The Great Contradiction: The Tragic Side of the American Founding

Joseph J. Ellis
51 pages1-hour read
Nonfiction
Book
Adult
Published in 2025

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Themes

Content Warning: This section of the guide includes discussion of racism, physical abuse, and emotional abuse.

White Supremacy as a Foundational Assumption

In The Great Contradiction, Ellis argues that beliefs in white supremacy were pervasive among the white population during the American founding and profoundly constrained the political possibilities for racial equality. This deeply ingrained racial prejudice made the concept of a multiracial republic unacceptable to much of the white population, thereby constricting the moral and political options available to the nation’s architects. Belief in inherent Black inferiority shaped local laws and national policy, limiting the extent to which many white Americans were willing to extend the revolutionary promise of equality to Black Americans.


This worldview is evident in the private writings and public actions of prominent Founders, although their racial views weren’t necessarily static. Benjamin Franklin, in his 1751 Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, expressed a clear preference for peopling America by “excluding all blacks and tawneys, of increasing the lovely white and red” (3), though he later became acting president of the Pennsylvania Abolitionist Society and publicly advocated abolition. Thomas Jefferson, the author of the nation’s creed, articulated a formal theory of Black inferiority in his Notes on the State of Virginia. He concluded that Black people were inferior “in the endowments of both mind and body” (184), a conviction that led him to insist that emancipation must be followed by “expatriation,” or the physical removal of freed Black people from America. Jefferson simultaneously condemned the injustice of slavery and regarded racial coexistence as impossible, illustrating how racist assumptions constrained the solutions that even some opponents of slavery were willing to contemplate.


The power of this white-supremacist ideology is evident in public opposition to measures that challenged slavery and the racial hierarchy. In 1769, when a young Jefferson drafted a bill to allow Virginian enslavers to manumit their enslaved people without government permission, his senior colleague Richard Bland introduced it and faced intense opposition; according to Jefferson, Bland’s political career never recovered. The popular backlash in the press was just as fierce, with letters to newspapers expressing explicitly racist views about the humanity and inferiority of enslaved Africans. This widespread public racism created a political environment where advocating for emancipation could amount to political ruin, demonstrating that racist beliefs extended beyond political elites into the broader white population, including those who weren’t enslavers.


Ultimately, this foundational assumption of white supremacy shaped some Southern states’ decisions during the Revolutionary War. Political leaders in South Carolina and Virginia resisted proposals to arm enslaved men, even in moments of military crisis. South Carolina’s legislature, when presented with John Laurens’s plan to raise an all-Black regiment of enslaved men who would receive their freedom in return for military service, reacted with incredulity and outrage, despite support for the proposal from George Washington and the Continental Congress. Similarly, Virginia’s legislature offered bounties payable in enslaved people to attract white recruits but rejected the alternative of freeing enslaved men to serve as soldiers. In both states, political leaders were willing to accept serious military risks rather than challenge the existing racial hierarchy, demonstrating how deeply racial prejudice constrained their responses even during wartime.

The Deferral of Emancipation for Political Unity

The Founders’ approach to slavery, as detailed in The Great Contradiction, was defined by repeated decisions to defer the issue when confronting it threatened political unity. Ellis argues that prominent members of the revolutionary generation treated slavery as a dangerously divisive issue whose resolution could threaten the unity required first to secure independence and later to sustain the new republic. This strategy of deferral reflected the belief that preserving sectional unity required accommodation with the enslaving states and repeatedly shaped national political decisions from the First Continental Congress through the Constitution and its aftermath.


This pattern of deferring the slavery question to preserve political unity emerged early in the revolutionary movement. To maintain what they called “The Cause,” the Continental Congress sought to prevent slavery from becoming a divisive political issue. In 1774, the First Continental Congress included enslaved Africans in its boycott of British imports and pledged to discontinue the trafficking of enslaved people. Ellis notes, however, that the surviving records do not reveal how the delegates reached this agreement. South Carolina was known to oppose restrictions on the trafficking of enslaved people, while rice, its principal export, was excluded from the boycott of American exports, suggesting that political accommodation may have helped preserve intercolonial unity. Two years later, Congress deleted Thomas Jefferson’s paragraph attacking slavery and the trafficking of enslaved people from the Declaration of Independence. Although Ellis identifies stylistic problems with the passage as one reason for its removal, its deletion also removed the divisive slavery question from the document at the moment when Congress was seeking agreement on independence. Together, these episodes illustrate an emerging pattern in which national leaders repeatedly avoided sustained confrontation with slavery when they believed it threatened political unity.


