madison to recognize what Ellis calls the Constitution’s “beauty of ambiguity” (111): Its division of authority between the federal government and the states left contested questions unresolved, with slavery the most consequential among them.


The debate exposed a fundamental disagreement over slavery. James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued that the Constitution’s compromises put slavery on a path to extinction after 1808. In contrast, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina believed that the Constitution had denied the federal government authority to emancipate enslaved people within the states.


This conflict erupted in the first US Congress in 1790 when Quaker delegations and the Pennsylvania Abolition Society submitted antislavery petitions. The latter arrived under Benjamin Franklin’s signature; his actual final public act was publishing a satirical parody as “Historicus.” In response, Representatives James Jackson of Georgia and William Loughton Smith of South Carolina defended slavery by citing economic necessity, constitutional prohibitions, and racial arguments drawn from Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia. Franklin, writing as “Historicus,” satirized their arguments by comparing them to an Algerian pirate’s justification for enslaving Christians.


Ultimately, the Virginia delegation mobilized behind an amended resolution and lobbied northern delegations from Massachusetts and New York to support it, declaring that Congress had “no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the Treatment of them within any of the states” (127). The resolution passed 29-25, setting a precedent that kept federal emancipation of enslaved people within existing states off the national political agenda. The 1790 census soon revealed the consequences of this deferral: The enslaved population was nearing 700,000, up from roughly 500,000 in 1776, and growing exponentially, making comprehensive emancipation increasingly impractical because of the mounting financial and logistical challenges. Ellis concludes that Franklin and the Quaker petitioners pressed for national action against slavery at the last moment when such an effort still had a meaningful prospect of success.

Part 2, Chapter 7 Summary: “The Treaty”

After the Revolutionary War, the US government initially adopted an imperial “conquest theory,” asserting ownership of all Indigenous lands east of the Mississippi. However, Secretary of War Henry Knox persuaded President Washington to pursue a radically different policy. They sought to treat Indigenous tribes as sovereign foreign nations whose land rights must be respected and protected by federal law, envisioning a future of federally protected Indigenous homelands east of the Mississippi.


To test this new approach, they focused on the powerful Creek Nation, led by the shrewd, educated chief Alexander McGillivray—one-quarter Indigenous by ancestry, though regarded by the Creeks as a full member of their nation through his mother’s matrilineal line. A first diplomatic effort failed at Rock Landing in late 1789. Then, in January 1790, the Georgia legislature announced the sale of 24 million acres through the Yazoo companies, threatening to unleash a flood of settlers into Creek territory. The Yazoo scheme threatened both Creek sovereignty and federal authority, creating a common enemy for McGillivray and the Washington administration.


In 1790, McGillivray and a delegation of Creek chiefs traveled to the national capital in New York. They were received with extraordinary ceremony. Knox assumed primary responsibility for the negotiations, joined by the recently arrived Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, whose main documented contributions were legal memoranda arguing that Yazoo claims were illegal and that the Creeks constituted a foreign nation. The resulting Treaty of New York established a large, federally protected Creek homeland, with the US seeking to supplant Spain as the Creeks’ main ally. The federal government also guaranteed Creek territory against encroachment. Secret articles granted McGillivray the rank of brigadier general at an annual salary of $1200, with lesser Creek chiefs receiving lesser amounts.


Despite the leaders’ sincere efforts, the treaty failed almost immediately. The new federal government was powerless to stop thousands of white settlers, encouraged by Georgia, from illegally pouring across the guaranteed borders. Washington was infuriated by these “lawless” citizens but recognized the government’s inability to stop them. Ellis attributes the failure to the relentless demographic pressure of westward expansion and the limited power of the new federal government to restrain settlers and enforce its treaty commitments. He concludes that these forces overwhelmed diplomacy and made the tragic fate of Indigenous communities east of the Mississippi inevitable.