The Constitutional Convention of 1787 extended the pattern of deferral by accommodating slavery within the nation’s legal framework through a series of compromises. The Three-Fifths Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and, most critically, the protection of the Atlantic Slave Trade until 1808 each accommodated slavery, although they emerged from different political negotiations. The Atlantic Slave Trade compromise most clearly reflected the priority placed on preserving sectional unity. As South Carolina delegates John Rutledge and Charles Pinckney made clear, their state would “never receive the plan if it prohibit[ed] the slave trade” (101). Enough delegates from the Northern states ultimately accepted the compromise to secure agreement on the Constitution, despite vocal opposition to slavery and the trafficking of enslaved people from several delegates. These constitutional accommodations allowed the new federal government to be established without resolving the conflict between slavery and the revolutionary principles of liberty and equality.


This strategy culminated in 1790, when the first federal Congress effectively closed the door on federal efforts to promote emancipation within the existing enslaving states. In response to abolitionist petitions from Quakers and the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, whose petition was signed by Benjamin Franklin, James Madison helped secure a congressional resolution declaring that Congress lacked authority to intervene in emancipation within the states. The final report declared that Congress had “no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in Treatment of them within any of the states” (127). This decision transformed the earlier strategy of deferral into an enduring congressional precedent, removing emancipation within the existing states from the federal political agenda. For Ellis, the 1790 settlement demonstrates how preserving sectional unity repeatedly took precedence over confronting the unresolved conflict between slavery and the revolutionary commitment to liberty.

Demographic Pressures and the Limits of Reform

In The Great Contradiction, Ellis shows how demographic change increasingly constrained efforts to address slavery and the dispossession of Indigenous lands. The enslaved African American population continued to grow, while white settlement expanded westward into Indigenous territory. Both developments made reform more difficult over time. Demographic changes magnified the consequences of earlier political decisions and racial assumptions, making problems left unresolved during the founding era harder to address over time.


This demographic constraint was especially apparent in proposals that tied emancipation to the removal of freed Black Americans. The 1790 census revealed a population of nearly 700,000 enslaved people, and Ellis emphasizes that the African American population had become self-sustaining and would continue to grow even without further importation through the Atlantic Slave Trade. The implications of this demographic growth became especially apparent decades later in Thomas Jefferson’s insistence that emancipation be accompanied by expatriation. Because Jefferson believed that freed Black Americans should be removed from the US, he eventually calculated that transporting 1.5 million people over a 25-year period would cost $900 million, a figure so immense that he concluded it was “impossible to look at this question a second time” (184-85). Ellis describes Jefferson’s insistence on expatriation as a form of “self-imposed paralysis” (184): During the 25 years required to carry out such a plan, the enslaved population would double. 


The calculation exposed the impracticality of Jefferson’s solution and showed how delaying action had made his preferred form of emancipation still harder to carry out. Demographic growth also became tied to the economic interests sustaining slavery. Virginia enslavers could profit by selling enslaved people to expanding markets farther south, while the constitutional compromise preventing Congress from prohibiting the Atlantic Slave Trade until 1808 permitted further importation. Ellis notes that more than 200,000 enslaved Africans were imported between 1788 and 1808, increasing the enslaved population and strengthening the political power of the South.


Population growth also shaped Ellis’s account of the failure to protect Indigenous lands. The Treaty of New York, negotiated in 1790 between the Washington administration and the Creek Nation, was an important attempt to recognize and federally protect a substantial Creek territory east of the Mississippi. The federal government recognized the Oconee River as the eastern boundary of Creek territory, but continued white settlement and opposition from the State of Georgia undermined its ability to enforce the agreement. Washington complained that the settlers were a “lawless set of unprincipled wretches” and that nothing short of a “Chinese wall” could restrain settler encroachment on “Indian Country” (165-66). Ellis places this failure within a broader population shift. He notes that the white American population was doubling approximately every 25 years, while the Indigenous population was declining at roughly the same rate. The federal government lacked the military resources and political authority needed to prevent continued encroachment on Creek territory. In Ellis’s account, population growth intensified pressures that the federal government was increasingly unable to contain, while earlier political decisions and institutional limitations continued to shape the outcome.

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