Part 2, Chapters 6-7 Analysis

Ellis places the failures over slavery and the ongoing land theft and genocide against Indigenous peoples within the tragic framework introduced at the beginning of the book, while assigning different degrees of agency to the historical actors involved. The closing opportunity for federal action against slavery leaves greater room for human responsibility: Ellis emphasizes the political choices that allowed an existing possibility for reform to disappear. His treatment of Indigenous dispossession gives greater weight to forces beyond the control of individual leaders. Although George Washington and Henry Knox pursued what they regarded as a just accommodation, Ellis uses hindsight carefully, emphasizing that an outcome that appears inevitable retrospectively did not appear so to those confronting it. This distinction allows Ellis to examine historical responsibility without treating every failure of the revolutionary generation as equally avoidable. The pairing therefore develops the book’s central question about tragedy by distinguishing between the effects of political choice and the limits imposed by historical circumstances.


Ellis portrays James Madison as a central figure in the political containment of the slavery question. Madison’s procedural skill becomes significant because Ellis connects it to the preservation of sectional cooperation in the face of disagreement over slavery. His description of Madison’s “enlightened obfuscation” is especially revealing: The resulting verbal “fog bank” allowed the slavery question to be managed without resolving the underlying conflict. Ellis thus makes Madison’s language itself part of the analysis, showing how ambiguity could serve a political purpose when greater clarity threatened sectional cooperation. The eventual congressional settlement develops The Deferral of Emancipation for Political Unity, as federal action against slavery within the states was effectively removed from the national agenda at what Ellis later identifies as the last possible moment when decisive action still had a meaningful prospect of success. The episode also gives constitutional ambiguity a consequential political function: The same flexibility that preserved sectional cooperation also allowed slavery within the states to remain beyond federal intervention.


Ellis discusses land theft and genocide against Indigenous peoples through the tension between historical possibility and retrospective inevitability. Although the demographic forces driving white settlement make Indigenous dispossession appear inevitable in hindsight, he emphasizes that the historical actors themselves did not initially perceive that outcome as predetermined. Washington and Knox therefore become important to Ellis’s argument because their commitment to recognizing Indigenous sovereignty and land rights demonstrates that a different federal policy was seriously pursued. The failure of the Treaty of New York exposes the limits of that political commitment: Federal authority proved insufficient to enforce treaty guarantees against continuing white settlement. Washington’s observation that “scarcely anything short of a Chinese wall w[ould] restrain” the settlers conveys his recognition of this limitation (166). Ellis’s conclusion that “demography trumped diplomacy” develops the theme of Demographic Pressures and the Limits of Reform (136), showing how the scale of westward migration increasingly exceeded the federal government’s capacity to enforce its own policy. His emphasis on hindsight preserves the significance of the choices made by Washington and Knox while explaining why those choices ultimately proved unable to alter the demographic trajectory of American expansion.


Throughout these chapters, Ellis uses historical figures and their conflicting viewpoints to expose competing understandings of the new republic’s authority and principles. In the debate over the Constitution’s meaning, James Wilson’s belief that the document placed slavery on a path toward extinction contrasts with Charles Cotesworth Pinckney’s confidence that federal authority couldn’t interfere with slavery within the states. Their incompatible interpretations illustrate Ellis’s “Great Cacophony” and demonstrate the significance of what he calls the Constitution’s “beauty of ambiguity” (111): The document allowed unresolved sectional disagreements to persist within a shared political framework. Ellis develops a related problem of sovereignty through the conflict between federal Indigenous policy and Georgia’s territorial ambitions. Here, the question of federal authority acquires an imperial dimension, reflected in Ellis’s question, “[H]ow could a republic be an empire?” (138). The contradiction between republican principles and American claims over Indigenous lands places Indigenous policy within the same broader inquiry into the limits of revolutionary ideals. Across the two chapters, constitutional ambiguity and contested sovereignty allow Ellis to connect the disputes over slavery and Indigenous lands to a common problem: The new republic claimed national authority while leaving fundamental conflicts over the exercise and limits of that authority unresolved.

blurred text
blurred text
blurred text

Get in-depth, chapter-by-chapter summaries and analysis from our literary experts.

  • Grasp challenging concepts with clear, comprehensive explanations
  • Revisit key plot points and ideas without rereading the book
  • Share impressive insights in classes and book clubs